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Abstract 
As a "new world order" dawned with the end of the Cold War, traditional 
peacekeeping was adapted as a conflict management tool to fit a wide range of 
conflict conditions in a new security environment. Although this environment 
was drastically different from the one in which peacekeeping in its classical form 
was practiced, the sense of enthusiasm that swept over world leaders with the 
War's end and with a number of peacekeeping successes allowed it to become the 
United Nation's (UN) most visible instrument. Thus, from Cambodia to El 
Salvador to Angola, peacekeepers were placed in an array of conditions in an 
increasing number of conflict zones. Their responsibilities were also expanded 
after the publication of then-Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali's An 
Agenda for Peace. This opened the door to conflict resolution through 
peacekeeping that included political, military, civilian, and humanitarian 
elements within a single peace operation. The UN found itself in hostile 
situations in which military force was necessary to enforce the peace and it 
struggled to keep up with the demand and scope of peace operations. 
Conflicts in Africa proved especially difficult to bring under control. The 
peacekeeping failures in Somalia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively 
brought UN peacekeeping under intense scrutiny and triggered an international 
withdrawal from multilateral UN-led operations on the continent until the end of 
the decade. Indeed, Somalia and Rwanda illustrate the intricate difficulties of 
contemporary conflicts in Africa and complex peace support missions. 
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The West's \,vithdrawal contributed to the grm\'ing driye to\\'ards regional 
organisations taking on peacekeeping activities once performed exclusively by the 
UN. An increased confidence in "African solutions to African problems" has 
worked in tandem with this retreat. In West Africa, the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) took on the challenge and has been especially 
active in the field of peacekeeping. Its first improvised peacekeeping operation in 
1990 in Liberia provides one of the case studies examined in this thesis. The 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) second mission in Sierra Leone and its 
more recent experience in Cote d'Ivoire are the other two instances that 
demonstrate ECOWAS and ECOMOG's progress as well as its many challenges. 
They also provide the setting for significant unilateral involvement by the world's 
major powers, namely the United States, Britain, and France. 
In spite of its lengthy security presence in the region, ECOMOG's efforts 
were impeded by complex alliances among member-states, perceptions of its 
partiality, and by its lack of institutional structure, peacekeeping experience, and 
logistical, military, and financial capabilities. Substantial international support 
did not come from the UN or the major powers until 1999, and did not reach a 
significant level until 2000, with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNAMSIL). 
Although the internal politics of various ECOWAS members has changed 
in the last 17 years, these same difficulties continue to challenge the regional 
organisation. Thus, the actual quality of the responses, which remains dubious, 
overshadows the questions that many have on the desirability of a division of 
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labour v.ith the UN. The most critical issue that the cases underline is the 
necessity of active UN support and collaboration with sub-regional peace efforts. 
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Introduction 
The Context 
Successful United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in the late 1980s 
in Namibia, Cambodia, and Iraq made peacekeeping the organisation's 
centrepiece for conflict management in a range of varying scenarios. However, 
the Cold War's end in 1989 brought significant changes to the international 
security environment. Traditional peacekeeping, as practiced during the Cold 
War, proved unable to effectively cease or control contemporary conflicts. These 
conflicts are generally characterised by state failure, ethnic violence, and human 
rights violations. Their effects, often manifested through mass refugee flows, 
arms trafficking, and cross-border raids, spill over into neighbouring countries 
and have brought disorder to many regions of the globe. 
In the immediate post-Cold War era, the UN demonstrated a strong 
penchant for peace operations, as the organisation intervened in wars within 
states for the first time in its history. However, consecutive high-profile 
peacekeeping disasters in Somalia and Rwanda in 1993 and 1994 respectively 
sealed the fate of African conflicts and extinguished the international 
community's post-Cold War fervour for such operations!. In particular, the UN 
Security Council members' growing reluctance to commit their own soldiers to 
UN missions neutralised the organisation and impacted negatively on its ability 
I Sens, Allen G., "From Peacekeeping to Peace-building: The United Nations and the Challenge of 
Intrastate War," in Price, Richard M., and Zacher, Mark W. (eds.) The United Nations and Global 
Security (New York: Palgraye Macmillan, 2004), p. 143. It is widely believed that the failures of the UN 
Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in the Former Yugoslavia also contributed significantly to the 
international community's disillusionment with UN peacekeeping at this time. 
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to manage conflicts in the mid -1990S. Declarations of the UN's inefficiency and 
redundancy set in motion appeals for reform. 
The UN's waning affected Africa more severely than other regions, as its 
decreased strategic value led to its virtual abandonment by Western states 
despite the need and demand for peace operations to manage its ongoing wars. 
In an attempt to fill the security gap left by the West, Africa's regional and sub-
regional organisations were exceptionally active in pursuing a conflict 
management role. In West Africa, where inter-related conflicts engulfed virtually 
the entire region in the 1990S, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) has been especially active, launching peace operations independently 
of the world organisation. Its efforts stand out, as ECOW AS has gained 
substantial experience through four operations in its neighbourhood in the last 17 
Thesis Objectives 
There is a substantial amount of literature written on how to reconcile the 
relationship between regional organisations and the UN. It is not the aim ofthis 
work to offer solutions to the challenges of this relationship. Rather, this thesis 
offers a description ofthe relations between ECOWAS, the UN, and the major 
powers involved in the management of conflicts in West Africa in the post-Cold 
War era. The focus is therefore on the dynamics between these actors as shown 
through their cooperation and coordination, or lack thereof, in the peace 
2 The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) has operated peace missions in Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Imire. 
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missions in the region. During the course of this account, the following empirical 
questions are raised: what were the relations among these actors during the 
conflict management process and what are the criticisms of those relations? 
These questions are considered through a survey of primary and secondary 
literature on peace operations, as these missions have become the most visible 
tool used by African regional and sub-regional organisations, as well as the UN, 
to manage conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Indeed, the successes and failures 
that peacekeeping operations have produced have significantly tested the 
relations among all these actors. The ECOW AS and UN peace operations in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'lvoire are used as empirical case studies in this 
examination. 
Justification of the Topic 
I. The Politics of Peace Operations 
In spite of being a primarily military undertaking, peace operations are in 
fact a highly political activity, as the "decision to respond to a given situation [and 
how to respond] is a political one."3 Thus, they are also a means of projecting 
power in areas of strategic or vital concern, as the case studies will demonstrate. 
As such, the decision to send, withhold, or withdraw peacekeepers imbues a 
powerful political message indicating significant or limited commitment and, 
hence, strategic interest. 
3 Boulden, .Jane, Peace Enforcement: The United Nations Experience in Congo, Somalia, and Bosnia 
(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2001), p. 4. 
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Africa today remains the poorest continent on the globe. It is 
simultaneously overwhelmed by devastating wars that have defied regional and 
international actors alike. Since the end of the Cold War, the continent has found 
itself in a situation of strategic irrelevance. Yet, it has been the setting for some 
of the UN's greatest peacekeeping failures and successes in the post-Cold War 
era. It has also seen significant unilateral intervention from the world's major 
powers, namely the United States (US), Britain, and France. Such circumstances 
make it a particularly relevant region for the study of peace operations. 
II. The Present Practice of Peacekeeping 
Peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era have varied 
considerably in shape, size, make-up, and purpose. The world has seen 
contradictory actions by international actors in the name of bringing peace to 
conflict areas: the US ipso facto invaded Iraq on the grounds of 
humanitarianism; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) bombed the 
former Yugoslavia to stop ethnic cleansing; private military companies (PMCs) 
are engaged independently in conflicts throughout Africa; and the UN has 
actively participated in peace-building activities in Cambodia and El Salvador but 
has also been engaged militarily in Somalia. The practice of peacekeeping, 
therefore, has evolved into a confusing exercise involving a range of international, 
national, and sub-state actors carrying out military, political, and civilian 
activities. It is the aim of this work to clarify this empirical situation by 
identifying the actions of the major actors as well as how they were criticised for 
these actions in the context of regional peace operations. 
III. From International to Regional Peace Operations: 
4 
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The Progression 
i) The End ofthe Cold War 
The end of the Cold War allowed national interest, rather than ideology or 
Superpower alliances, to determine states' actions. There was a sense of 
optimism amongst the world's leading powers, who hoped that these national 
interests would converge on the UN, allowing it to perform as envisaged, released 
from the immobilising grasps of Cold War rivalries. US President George H.W. 
Bush led the pack by proclaiming the beginning of a "new world order"4. The 
international cooperative spirit facilitated a dramatic increase in UN activity and 
involvement across the globe in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Between 1991 
and 1994, UN peacekeeping operations worldwide spurted from eight to 
eighteen; a testimony to international collaboration, to the rise in the demand for 
peacekeeping operations worldwide, and to peacekeeping's increased prominence 
as a UN mechanism for conflict resolution. Traditional UN peacekeeping has 
since been used, adapted, and expanded beyond the simple interposition of a 
small number of passive and unarmed observers to include more complex and 
more robust uses of military resources to achieve a range of political and 
humanitarian objectives. 
ii) The United States and the United Nations in Somalia and Rwanda 
Following a successful intervention in Iraq in 1991, the US offered to lead a 
UN humanitarian intervention into Somalia, where a severe drought and inter-
clan warfare was impeding the delivery of humanitarian aid, contributing to a 
4 Bush, George H.W., "The World after the Persian Gulf War," address before joint session of Congress, 
6 March 1991. As quoted in MacKinnon, Michael G., The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy Under 
Clinton: A Faim·eather Friend? (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 14. 
5 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
p
 To
wn
faminc that had not been seen since the carly 1980s in Ethiopia. The mission was 
cast as "the ideal test case" for UN-US cooperation and leadership in a new and 
cyolying world orders. However, the deaths of eighteen American Rangers on 3 
October 1993 and the brutal images of a mutilated American soldier being 
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by a crowd of Somalis led the 
American government to immediately withdraw its support from the operation. 
This decisive political and military failure6 caused a major shift in Washington's 
attitude towards such larger and complex operations and led to a complete 
revision of US President Bill Clinton's policy of assertive multilateralism. The 
resulting policy guideline outlined in Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive-2S 
(PDD-2S), which was essentially "a formula for non-action in any ... future 
crisis"7, set strict conditions on any future American involvement in UN-led peace 
operations. Thus, without having stabilised the Somali conflict, the UN and other 
states quickly withdrew from Somalia. 
No other peace mission than that of Somalia played a more integral role 
in, and indeed formed the basis for, the UN and American retreat from peace 
operations in Africa in the mid-1990s. A desire to be seen as doing "something" 
coupled with an extreme reluctance for involvement and an aversion to supply 
the adequate means to meet these ends replaced the short-lived optimism. The 
3 .Jonah, James, "Humanitarian Intervention," in Weiss, Thomas, and Minear, Larry, (eds.), 
Humanitarianism Across Borders: Sustaining Chilians in Times of War (London: L}l1ne Rienner, 
1993), p. 75. See also Hutchison, Mark R., "Restoring Hope: UN Security Council Resolutions for 
Somalia and an Expanded Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention," Harvard International Law 
Journal 34 (Spring 1993): 624-40. 
6 Woods, James L., "U.S. Decisionmaking during Operations in Somalia" in Clarke, Walter, and Herbst, 
Jeffrey, (eds.), Learning from Somalia: The Lessons of Armed Humanitarian IntelYention (Boulder: 
West,iew Press, 1997), p. 164. 
-Urquhart, Brian, forward to MacKinnon, The Evolution of US Peacekeeping Policy under Clinton, p. 
\111. 
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majority of Western peacekeeping efforts for the remainder ofthe 1990S thus 
turned away from Africa, which bore little threat or strategic importance to the 
world's major powers, towards other crises materialising in Europe. The Somalia 
operation is therefore treated as the trigger event for Western withdrawal from 
further peace missions until the end of the decade. 
The UN's experience in Somalia unquestionably shaped its inaction just 
months later in Rwanda, another African country of no strategic consequence to 
any nationS, when in March of 1994, Hutu government forces initiated genocide 
against the country's moderate Hutu and Tutsi population. Traumatised by the 
events in Somalia, the Security Council responded by ordering the retreat of the 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR). A skeletal core of 270 
was left with "a mandate that allowed them to do little more than hunker down 
behind their sandbags and watch"9 while an estimated 800,000 civilians were 
brutally killed within three months. Again, as in Somalia and Bosnia, the UN sat 
as a spectator to the unfolding tragedy. 
These (and other) peacekeeping failures in the early 1990S attracted 
negative attention for UN peacekeeping and exacerbated Africa's post-Cold War 
plight of strategic unimportance. The mounting political and material costs for 
peacekeeping operations in the region, the major powers' unwillingness to 
commit the necessary material or political support, perceptions of unsolvable 
age-old tribal conflicts, and a seeming endlessness to conflict throughout the 
continent effectively terminated peacekeeping operations in Africa after 1994. 
8 Shawcross, William, Deliyer Us from E\'i1: Peacekeepers. Warlords. and a World of Endless Conflict 
(New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 2000), p. 128. 
9 Goure\;tch, Philip, We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: 
Stories from Rwanda (New York: Picador, 1998), p. 150. 
7 
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Save for select missions in Angola (1991-1999), Libya (May 1994), and 
Mozambique (1992-1994), the size and frequency of UN peace operations in 
Africa decreased drastically. The number of UN peacekeepers on the continent 
fell from more than 30,000 during 1993 to under 2,000 at its lowest point in 
iii) The Regionalisation of Peace Operations 
Motivated as much by sheer necessity as by a desire to find "African 
solutions to African problems", a cocktail of actors, and in particular Africa's 
regional and sub-regional organisations, moved to fill the security gap left by the 
UN and the world's leading states. This development follows a global trend that 
has seen a significant increase in peacekeeping efforts made at the regional level. 
Thus, while only six "non-UN missions" took place worldwide in the 40 years 
between 1948 and 198811 , 10 such missions were being fielded by 199712 • Less 
than a decade later, in 2005, there were no fewer than 19 regional peace 
operations taking place in the world13. 
Similarly, in Africa prior to 1990, there had been few peacekeeping 
operations ventured by regional organisations; a total of three had been 
10 Berman, Eric G., "Recent Dewlopments in US Peacekeeping Policy and Assistance to Africa," 
African Security Review 13:2 (2004). Available at 
http://\\'\'\·.iss.co.za/pubs/asr /13N 02/CBerman.htm 
11 Mays, Terry M., Historical Dictional}' of Multinational Peacekeeping (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 
Inc., 2004), p. X\ii. There is little data on non-UN missions that is publicly a\·ailable. The New York 
Uniwrsity-based Centre on International Cooperation, with the support of the UN Department of 
Peacekeeping and the Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, is currently in the process of compiling 
comprehensiw data on this type of mission from 1948 onwards. See Centre on International 
Cooperation, Annual Re\iew of Global Peace Operations, 2006 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2006) for 
more information on this and on current UN and non-UN missions. 
12 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Peace, Security and Conflict Preyention: SIPRI-
UNESCO Handbook (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 46-50. 
l:l See Centre on International Cooperation, pp. 154-159. 
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supported by t\-\'o organisations - the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) '-1 and 
the Treaty of Non-Aggression Assistance and Mutual Defence (ANAD)15. 
However, since 1990 to the present, a number of Africa's sub-regional 
organisations, in addition to the OAU, have fielded no fewer than nine peace 
operations on the continent!6. It is notable that over half of these missions have 
taken place in the West African region, which has been described as "an 
interconnected web of instability"!? because conflicts have tended to spill over 
and spread from one state to the other. The region's permeable borders facilitate 
this, as well as the free flow of weapons and the export of former-combatants 
between the various war zones, causing sizable obstacles to any and all conflict 
management and resolution efforts. Nevertheless, amidst this "web of 
instability", ECOWAS has vigorously attempted to manage the region's conflicts 
since 1990. It devolved peacekeeping initiatives from the UN when no other body 
was willing. 
The high propensity of peacekeeping operations in West Africa is 
significant for two reasons. Firstly, it reveals that the region's security 
mechanism is a relatively new one, as all of ECOWAS' peacekeeping experience 
has been acquired in the last 17 years alone. Secondly, and more importantly, it 
14 The OAU "'as transformed into the African Union (AU) in 2002. 
15 The OAU sent peacekeepers to Chad in 1980 and ANAD was present in Burkina Faso and Mali in 
1986. 
16 This includes the Southern African Development Community's (SADC) missions in Lesotho and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa's (CEMAC) mission in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2002, ECOWAS' peace operations 
in Liberia (1990), Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998), Guinea (2000), and Cote d'I\'oire (2002), 
and the African Union's (AU) Mission in Sudan (2005). It should be noted that mediation efforts and 
obser\'er missions, such as the OAU's observer missions in Rwanda (1990-1993), Burundi (1993), in 
the Comoros (1997), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1999), and in Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000), 
are excluded here. 
1- Adebajo, Adekeye, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia. Sierra Leone. and Guinea-Bissau (Boulder: 
Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 15. 
9 
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demonstrates that regional peacekeeping in Wcst Africa, as wcll as the rest ofthe 
world, is a relatively new activity that warrants particular examination. 
Conceptual Definitions and Terminology 
UN peacekeeping terminology was first formed in 1992 by then-Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his work An Agenda for Peace. Its language 
has since become near-universally accepted. Boutros-Ghali outlined four phases 
for international action: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and 
post-conflict peacebuilding. Preventive diplomacy is seen as an initial means of 
containing and preventing disputes from escalating into full-scale conflict, 
limiting the spread of such conflicts to other states and to the greater region. It 
can include fact-finding missions, mediation, confidence-building measures, and 
preventive deployment. However, once a conflict has erupted, it is the 
peacemakers who are to engage in bringing hostiles to an agreement through 
peaceful means. Where the fighting has ceased, peacekeepers, which Boutros-
Ghali argued may be military, police, as well as civilian, are to preserve the peace, 
even if fragile, while the peacemakers pursue a diplomatic settlement. In An 
Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General defined peacekeeping as "the 
deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of 
all the parties concerned"18. This articulation of the term first opened the door to 
the possibility that consent in future operations may not be required. 
An Agenda for Peace introduced the concept of post-conflict 
peacebuilding. This stage follows the cessation of hostilities and aims to 
18 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking. and 
Peacekeeping (17 June 1992), paragraph 20. Available at http://ww\\·.ul1.org/docs/SG/agpeace.html 
10 
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revitalise and consolidate peace in order to prevent a relapse into conflict. The 
ultimate goal of this stage is the building or rebuilding of foundations for a long 
lasting peace that is more than just the absence of war. This necessitates the 
establishment or re-establishment of a stable, independent, and legitimate 
functioning government. Activities that fall under peacebuilding are 
disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes for former 
combatants, restoring institutional infrastructure destroyed by conflict, and the 
repatriation of refugees. 
On the heels of An Agenda for Peace came peacekeeping operations that 
expressed a combination of military, civilian, and humanitarian elements. They 
have since been labelled complex peacekeeping, multi-dimensional peacekeeping, 
multi-functional, and second-generation peacekeeping operations. Other 
operations, though still mandated in the name of keeping the peace, did not 
require consent from the belligerents and were therefore, by nature, more 
combat-oriented. These missions, known as peace-enforcement, differed 
fundamentally from peacekeeping in its classical sense. 
The typology of peace operations under consideration in this paper are of 
the post-Cold War multi-functional variety, many of which also have a peace-
enforcement dimension. The general term of 'peacekeeping' is often misused by 
the media and political leaders as an all encompassing term for the full range of 
activities from peace-enforcement to humanitarian intervention, which are not 
peacekeeping in its traditional sense. An effort has been made to distinguish 
between these theoretically and practically distinct activities. However, because 
more recent peace operations have had a propensity to slip between 
11 
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peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, the terms 'peace operation' and 'peace 
mission' are used as an inclusive term to refer to the full range of multilateral 
first, second, and third generation operations designed to provide political, 
military, and civilian services to prevent or settle disputes in terms of Chapters VI 
and VII of the UN Charter. Included under this broad term are peacemaking, 
peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peace-building. These more specific 
terms are defined in accordance with the UN, and in particular, with An Agenda 
for Peace from 1992 and its Supplement, written in 1995. 
The term 'regional peace operations' is used to refer to peace operations 
that are undertaken by formal regional or sub-regional arrangements that are 
also recognised as such. It must be noted that regional peace operations are often 
equated with hegemonic peace operations. As the driving force of a regional 
peace operation, a regional hegemon is also able to steer the mission according to 
its own agenda, as other member-states lack the capability to act as an effective 
counterbalance19 . 
Chapter Outline 
The thesis begins with an examination of the evolution of UN peace 
operations in Chapter 1. The development of this activity is traced over three 
distinct periods: the traditional peacekeeping operations launched before the 
Cold War, the retrenchment during the War, and the expansionism that occurred 
thereafter. An emphasis is placed on the current, more robust and complex peace 
missions that take place in hostile environments within a state. These are 
]'l This is discussed further in Chapter 4. 
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examined in greater detail in the second chapter in the context of the UN and its 
peacekeeping terminology. Within the shifting security framework of the post-
Cold War world, the UN operation in Somalia is considered as an example of a 
complex humanitarian intervention. More importantly, it serves as the operation 
that highlights the issues and problems surrounding multi-functional initiatives. 
Chapter 3 examines the consequences ofthe West's withdrawal resulting from 
Somalia. Most notable was the world's inaction, perhaps better described as its 
bad action, in Rwanda. The resulting retrenchment of the mid-1990s, the lessons 
learned, and policy changes in the US and within the UN are described. The 
fourth chapter discusses the emergence of regionalised peace operations in the 
West African context as a result ofthe West's retreat. Empirical analyses of the 
Liberian, Sierra Leonean, and Ivorian cases follows in Chapter 5, where an 
emphasis is placed on the relations between ECOWAS, the UN, and the world's 
major powers, most notably the US, Britain, and France. 
13 
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Chapter One 
The Evolution of UN Peace Operations 
United Nations peacekeeping emerged in the course of the Cold War as a 
product of the prevailing circumstances and has since become the organisation's 
most visible conflict management instrument. This chapter traces the evolution 
of UN peace operations from its traditional form as practiced prior to and during 
the Cold War to its complex multi-dimensional variety that is prevalent today. 
Thus, peace operations are broken into three periods: those launched from 1946-
1988, those from 1989-1994, and finally those from 1995 to the present. This 
evolution can be loosely traced over time, as the practice was moulded to fit the 
varying circumstances of the international political climate. More significant 
than the actual time periods is the progressive trend of peace operations fulfilling 
an assortment of more demanding and complex civilian and political functions in 
addition to the traditional military aspects of peacekeeping. 
This chapter is divided into two sections with the first introducing 
conceptual and functional aspects of traditional UN peace operations as practiced 
from the 1950S until the end of the Cold War. The gap in peace operations 
between 1979 and 1988, when the Security Council was paralysed by relations 
between the US and the Soviet Union, is discussed very briefly as a phase leading 
to the resurgence in operations after 1989. The second section examines the 
effects of the end of the Cold War on the international security climate, with 
particular attention to the UN, freed from the Cold War stalemate and a Security 
14 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Council willing and eager to act. The characteristics and challenges of 
contemporary conflicts in Africa in the post-Cold War world are also discussed. 
UN Peace Operations and the Cold War World: Keeping the Peace 
I. The Development of Peacekeeping 
The post-1945 world was "as inhospitable as could be imagined for the 
arrangements for keeping the peace which are outlined in the UN Charter."2o The 
UN was unable to act as envisioned by its founders, due partly to external 
structural problems but also from internal difficulties. The onset of tensions 
between the US and the Soviet Union and the division of the world into hostile 
blocs made it impossible for the UN to project military power under Chapter VII. 
Peacekeeping was developed in response to this stalemate21. By positioning itself 
in a more neutral position, the UN was able to help bring smaller conflicts to an 
end, "[keeping] them from flaring anew, and [keeping] them from leading to a 
direct and potentially catastrophic clash of US and Soviet arms."22 
Peacekeeping's neutral position and limited range of activities allowed it to 
grow in prominence in the political climate of the Cold War so that it has become 
the UN's most visible contribution to international peace and securitY2 3 in spite of 
having no mention in the Charter itself. The award of the 1988 Nobel Peace Prize 
to the UN peacekeeping forces is an acknowledgement of this contribution. 
20 ,James, Alan, Peacekeeping in International Politics (London: MacMillan Academic & Professional 
Ltd., 1990), p. 10. 
21 Hill, Stephen M., and Malik, Shahin P., Peacekeeping and the United Nations (Vermont: Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited, 1996), p. 14. 
22 Durch, William J., The E\'olution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies and Comparati\'e Analysis (New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), p. 1. 
23 Weiss, Thomas G., Fors~the, Da\id P., and Coate, Roger A., The United Nations and Changing World 
Politics (Boulder: Wesniew Press, 2004), p. 35. 
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II. UN Peace Operations: 1978-1988 
The overwhelming majority of the UN's first 13 peace operations launched 
prior to 1978 followed the principles and functions oftraditional peacekeeping. 
However, the rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union prevented the UN 
from launching a single new peace operation between March 197824 and May 
1988~5 in spite of regional conflicts and proxy wars taking place at this time. 
In Africa, the UN peacekeeping absence dates to the United Nations 
Operation in the Congo CONUC) in 1960. ONUC was perhaps ahead of its time in 
that its complexity, size, and costs resembled the UN operations of the 1990s. 
Whether because of the UN's grim experience or because the organisation "had 
acquired an operational black eye ... as a result of its clearly partisan stance"~6 in 
the Congo's internal conflict, ONUC was to be the last UN peace mission in Africa 
until the first United Nations Angola Verification Mission CUNAVEM I) 29 years 
later. 
The End of the Cold War: the Rebirth of UN Peace Operations 
I. A Reinvigorated UN 
The end of the Cold War ushered in a period of unprecedented American-
Soviet cooperation, making the UN's resurgence possible. Thus, the late 1980s 
saw consensus that had not been experienced in the first 40 years of the UN's 
existence, as the five permanent members of the Security Council cooperatively 
"4 The last operation to be approyed was the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNFIL), which 
continues to this day. See the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations website for further details. 
25 The UN reappeared with the UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP), 
which began in May 1988 and ended in March 1990. 
26 Weiss, Fors)the, and Coate, p. 35. 
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took the lead in an unprecedented upsurge in the scope, size, and number of 
peace operations. The number of deployed peacekeepers increased from less 
than 10,000 to more than 70,000 in this period while the budget experienced a 
similar increase from $230 million to $3.6 billion, reaching roughly three times 
the UN's regular operating budget of $1.2 billion27. 
Various factors helped to bring the UN back onto the international security 
stage. Firstly, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's economic and political 
redirection of the Soviet Union, which helped to reinvigorate multilateralism as 
well as UN peacekeeping2B, prompted US President Reagan to modify his long-
standing public stance against the UN. His successor, George H.W. Bush, 
continued this course, declaring in 1991 the coming of a "new world order...in 
which the principles of justice and fair play protect the weak against the strong ... ; 
a world where the United Nations - freed from the Cold War stalemate - is 
poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders."29 These changed attitudes of 
the two Superpowers were critical to the mounting of a number of peace 
operations between 1988 and 1989 that helped to raise the UN's visibility. 
Secondly, the UN's involvement in the 1991 Gulf War, "the first instance of 
any large-scale Chapter VII enforcement operation, placed [it] at the centre of the 
international security stage"30 • It was from the Gulf War that the US strategy of 
"assertive multilateralism" flourished to become the guiding force of its foreign 
2- Boutros-Gali, Boutros, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace (25 ,January 2995), p. 4. A\'ailable at 
http://\\"\\\\" . un .0rg/Docs/SG lagsupp.html 
28 Weiss, Thomas G., and Kessler, Meryl A., "Moscow's UN Policy," Foreign Policy 79 (Summer 1990): 
94-112. 
29 United States Government, "The United Nations in a New Era," address to the UN General Assembly 
by George H.W. Bush on 23 September 1991, Department of State Dispatch (30 September 1991): 718-
721. 
30 Weiss, Fors)the, and Coate, p. 55. 
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policy until disaster struck on 3 October 1993 in Mogadishu31 . Thus, according to 
Michael Doyle, "[m]ultilateral action under the United Nations Charter ... 
appeared to be a practical solution to global community when each nation caring 
a little seemed sufficient to ensure that all together cared enough.":12 However, 
the end of the Cold War had dramatically altered the international political 
environment and hence, conflicts. As Thomas Weiss and Jarat Chopra note, "[a] 
typology of peacekeeping is thus largely determined by a typology of conflict."33 
Consequently, peacekeeping evolved as a fluid concept in practice and the UN 
Charter was reinterpreted to fit the new circumstances. The following section 
discusses the changed security climate and the "new" conflicts that surfaced, with 
a particular focus on Africa. 
II. The Changed Security Context and Contemporary Conflict in Africa 
In the post-Cold War era, Africa has been the world's most conflict-prone 
continent. According to the Human Security Report 2005, 
[a]lmost every country across the broad middle belt ofthe 
continent - from Somalia in the east to Sierra Leone in the west, 
from Sudan in the north to Angola in the south - remains 
trapped in a volatile mix of poverty, crime, unstable and 
inequitable political institutions, ethnic discrimination, low 
state capacity ... all factors associated with increased risk of 
armed conflict.34 
31 Doyle, Michael W., "DiscoYering the Limits and Potential of Peacekeeping," in Otunnu, Olara A., and 
Doyle, Michael W., (eds.), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the New Century (Oxford: Rowan & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1998), p. 4. 
32 Doyle, "Discoyering the Limits," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 5. 
33 Weiss, Thomas G., and Chopra, Jarat, United Nations Peacekeeping: An ACUNS Teaching Text 
(Pro\'idence: ACUNS, 1992), p. 8. 
3~ UniYersity of British Columbia, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st Century 
(New York: Oxford UniYersity Press, 2005), p. 4. 
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It continues to state that "more people were being killed in wars in sub-Saharan 
Africa than in the rest of the world combined":!5. Indeed, Africa's conflicts do not 
take place v.ithin well-established states that are able to exercise control over 
their people, policies, and territories but rather inside states where "the structure, 
authority (legitimate power), law and political order have fallen apart.":l6 
According to I. William Zartman, the process of state failure has caused these 
conflicts; it is not the consequence of wars37• As part of this struggle, nearly all of 
Africa's regimes have laboured to find the appropriate balance between too much 
and too little government control, where both its excess and its shortage can 
bring failure and collapse to the state38 . 
Where a weak government is unable to serve the needs of its people and to 
maintain order within its borders, conflicts have easily spilled over into 
neighbouring countries and have become struggles for regional balances of 
control39 , a third characteristic of modern African conflicts. According to 
Zartman, the "[r]egionalisation of conflict is produced by both pull and push 
factors, from the inside and outside respectively, negative externalities of the 
original process of state collapse."4o This regionalisation of Africa's conflicts 
helps to explain the development of Africa's regional conflict management 
mechanisms, which are discussed in Chapter 4. 
33 Ibid. 
36 Zartman, 1. William, "Introduction: Posing the Problem of State Collapse," in Zartman, 1. William, 
(ed.), Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1995), p. 1. 
r Zartman, 1. William, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl, Paul F., and Lepgold, Joseph, (eds.), 
Regional Conflict Management (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 82. 
38 Mazrui, Ali A., "The Failed State and Political Collapse in Africa," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 235. 
39 Zartman, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 81. 
40 Zartman, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 83. 
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The internal dimension of state failure, which yields conflict within a state, 
has changed the very nature of warfare, as fighting between traditional national 
armies has lessened, and given rise to disorganised rebel factions recruited 
amongst the disenchanted, students, and even children. Distinguishing between 
soldiers and chilians is increasingly difficult and the scope of belligerents 
involved in a conflict widens to include anyone with a machete. Under these 
circumstances, naming an aggressor and a victim in a conflict for the purpose of 
collective action is a subjective process and is extremely difficult and ambiguous. 
As Paul F. Diehl notes, the inability to reach a consensus on identifying an 
aggressor can split UN membership, leading to inaction as well as conflict 
escalation41 , as seen in Cambodia, the Middle East, the former Yugoslavia, and 
Kurdistan. 
Contemporary African conflicts have had devastating civilian dimensions, 
\\;th \\;despread murder, rape, and mutilation. Subsequent refugee flows have 
placed significant pressure on already poor neighbouring countries barely able to 
provide for their own populations. Refugee camps along borders have become 
recruitment grounds for factions, transforming internal chil wars into regional 
and trans-national ones, as seen in camps along the Liberian and Sierra Leonean 
borders. However, these conditions in Africa did not inhibit the UN from 
sending peacekeepers, who increasingly found themselves in compromising 
situations in conflict zones where no ceasefires existed, rendering adherence to 
4' Diehl, Paul F., "Regional Conflict Management: Strategies, Necessary Conditions, and Comparati\"e 
Effecti\"eness," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 49. 
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the tenets of traditional peacekeeping virtually impossible42 . Much worse, UN 
peacekeepers were unable to keep the peace and were left powerless to protect 
those whom they were sent to protect. 
Such contemporary conflicts in Africa have brought into question 
traditional notions of a state's inviolable sovereignty, which is enshrined in the 
UN Charter4:l . Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated that "[s]tate sovereignty .. .is 
being redefined... States are now widely understood to be instruments at the 
service of their peoples, and not vice versa."44 To extend its jurisdiction to what 
was previously untouchable, the UN has expanded the operational meaning and 
interpretation of "threats to peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of 
aggression"45, which have since come to include civil wars, the disruption of 
humanitarian assistance, and "whatever nine members of the Security Council 
(absent a permanent member veto) [say] it [is]"46• Nevertheless, states remain 
the hallmark of the international system and there therefore remains strong 
support for the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference in the 
internal affairs of states, particularly among the developing world. 
Conclusion 
In the post-Cold War era, the UN saved itself from security irrelevance by 
adapting one of its conflict management tools: peacekeeping. Although 
~, Instances of the UN's presence in hostile territory where it was unable to keep the peace include its 
ventures in the Congo (1960-1964). Somalia in (1993-1995), and in Rwanda (1993-1996), 
43 Article 2(7) of the Charter enshrines state sovereignty and precludes the UN from "intelyen[ing] in 
matters which are essentially \dthin the domestic jurisdiction of any state", 
44 Annan, Kofi, "Two Concepts of SO\'ereignty," The Economist, 18 September 1999, See also Boutros-
Gali, Boutros, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs 72:5 (Winter 1992-1993), pp. 98-99. 
4' United Nations, United Nations Charter, Article 2(7). A\'ailable at 
http://\\"\\"\\. un.org/aboutunl charter I 
4" Doyle, "Discovering the Limits and Potential of Peacekeeping," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 4. 
21 
Un
iv
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
peacekeeping was first introduced to allow the UN to act and manage smaller 
conflicts in the politically hostile environment ofthe Cold War era, its sui generis 
character allowed the UN to become involved in significantly different 
circumstances than those faced at its inception. Thus, in spite of a stark absence 
of peace operations between 1978 and 1988, the conciliatory policies ofthe US 
and Soviet Union in the immediate post-Cold War era facilitated a resurgence of 
UN peace operations, which increased in number, size, and scope of activities. 
However, overwhelmingly intricate and difficult security conditions in Africa 
resulting from complex protracted conflicts in the post-Cold War era would test 
the world organisation's long term willingness and ability to maintain peace and 
security to all regions of the globe. 
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Chapter Two 
UN Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War World: Complex Peace 
Operations 
This chapter tackles the more complex multi-functional peace operations 
and peace-enforcement operations undertaken by the UN in the early 1990S. 
Reference is made to UN terminology and the writings of former Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Gali, which formally expanded the vocabulary of peace 
operations as well as the scope of its activities. Again, conceptual and practical 
issues are discussed, lending insight to the UN operation in Somalia in 1992. The 
UN's efforts to manage Somalia's civil war by means of humanitarian 
intervention revealed the harsh realities, as well as the practical and conceptual 
difficulties of the 'new peacekeeping'. These problems are examined in detail. 
The failure of the ambitious UN and American operations in Somalia, the "guinea 
pig" of the new world order, had a critical impact on defining the limits of UN 
peace operations in Africa in the post-Cold War era. 
An Agenda for Peace 
Following the UN's success in the Persian Gulf, Secretary-General Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali produced a report in 1992 on ways to enhance the organisation's 
capacity for preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Previously, 
classical peacekeeping, in spite of its military nature, had been placed under 
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Chapter VI of the UN Charter-t!o This chapter empowers the Security Council to 
make non-binding recommendations on appropriate methods of resolution, 
though the Council does not have enforcement powers for such resolutions. By 
extension, traditional peacekeeping's essence was formed by a 'holy trinity'48 of 
values: consent, neutrality, and the limited use offorce by peacekeepers49. These 
principles enhanced the non-threatening nature of a peacekeeping operation50 
and as a result created a political environment that was conducive to political 
cooperation between belligerents. Their practice and the perception of their 
practice during an operation thus enabled it to fulfil its purpose. The UN's first 
thirteen peace missions generally fulfilled this doctrine and subscribed to the 
'holy trinity'51• 
An Agenda for Peace significantly transformed UN peace missions by 
articulating a general policy guideline where none had previously existed and by 
adding an ambitious spectrum of activities to traditional peacekeeping. It 
envisioned new components for UN peacekeeping that surpassed the traditional 
interposition of neutral forces between belligerents. The publication shifted the 
military goals of peacekeeping to the attainment of "far-reaching, just, and long-
4- Weiss, Fors}the, and Coate, p. 16. 
48 Bellamy, Alex J., Williams, Paul, and Griffin, Stuart, Understanding Peacekeeping (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2004), p. 95. 
49 For further reading on principles of peacekeeping, please refer to: James, Alan. Peacekeeping in 
International Politics; Goulding, Marrack, "The Evolution of United Nations Peacekeeping," 
International Affairs 69:3 (1993): 451-464; Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin, Understanding 
Peacekeeping; Rotberg, Robert 1., "The Effective Prevention of War," in Rotberg, Robert 1., (ed.), 
Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict PreYention (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2000); Durch, William J., Introduction to Durch, The Evolution of UN 
Peacekeeping; Mackinlay, John, and Chopra, Jarat, "Second Generation Multinational Operations," 
Washington Quarterly 15:3 (Summer 1992):113-131. 
50 Hill and Malik, p. 15. 
51 The UN Operation in the Congo from 1960-64 is the one exception in this time period. 
24 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
f C
ap
 To
wn
term political solutions."'i~ Thus, peacekeeping's purpose became conflict 
resolution as opposed to just its management, with the aim being to reach a long-
term settlement ofthe roots ofthe conflict in order to help build a long-lasting 
and stable government'):>. 
From Traditional to Complex Peace Operations 
An Agenda for Peace spawned a new type of operation, which differs from 
traditional peacekeeping in that it combines military, civilian, and humanitarian 
elements'i4 within a single operation. These complex operations, although taking 
a substantial step beyond first-generation peacekeeping, nonetheless require the 
consent of the parties, although the nature of the consent and the purposes for 
which it is granted are qualitatively different from classical peacekeepingss. The 
UN operations in Namibia in 1989, El Salvador in 1991, and Cambodia in 1992 
provide successful examples of this second category of peacekeeping. 
A third category of combat-oriented peace missions focused specifically on 
internal conflictss6 also emerged. Although the notion of peace-enforcement was 
first proposed in Boutros-Gali's An Agenda for Peace in the context of peace-
enforcement unitss7, the term was subsequently redefined by Boutros-Gali to 
refer to "peacekeeping activities which don't necessarily involve the consent of all 
52 Boutros-Gali, Boutros, "UN Peacekeeping in a New Era: A New Chance for Peace," The World Today, 
April 1993, p. 68. 
53 Doyle, "DiscO\'ering the Limits," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 6. 
54 Weiss, Thomas G., Introduction to Weiss, Thomas G., (ed.), The United Nations and Ci\il Wars 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), p. 1. 
55 Doyle, "Disco\'ering the Limits," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 6. 
5" Doyle, "Disco\'ering the Limits," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 7. 
5- Boutros-Gali, An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 44. 
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the palties concerned." sH Missions such as the one in Somalia were erroneously 
dubbed peace-enforcement by the media and the term was applieds9 to all other 
operations in which the use of force was sanctioned to compel compliance. 
Peace-enforcement missions are therefore armed with the ability to use force, 
which negates the necessity that consent be gained from the belligerents. They 
are intended to be impartial, in that the mandates themselves and their 
implementation must be impartial. 
In 1993 the British military incorporated and successfully exported this 
proactive approach into its own doctrine. Its army training manual, Wider 
Peacekeeping, and drafts of Peace Support Operations, demonstrate the changes 
that peacekeeping-by-consent had undergone after recent experiences in civil 
wars60 . 'Wider peacekeeping' was therefore seen as a fusion ofthe once-distinct 
military cultures of war fighting, peacekeeping, and counter-insurgency with 
political primacy at the operationallevel61 . In this context of progressive military 
doctrines, from 1990 to 1995, a previously unknown activism developed, as the 
UN became involved in an unprecedented number of peace operations in often 
hostile environments. 
The international community's post-Cold War enthusiasm converged on 
Somalia in 1992. The UN and American missions there are singled out because 
they exposed two distinctive elements of peace support operations: the 
58 See Boutros-Gali, Boutros, "Empowering the UN," p. 93, and Boutros-Gali, Boutros, Report on the 
Work ofthe Organisation (rom the Forty-Seventh and Fortu-Eighth Session of the General Assemblu 
(New York: United Nations, 1993), paragraph 278. 
39 Boulden, p. 16. 
60 Pugh, Michael, "Military Intef\'ention and Humanitarian Action: Trends and Issues," Disasters 22A 
(December 1998): 339-351, p. 343. 
61 Mackinlay, John, "Deyeloping a Culture of Intef\'ention," British Peace Support Operations Doctrine, 
.Joint Sef\1CeS Command and Staff College, 11 April 1993. Available at 
\ \\, '\ \'. kc I. ac. uk! depsta!,,'sg! dsd! ne\\'s! abstracts4.doc 
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deficiencies of peacekeeping, armed humanitarian intervention, and pcacc-
enforcement in hostile areas of little strategic interest; and the inadequacy of 
Western leaders' hollow declarations of a new world order and of assertive 
multilateralism. Peace operations in Africa decelerated in all aspects soon after 
the end of the operation in Somalia, almost as swiftly as they had surged in the 
early 1990S. 
The UN in Somalia 
I. Background and Context 
In spite of being comprised of a single ethnic group sharing the same 
culture, language, and religion, Somalia has repeatedly been torn apart by clan-
based civil wars since its independence on June 1,1960. During the Cold War, 
the "superpower rivalry was raged [in Somalia] at fever pitch"62, with the US and 
Soviet Union pumping arms and money into the country, enabling dictator Siad 
Barre to stay in power. With the Cold War's end and the retreat of the 
superpowers, a political power vacuum unsettled the country. Amidst civil war, 
Barre was overthrown by General Muhammed Farah Aideed in 1991 and a 
struggle for power broke out in the capital of Mogadishu, primarily fought 
between followers of Aideed and Ali Mahdi Mohammed. 
The "war of all against all"63, as Secretary-General Boutros-Gali termed it, 
gave rise to anarchic conditions that destroyed the country's infrastructure and 
ruined the local population, creating a humanitarian disaster. Widespread 
62 Peterson, Scott, Me against My Brother: At War in Somalia. Sudan. and Rwanda (New York: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 12. 
63 As quoted in Shawcross, p. 86. 
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statTation afflicted the country, with 4 million of Somalia's 5.1 111 ill ion people 
reportedly liying in famine-afflicted areas64. With a quarter of the population 
facing imminent starvation, a situation worsened by drought, gunmen from 
various factions reportedly stole half of the food aid and resold it on the black 
market, making organised looting the new basis for the Somali economy6s while 
the general population faced starvation. Aid agencies were unable to deliver food 
to the starving population due to the lack of security throughout the country. 
II. The UN and US Peacekeeping War 
The UN first moved to intervene in April 1992 through an essentially 
classical peacekeeping operation. Following an UN -sponsored ceasefire between 
Aideed and Mahdi, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM 1)66, a 
small security force of 500, was sent to monitor the ceasefire in Mogadishu and 
to escort deliveries of humanitarian supplies. Security Council Resolution 751 
was significant because it was the first instance where the concept of a threat to 
international peace and security was expanded to include "the magnitude of the 
human suffering caused by the conflict". This purely humanitarian-based 
operation "illustrated both post-Cold War euphoria and the unwillingness ofthe 
Council to take political action" at a high cost to the main powers67. 
64 Seiple, Chris, The US Military/NCO Relationship in Humanitarian Inter,entions (Carlisle Barracks, 
PA: US Army War College, 1996), p. 98. 
6J Seiple, p. 109. 
66 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 751, 24 April 1992. 
6- Shawcross, p. 86. 
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Support from the US was therefore vital but the leaders of the world's 
strongest military were "adamantly opposed to any escalation"68 of the UN 
operation. Then, with mounting crises in the former Yugoslavia, Washington 
began to shift in favour of armed intervention in Somalia, as a limited 
intervention by the American military presented fewer risks than the large-scale 
military intervention being called for in the Balkans. As one Pentagon official 
said, "[t]he best thing about Somalia was it saved us from Bosnia"69. 
Signifying a radical departure from traditional US policy'7° and in "tacit 
recognition of the lack of UN readiness to manage a Chapter VII operation"7!, 
American leadership of a new mission was proposed and accepted. Thus, the 
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) replaced UNOSOM I on 3 December 1992 in 
accordance with Resolution 79472. UNITAF, whose mandate was drafted by the 
Pentagon in consultation with Secretary-General Boutros-Gali73 , was under 
American command and control and was overwhelmingly staffed by American 
soldiers. The multinational mission was armed with a Chapter VII mandate74 to 
use all necessary means to establish "as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia". UNITAF was to be transferred to a 
6R Mayall, ,James, Introduction to Mayall, James, (ed.), The New IntelYentionism. 1991-1994: United 
Nations Experience in Cambodia. Former Yugoslavia. and Somalia (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), p. 110. 
69 As quoted in Peterson, p. 60. 
-0 Ohaegbulam, Festus Ugboaja, U.S. Policy in Post-Colonial Africa: Four Case Studies in Conflict 
Resolution (New York: Peter Lang Publishers, 2004), p. 103. 
-, Howe, Jonathan T., "Relations between the United States and the UN in Dealing with Somalia," in 
Clarke and Herbst, p. 175. 
-2 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 794, 3 December 1992. 
-3 Clarke, Walter, "Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates in Somalia," in Clarke and Herbst, p. 9. 
'4 A mandatc grantcd Chapter VII powers allows the UN to take all necessary means to restore international 
pcace and security. It may do so through action hy air, sea, or land forces. Scc UN Charter Chapter VII. 
article 42. 
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UN peacekeeping force once this directive was completed in May 1993, four short 
months later. 
While the Secretary-General wished to widen UNITAF's role to include the 
disarmament of rebel fighters beyond Mogadishu, the Americans insisted on the 
limited, short-term, and non-political75 character of the intel"Yention. This 
underlying dynamic between the Secretariat seeking a Chapter VII peace-
enforcement mission supported by peacebuilding and a reluctant, though self-
imposed, US leadership seeking a quick victory was one of many sources of 
division and tension between the different approaches of the UN and its strongest 
member76. 
In spite of this rift, UNIT AF successfully secured the supply routes for 
humanitarian activities and helped end the famine. The mission was formally 
handed over to the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in 
March 1993, three months into President Bill Clinton's administration. 
Resolution 814 of 26 March 1993 expanded UNOSOM II's enforcement powers 
beyond the protection of humanitarian relief supplies to include the 
"consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout 
Somalia". It also turned UNOSOM's goal into "nothing less than the restoration 
of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community 
of nations"77, according to Madeleine Albright. Having warded off starvation, the 
UN and the US were drawn into measures to prevent famine from returning. 
-5 Shawcross, p. 88. 
-6 See Drysdale, John, "Foreign Military Intervention in Somalia: The Root Cause of the Shift from UN 
Peacekeeping to Peacemaking and Its Consequences," in Clarke and Herbst, p. 128. 
- As quoted in Bolton, John R., "Wrong Turn in Somalia," Foreign Affairs 73:1 (.January/February 
1994): 104. As quoted in Peterson, p. 66. 
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That meant disarming the factions whose internecine ,vars had disrupted the 
food supply. Beyond that, it also involved the formidable task of constructing a 
stable political order78. 
III. The Beginning of the End 
On 5 June 1993, with the death of 26 Pakistani peacekeepers79, the UN 
experienced the highest number of deaths in a single day for a peacekeeping 
operation since its operation in the Congo in 196180. The Security Council swiftly 
passed Resolution 837, authorising the Secretary-General to "take all necessary 
measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks"81. This had "no 
relevance to humanitarian peacemaking, nor its dubious ancillary - establishing 
a secure environment"82. The wanted posters around Mogadishu and the 
$25,000 offered for Aideed's capture "was tantamount to a declaration of war 
against [his] militia"83 and gave weight to the Somali leader's accusations ofthe 
UN's 'imperialist designs'84 and foreign occupation. 
On 3 October 1993, in what has become known as the Olympia Hotel 
battle, two Black Hawk helicopters were shot down, 73 soldiers were wounded, 
and 18 US Rangers were killed in a battle between the UN and Aideed's forces. 
Hundreds of innocent civilians were also wounded and killed in this one incident. 
Media clips of the battered corpses of two dead American soldiers being paraded 
-8 Mandelbaum, Michael, "The Reluctance to Intervene," Foreign Policy 95 (Summer 1994): 3-18, p. 4. 
-9 Shawcross, p. 120. 
80 Peterson, p. 73. 
81 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 837, 6 June 1993. 
82 Drysdale, "Foreign Military Interyention in Somalia" in Clarke and Herbst, pp. 132, 133. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Peterson, p. 72. 
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and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by angry mobs ,'>'ere aired across 
America. 
IV. Withdrawal 
Four days after the battle, Clinton made a speech in which he stated; "If we 
were to leave [Somalia] today ... our own credibility with friends and allies would 
be severely damaged ... And all around the world, aggressors, thugs, and terrorist 
will conclude that the best way to get us to change our policies is to kill our 
people"85. These fateful words would prove to be all too true in Somalia and in 
subsequent peace operations around the world. With this confrontation, support 
from the US Congress and the White House for UNOSOM II, and more 
importantly for UN peace operations in general, effectively ended. Clinton 
announced that the US would withdraw fully from Somalia by 31 March 1994. In 
February 1994, the Security Council revised UNOSOM II's mandate to exclude 
the use of coercive force86 and just over a year later in March 1995, the operation 
was completely withdrawn from Somalia, without having restored peace to 
Somalia. 
The UN withdrawal that ensued after the events of October 1993 
demonstrate its inability to effectively impose order with force. Instead of acting 
as an impartial multinational force or setting a precedentS?, the UN became 
"complicit in a record of inadequate protection, seemingly unnecessary 
casualties, and Vietnam-like escalation on the one hand and 1930s-style 
85 As quoted in Ohaegbulam, p. 108. 
86 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 8974 February 1994. 
8- Woods, "U.S. Decisionmaking During Operations in Somalia" in Clarke and Herbst, p. 171. 
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appeasement on the other"R8. However, as Thomas G. Weiss cautions, it is 
important to consider the UN's shOltcomings in Somalia not in isolation "but 
rather contextualised in light of other [deteriorating] efforts in northern Iraq, 
Bosnia, Haiti, and Rwanda."89 In other words, there was a high demand for UN 
peace operations in the early 1990S and the United Nations Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) was considerably overstretched and under-
resourced to adequately meet the needs of all these conflicts. 
Tragically, the Olympic Hotel battle "rather than Operation Restore Hope, 
was the measure by which global humanitarian peacemaking operations were 
now to be judged. This view was illustrated by the myopic shibboleth 'the 
Somalia syndrome."'9o Indeed, as John Drysdale rightly notes, "no 
differentiation was made by the international community between a benign form 
of peacemaking to carry out urgent humanitarian missions ... and the 
untrammelled exercise of peacemaking with a relentless and all-powerful armed 
engagement by air and on the ground"91• As a result of this failure to distinguish 
between the two separate activities, and indeed the UN's own inability to set the 
two apart, misconceptions arose regarding UN peacekeeping and peace-
enforcement in general and regarding the UN operation in Somalia specifically. 
88 Doyle, "Discovering the Limits," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 8. 
8g Weiss, Thomas G., "Rekindling Hope in UN Humanitarian Intervention," in Clarke and Herbst, p. 
208. 
go Drysdale, "Foreign Military Intelyention," in Clarke and Herbst, p. 133. 
91 Ibid. 
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Issues and Problems of Complex Peace Operations 
The Somalia case study demonstrates a number of external and internal 
challenges facing the UN. Perceptions of these challenges led many to claim that 
the organisation was experiencing a "crisis in peacekeeping"92 • FiYe key 
conceptual and practical challenges that have contributed to this crisis are 
identified and discussed in this section. 
I. Chapter VII Operations: Peace-enforcement as Peacekeeping 
In spite oftheoretical differences, there exists a tendency to lump first-, 
second-, and third-generation peace operations together, both in rhetoric and in 
practice. The "grey area", or what Olara Otunnu identifies as "the thin end ofthe 
enforcement wedge"93 between peace-enforcement and full-scale enforcement 
has caused many scholars to equate peace-enforcement with war-making94 or 
counter-insurgency9s. The result has been to question its compatibility with the 
philosophy, functions, and design of peace operations and, by extension, the 
desirability of the militarisation of these missions. When traditional 
peacekeeping and humanitarian-based functions merge, the absence of a clear 
and effective framework or mechanism for responding to "the challenge of the 
grey zone"96 causes significant confusion and misunderstanding over the precise 
nature of the different types of peace operations in which the UN participates. 
The tendency for operations to slide from peacekeeping to peace-enforcement to 
92 Roberts, Adam, "The Crisis in United Nations Peacekeeping," in Crocker, Chester A., Hampson, 
Osler, Fen, and Aall, Pamela R., (eds.), Managing Global Chaos (Washington, D.C.: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 1996). 
93 Otunnu, Olara A., "The Peace-and-Security Agenda for the United Nations: From a Crossroads into 
the New Century," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 306. 
94 Doyle, "DiscO\'ering the Limits," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 7. 
95 Mockaitis, Thomas R., "From Counterinsurgency to Peace Enforcement: New Names for Old 
Games'?" Small Wars and Insurgencies 10:2 (1999): 40-57. 
96 Otonnu, ''The Peace-and-Security Agenda," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 306. 
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war and back adds to this misunderstanding. Morem'cr, using the all-
encompassing 'peacekeeping' term to refer to any and all of these types of 
missions has tarnished the successes of traditional UN peacekeeping. As the 
Somali rebel Aideed pointed out, "[t]he way the UN was acting [in Somalia] was 
so inhumane. They implanted the minds of Somalis with these declarations of 
human rights and freedoms then [carried out] such actions against humanity."97 
II. Lack of Funding 
The UN has attempted to provide humanitarian and developmental 
assistance both during and after civil wars. In the case of failed states, this duty 
commits the UN to a country until the time when a functioning government, 
preferably democratic, is able to replace it. This process necessitates substantial 
costs from donors. However, funding has long been a source of problems for the 
organisation and the increase in peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War 
era heightened the deficit. Accordingly, while the Security Council launched the 
"largest and most complex peacekeeping missions in UN history", the cost of 
peacekeeping rose from $635 million in 1989 to $3.3 billion by 199498. Unpaid 
peacekeeping costs also reached unprecedented levels, increasing from $444 
million to nearly $1.3 billion99. Although the International Court of Justice 
issued an advisory opinion earlier in 1962 that all member-states are legally 
9- Peterson, p. 99. 
98 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping, "A Note on the Financial Crisis." A\'ailable at 
http://\\ ,\". un.org/ Depts / d p ko / dp ko / intro / fi nance. h tIll. 
99 Global Policy Forum, "Peacekeeping Operations Expenditures \'s. Payment Arrears of Member-
States: 1975-2005." Ayailable at 
http://\\\\\\ .globalpolicY .org/finance/ta bles/pko / expenda rrcars.1! tm 
35 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
obliged to bear their share of peacekeeping costs lOO , states continue to pay their 
peacekeeping assessments late or only partially. The US is currently the largest 
debtor to the UN and has therefore been a key player in the UN's financial 
crisisHll , owing more than $1 billion to the peacekeeping, regular, and 
international tribunal budgetslO2 • According to the UN, this failure by member-
states to pay these assessments "has, in effect, shifted the burden of peacekeeping 
onto those States which have not been reimbursed for essential personnel, 
equipment and other elements they have supplied"103 • As a result, paying states 
suffer strains on their respective domestic military and financial capacities. 
This financial crisis within the DPKO specifically and the UN generally has 
reduced the available "ready capital" 104. The insufficient funding has not only 
placed a ceiling on the number and scope of possible operations, but has also 
severely hampered the department's ability to mount timely and effective peace 
operations. The organisation's inability to secure the necessary funds, or more 
accurately, member-states' failure to provide the necessary funds, renders 
statements of support moot105 and extensive mandates senseless. 
100 "United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping, "A Note on the Financial Crisis." Peacekeeping costs 
are currently measured in accordance with a formula that member-states establish \\1th the UN. See 
United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "Meeting New Challenges," for more 
information. Ayailable at http:/hnnv.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/fag/g9.htm 
101 Karns, Margaret P., and Mingst, Karen A., "Maintaining International Peace and Security: UN 
Peacekeeping and Peacemaking," in Klare, Michael T., and Thomas, Daniel C., (eds.), World 
Security: Challenges for a New Century (New York: st. Martin's Press Inc., 1994), p. 199. 
102 Wahlberg, Katarina, "The Challenges of UN Finance," at a presentation organised by Global 
Policy Forum and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, New York, 22 March 2006. A"ailable at 
ht lp: / 1\1\1\\ .globalpolicY.org/finance/ dOCS/2oo6 /o322challenges.hlm 
IOJ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 'A Note on the Financial Crisis.' 
104 Karns and Mingst, "Maintaining International Peace and Security," in Klare and Thomas, p. 210. 
IOJ Karns and Mingst, "Maintaining International Peace and Security," in Klare and Thomas, p. 211. 
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III. Lack of Resources 
The UN's similar reliance on member-states for material resources, 
including military and civilian personnel, military and non-military equipment, 
and logistical support, is a dimension related to its financial problems. The rise 
in demand for peace operations in the early 1990S required a similar increase in 
both the willingness and ability of its member-states to contribute personnel, 
equipment, and logistical support. But these, like peacekeeping finances, were 
less forthcoming in the surge of more dangerous and complex peace support and 
peace-enforcement operations in Africa. The result has been a commitment gap 
that is specific to Africa alone106. 
This reality does not negate the fact that the greater complexity and higher 
level of danger in contemporary African conflicts necessitate better trained and 
better equipped personnel. However, leaders ofthe world's most capable armies 
have generally been unwilling to put their soldiers at risk. This has prompted 
more military units being drawn from countries with little or no UN 
peacekeeping experience or capability, leading "the United Nations [to send] 
some of the worst soldiers in the world off to situations where it can only hope 
they are not called on to actually do anything."107 Consequently, the UN's most 
capable members contribute least to mission areas where death tolls are highest 
and the UN's role most critical108. Fear of "mission creep" and a lack of a clear 
106 Jones, Dr. Bruce, and Cherif, Feryal, Evolving Models of Peacekeeping: Policy Implications 
and Responses (Centre on International Cooperation, New York University), p. 7. Available at 
http://pbpll.lInlb.org/pbpu /libral\ IB ruce%20J oncs%2opaper%2owith% 20]ogO. pdf 
10- Jett, Dennis C., "The UN's Failures are Everyone's Fault," The New York Times, 15 May 2000. 
108 Jones, p. 22. 
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exit strategy augment the unwillingness of Western governments, and the US 
especially, to commit troops to UN peace support operations in Africa. 
IV. Lack of Will 
The fundamental driver behind the UN's financial and material 
deficiencies is its member-states' lack of political will to initiate and maintain 
missions. More specifically, it is members ofthe influential Security Council who 
have shown little interest in establishing or continuing peace operations in areas 
of minimal strategic significance such as Africa. Thus, the decision to intervene 
and how to intervene are political questions that are informed by different views 
of self-interest that guide the process. Although it is clear that the UN cannot 
attend to every rise on the conflict radar, its spotlight in the mid-1990s on the 
former Yugoslavia, driven by Western and European members, contrasted 
sharply with the total disregard of similar conditions in Burundi, Sudan, and 
Rwanda. Thus, the UN was actively engaged in finding solutions in a few 
countries around the world, while "[p]eace and security, the responsibilities of 
the United Nations, were absent in dozens of [them]."109 
Conclusion 
From the end of the Cold War until 1993, the Security Council, building on 
initiatives of the United Kingdom (UK), had evolved toward what the US would 
later call a strategy of "assertive multilateralism"; a strategy that flourished from 
the Gulf War in January 1991 until the Olympia Hotel battle in October 199311°. 
109 Sha\\'cross, p. 42. 
110 Doyle, "DiscO\'ering the Limits," in Otunnu and Doyle, p. 4. 
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The UN-US joint operation in Somalia was the turning point in the surge of 
expectations of heightened UN activism that had come when the Cold War ended. 
In its aftermath, UN peacekeeping in Africa entered a new phase, where well-
meaning ideals contrasted sharply with a lack of resources and an absence of 
political will and consensus among Security Council members. Instead of the 
anticipated international cooperation, the American experience in Somalia 
caused the White House and Congress to completely reverse its stated policy of 
collaboration with the UN, rendering the Security Council ineffectual to act in 
conflicts where American strategic interest did not call for action. As a result, the 
UN withdrew from many of its existing peace operations in Africa and ceased to 
intervene in conflicts there. Rwanda was to be the first casualty ofthis Western 
disengagement. 
39 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
Chapter Three 
Disengagement 
This chapter looks briefly at the UN and French course of action in 
Rwanda's brutal genocide of 1994 and examines the resulting lessons that were 
dra\'m. To this end, particular attention is given to the policy shifts within the US 
- and particularly the White House and the American Congress - and within the 
UN. It should be noted that the reassessment of the UN in general and UN 
peacekeeping specifically were not confined to the immediate aftermath of 
Somalia and Rwanda, as seen in PDD-25 and the Supplement to An Agenda for 
Peace, but continued to occur more recently as well, evinced by reports such as 
the Brahimi Report of 2000. These primary documents are given special 
consideration within the climate of international re-evaluation and reflection in 
the mid-1990s. 
Rwanda 
The UN and US failure in Somalia led directly to international inaction a 
few months later in March 1994 in Rwanda 111, the setting of "the fastest, most 
efficient killing spree of the twentieth century"112. An estimated 800,000 to one 
million people were killed within three months. In spite of indications "clear 
enough to anybody who cared to look" 113 of a planned genocide against the 
moderate Hutu and Tutsi populations, Security Council members refused an 
HI See Power, Samantha, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (New York: First 
Perennial, 2003); Goureyitch; Shawcross; and Peterson. 
m Power, p. 334. 
H3 Peterson, p. xix. 
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endeavour that could potentially require long-term financial, military, and 
political commitment. The US in particular, with its failure in Somalia still fresh, 
did not wish to risk the lives of its soldiers by committing to another mission in a 
politically unstable area of low strategic interest without a clear mandate or exit 
strategy. Thus, according to Samantha Power, "[t]he logical outgrowth ofthis 
fear was an effort to steer clear of Rwanda entirely and be sure others did the 
same."1l4 The Clinton administration's new policy of inaction, codified in PDD-
25, is \\~dely believed to have been the main reason for the world's general 
inaction1l5, as the policy restricted American participation in UN-led peace 
operations and urged Washington to "persuade others not to undertake the 
missions that it [the US] Mshed to avoid."116 
As President Clinton had predicted in his speech four days after the 
Olympic Hotel battle, the violent death of 10 Belgian peacekeepers had been 
strategically executed by Rwanda's genocidaires, who knew that "the record 
showed that such peacekeepers were generally cowardly, inclined to 'watching as 
spectators' when violence broke out"117. Their calculations were correct. 
Washington immediately demanded that UN peacekeepers be Mthdrawn from 
Rwanda1l8, 
then refused to authorise the deployment of UN reinforcements. 
Believing that another Somalia could not be afforded and hearing 
no American demands for intervention, President Clinton and his 
advisers knew that the military and political risks of involving the 
114 Power, p. 366. 
115 Power, p. 342. 
116 Goure\"itch, p. 150. 
W Goure\itch, p. 100. 
I1R Just one week later, certain member-states of the UN began pushing for the UN's return to Rwanda, 
as undeniable eddence of genocide began surfacing 
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United States in a bloody conflict in central Africa were great, yet 
there were no costs to avoiding Rwanda altogether. 1l9 
Similarly, it was belieyed that "the UN had more to lose by sending 
reinforcements and failing than by allowing the killings to proceed."120 According 
to Philip Goureyitch, this "desertion ... was Hutu Power's greatest diplomatic 
yictory ... and it [could] be credited almost single-handedly to the United 
States."121 
I. Operation Turquoise 
On 22 June, 1994, as the genocide had begun to lull, the Security Council 
endorsed France's Operation Turquoise122 with Chapter VII powers despite 
having denied UNAMIR this capacity for months. France, according to Power, 
was "perhaps the least appropriate country to intervene because of its warm 
relationship with the genocidal Hutu regime"123 . This sentiment was widely 
expressed throughout the international community due to France's reputation as 
the gendarme d'Afrique and its neo-colonial strategy of la Francophonie. 
Indeed, its connection with its former colonies has remained the strongest of all 
former colonial powers and Paris continues to view them as a natural extension 
of the motherland, intervening in at least nine other African countries124 in 30 
instances since the 1960s125. France had signed a military and training agreement 
119 Power, p. 335. 
120 Power, p. 384. 
121 Gourevitch, p. 150. 
m United Nations, Security Council Resolution 929,22 June 1994. 
12J Power, p. 380. 
124 Gberie, Lansana, and Addo, Prosper, Challenges of Peace Implementation in Cote d'Ivoire: Report 
on an Expert Workshop by KAIPTC and ZIF ISS Monograph No. 105 (Johannesburg: Institute for 
Security Studies, August 2004), p. 15. Available at 
http://I,,,,,.iss.org. za Ipubs 1M on ographs IN 01051 Can ten Is. ht ml 
12 5 Martin, Guy, Africa in World Politics: A Pan-African Perspective (Asmara: Africa World Press, Inc., 
2002), p. 67. 
42 
Un
ive
rs
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
To
wn
with Rv,'anda in 1975 and had been providing aid money to the Habyarimana 
regime since then. In 1998 it was revealed by le mission d'injormation 
parlementail'ejrwu;aise sur le Rwanda126 that the French government had also 
provided diplomatic, financial, technical, and military support to the government 
during the genocide in spite of an arms embargo, as well as to the Interhamwe 
and the Forces armees rwandaises (FAR) who had carried out the genocide127. 
These political connections between the Mitterand and Habyarimana regimes led 
Paris to naturally regard the rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) with intense 
suspicion. From these dubious beginnings, the operation began just as the RPF 
approached Kigali. According to former French president Valery d'Estaing, 
Operation Turquoise essentially "'[protected] some of those who had carried out 
the massacres'''128 by providing a safe area for fleeing Hutus. To many observers, 
this episode demonstrated the French government's complicity in the Hutu 
government's genocidal campaign. As an UN-sanctioned operation, this 
questionable performance was perceived by many as yet another stage in the 
accumulating failure of UN peacekeeping in Africa in the early 1990S129. 
Lessons and Policy Changes after Somalia and Rwanda 
"The spectre of Somalia has loomed over every world crisis since mid-
1993, inhibiting debate and limiting options."130 The "need to maintain absolute 
12(, The French Parliamentary Information Committee on Rwanda. 
12- Martin, p. 86. Also see Pr~nier, Gerard, The Rwanda Crisis. 1959-1994: HistoD' of a Genocide 
(London: Hurst Ltd., 1995), p. 164. 
128 As quoted in Goure\itch, p. 157. 
129 MacQueen, Norrie, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa since 1960 (London: Pearson Education 
Ltd., 2002), p. 172. 
130 Clarke, Walter, "Failed Visions and Uncertain Mandates," in Clarke and Herbst, p. 3. 
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neutrality in the face of all provocation for fcar of becoming unwilling 
participants in a civil war"l:ll, and the fear of crossing the "Mogadishu Line" 
reigned throughout the West in the mid-1990s. This section traces the changes 
that Somalia effected on peace operations in Africa. The policy re-orientation 
made in the US following its operation in Somalia is addressed first, as this had a 
significant bearing for the international community of states and for the UN. An 
examination of the tangible decrease of UN peace operations in Africa follows. 
Thirdly, general policy changes of the UN are examined, with specific reference to 
Boutros-Gali's Supplement to An Agenda for Peace of 1995 and the Brahimi 
Report of 2000. 
I. American Policy Changes 
In Somalia's aftermath, peace operations in Africa entered a bleak phase, 
as the West disengaged and isolated itself from the continent. Among the 
Western states, disenchantment towards the UN and peace operations "was both 
stronger and more genuinely felt in the US than was the case in either Britain or 
France"132 • This was perhaps because, as Michael G. MacKinnon contends, "no 
other world leader did more to spread the belief in [the] possibility [of a new 
world order] than US President George Bush"133. Clinton entered the White 
House continuing this sense of enthusiasm, "[taking] office better disposed 
toward peacekeeping than any other administration in US history."134 His 
administration gave indications of its commitment to reversing Republican 
131 Darnton, John, "U.N. Buildup in Bosnia Eyes 'Mogadishu Line,'" The New York Times, 7 June 1995. 
132 Berdal, Mats, "Peacekeeping in Africa, 1990-1996: The Role of the United States, France, and 
Britain," in Furley, O\iYer, and May, Roy (eds.) Peacekeeping in Africa (London: Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd., 1998), p. 52. 
133 MacKinnon, p. xiY. 
134 Power, p. 341. 
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policies and of a "ne,,,' relationship towards Africa [that would] differ in 
important respects from the approach ofthe past twelve yearS"!3:>. 
However, the failed US mission in Somalia, guided by the Weinberger-
Powell Doctrine!36 , laid the limits of its peacekeeping policy. The White House's 
fears of being entangled in the "messy imbroglios of foreigners"!:l? and Congress' 
obligation to foot one-third of a growing UN bill led to increased opposition to US 
participation in UN-led multilateral peace operations!38 . Thus, in the words of a 
senior US official, "'[n]ot to cross that notional [Mogadishu] line became the 
overriding determination of the Clinton administration everywhere in the world . 
... 'Mogadishu' and 'Somalia' are not place names now - they are cautionary 
slogans for disasters to be avoided at all costS."'139 
Insisting that the UN "learn to say no" after Somalia, Clinton's 
signature of approval on PDD-25 in May 1994 codified America's inaction 
in future UN peace operations. The directive outlines sixteen criteria that 
must be met for any international US military involvement. These include 
the necessity of clear objectives, "an endpoint for US participation", 
"acceptable" command and control arrangements, and the continued 
13, Berdal, "Peacekeeping in Africa," in Furley and May, p. 53. 
136 According to MacKinnon, despite UNITAF's humanitarian motives and aspects, the operation's 
limited task was wry much in line with the Weinberger Doctrine, which had become the government's 
guiding policy for matters that were not central to national interests, such as peace operations, after 
attacks on Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983. It later came to be known as the Weinberger-Powell 
Doctrine. 
IT Rotberg, Robert I., "The Lessons of Somalia for the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy," in Clarke and 
Herbst, p. 229. 
13R Ohaegbulam, p. 109. 
139 As quoted in Shawcross, p. 122. 
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support of Congress and the American people140. Furthermore, US 
participation can only be undertaken if it advances national interests141. 
Should a mission not threaten American interests, the US should also 
bring other states in line with their policy by persuading them not to 
undertake the mission142. 
II. Evidence of Retreat 
Afflicted by US disinterest and recalibration after the twin failures of 
Somalia and Rwanda, the number of UN peace operations in Africa dropped 
significantly from the earlier part of the decade. Between 1989 and 1993, 55% of 
the UN's new peace operations were launched in Africa, but between 1994 and 
1997, the number dipped to 15% despite continued conflicts143. In 1991, UN 
peacekeeping personnel numbered at around 14,000 while the budget was 
approximately $400 million USD144. These figures soared the following year, and 
continued to increase until 1993, when personnel reached a height of 78,000 
personnel supported by a budget of $3.6 billion USD145. Although there were 
eighteenoperations running in 1994, this number dropped substantially in 1995, 
140 United States GOYernment, Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace 
Operations (PDD-25) (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 22 February 1996). Reproduced in 
MacKinnon, p. 124. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Goure\ltch, p. 150. 
I4J Between 1989 and 1993, ten of the eighteen operations began in Africa; between 1994 and 1997, only 
tIm of the fifteen operations were in Africa. See UND PKO website for information. 
14~ United Nations, Peace and Security Section and Department of Peacekeeping Operations, "UN 
Peacekeeping from 1991-2000: Statistical Data and Charts," Available at 
http://\\'\'\'.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub Ipko. htm 
145 Ibid. 
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and by July 1998, UN personnel numbered only 8,000 while its budget had 
shrunk to $1 billion USD for 15 operations of which only four were in Africa 146. 
Although there began a slow resurgence of peace operations in Africa in 
1998, beginning with missions in the CAR, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), the UN was noticeably absent from Africa for five 
years until 1999. The robust United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) 
that year signalled the beginning of the UN's return. It became the largest UN 
peace operation of its time in 2002, with close to 18,000 troops deployed. In 
2000, seven new UN peace operations began after a prolonged absence. Five of 
these took place in Africa and remain there at the time of writing. These numbers 
offer striking evidence of the empirical effects of the UN's experience in Somalia 
and the subsequent US pullout. Equally significant are the UN "policy" changes 
that took place in the five years between 1994 and 1998. 
III. Policy Changes at the UN 
The overall effects of Somalia and Rwanda were disastrous for the 
organisation's moral authority, legitimacy, and credibility. Brian Atwood 
contends that "each time UN forces are successfully challenged or overwhelmed 
by those who oppose a peace mandate, serious damage is done to the United 
Nations." 147 The widespread demands calling for the reform of the UN are an 
outgrowth of this damage. Though delayed and haphazard, UN and NATO 
actions in Yugoslavia nevertheless contrast sharply with the international 
146 These are: the United Mission in the Central African Republic (April 1998 - February 2000), the 
United Nations Obser,er Mission in Angola (June 1997 - February 1999), the United Nations Obseryer 
Mission in Sierra Leone (July 1998 - October 1999), and the United Nations Mission for the 
Referendum in Western Sahara (1991 - present). 
14- Atwood, Brian, "Atwood Targets Key Issues of Peacekeeping Reform," The World Paper, May/June 
2000. 
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community's avoidance of similar circumstances in Africa occurring at the time 
and even v.ith its involvement in Somalia. This disparity led then-Secretary-
General Boutros-Ghali to accuse the Security Council of "fighting a rich man's 
war in Yugoslavia while not lifting a finger to Somalia ... "!48 
i) Supplement to An Agenda for Peace 
In the aftermath of Somalia, and while the UN struggled v.ith problems in 
the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Haiti, Secretary-General Boutros-Gali 
"trimmed his sails and recommended caution about the UN's security role"!49. 
His Supplement to An Agenda for Peace was issued in January 1995 in 
recognition of the over-ambition laid out in An Agenda for Peace, which had 
proven untenable in the conflicts ofthe post-Cold War world and with shrinking 
Western interests in those areas. The Supplement made a case for scaling back 
from peace operations requiring the use of force. Boutros-Gali acknowledged 
that "neither the Security Council nor the Secretary-General at present has the 
capacity to deploy, direct, command and control operations for this purpose 
[enforcement action], except perhaps on a very limited scale."!50 He 
acknowledged that the UN's financial and military capacity, including its ability 
to respond rapidly, required vast improvement for operations trying to address 
the political causes of failed states, genocide, or civil war through force!s!. The 
Secretary-General continued that "it would be folly to attempt to [develop such a 
capacity] at the present time when the Organisation is resource-starved and hard 
14R As quoted in Shawcross, p. 86. 
149 Weiss, Fors)the, and Coate, p. 99. 
150 Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 77. 
151 Woods, "U.S. Decisionmaking," in Clarke and Herbst, p. 167. 
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pressed to handle the less demanding peacemaking and peacekeeping 
responsibilities entrusted to it."15~ 
ii) The Brahimi Report 
Five years later, in August 2000, the Panel on United Nations Peace 
Operations issued a report "about how to do peace operations better v.rithin the 
structural parameters and constraints of the current global order"153 at the 
request of the Secretariat. The Brahimi Report provided an assessment of the 
shortcomings of the existing system and gave "specific recommendations for 
change"154. An aspect of the UN's peacekeeping problems as identified by the 
Panel is the disparity between the rhetorical desire of member-states to do 
something when confronted with an emergency and what is actually provided. 
The Report therefore urges: 
Member States [to] recognise that the United Nations is the sum of 
its parts and accept that the primary responsibility for reform lies 
with them. The failures of the United Nations are not those of the 
Secretariat alone... Most occurred because the Security Council and 
the Member States crafted and supported ambiguous, inconsistent 
and under-funded mandates and then stood back and watched as 
they failed155. 
This dynamic is named as the cause for many of the problems experienced by UN 
peace operations through the 1990S and is surely one ofthe reasons for the 
greater vulnerability of UN peacekeepers, as witnessed in Sierra Leone. Related 
to this issue is the organisation's fundamental inability to project credible force, 
IS2 Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 77. 
IS3 Bellamy, Alex J., and Williams, Paul, "Conclusion: What Future for Peace Operations? Brahimi and 
Beyond," International Peacekeeping 11:1 (Spring 2004): 183-212, p. 184. 
154 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Executive Summary for Report of the Panel on United 
Nations Peace Operations. Available at http://\\ww.un.org/peace!reports/peace operations/ 
's" Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
(The Brahimi Report), paragraph 266. 
49 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
which is demonstrated through its inability to deploy complex peace operations 
rapidly and efficiently, to sustain these efforts, and to support them with force 
when necessary. The Panel concludes that "no amount of good intentions can 
substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force."156 
Thus, where conflict continues, the report highlights that the UN and 
peacekeepers require "clear, credible, and resourced Security Council 
mandates"157. If these are lacking, even ragtag rebels, as witnessed in Somalia 
and Sierra Leone, can "wreak havoc with missions and with the very concept of 
preventing and reducing conflict by limited intervention."158 Therefore, part of 
the problem lies with member-states, who fail to provide the necessary "clear, 
strong, and sustained political support"159 for the mandates they themselves pass. 
Conclusion 
General Romeo Dallaire made no secret of his belief that Rwanda's 
genocide could have been avoided had the international community intervened 
earlier and more effectively160. However, rather than proactively prevent such 
tragedies from reoccuring, the US actively avoided emvroiling itself in Africa's 
conflicts. This American fear of engagement in African conflicts in the aftermath 
of Somalia led the international community's inaction, perhaps better described 
as its bad action. There were evident policy shifts both within the US and the UN 
156 Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Panel, paragraph 3. 
IS- Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Panel, paragraph 6b. 
158 Rotberg, Robert I., "Peacekeeping and the Effective Prevention of War," in Rotberg, Robert I. et aI., 
(eds.), Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in Africa: Methods of Conflict Prevention (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), p. 2. 
lS0 Ibid. 
16°Dallaire, L.Gen. Romeo, Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda (Toronto: 
Vintage Canada, 2003). 
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as a result. The Clinton administration turned away from assertive 
multilateralism to political inaction codified in PDD-25, while the UN Secretary-
General Boutros-Gali's Supplement to An Agenda for Peace recommended 
caution and called for a scaling back of the scope of operations previously 
outlined in An Agenda for Peace. Thus, for the latter half of the 1990S, peace 
operations in Africa suffered and Africans were obliged to tend to their own 
problems. 
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Chapter Four 
Developments in West Africa's Security Landscape 
The UN'S inability to effectively manage conflicts, as witnessed in Somalia 
and Rwanda, led many to question its capability to maintain security in Africa in 
the post-Cold War era. Thus, peacekeeping, as the UN's conflict management 
tool of choice, was also brought into question. This occurred at a crucial time at 
the end ofthe Cold War when the UN needed, but failed, to consolidate its 
legitimacy in the face of complex peace operations. In Africa in particular, a 
number of regional and sub-regional organisations filled the security vacuum left 
by the UN. This has occurred as part of a general proliferation of actors in 
Africa's security framework. This chapter examines the growing trend of Africa's 
regional and sub-regional organisations implementing peace and security 
responsibilities in their own neighbourhoods. Specific reference is made to 
ECOW AS efforts in the region, which provide general indications of aspects of 
regional peacekeeping within the context of Africa's mechanisms for regional 
security. 
The Regionalisation of Peace Operations 
During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union were able to suppress 
most violent conflict either through the threat of, or actual direct military 
intervention. Thus, regional organisations and their security mechanisms were 
contained by the interests of the US or the Soviet Union, which they ultimately 
served. The Cold War's end gave new opportunities for regional efforts and 
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provided the political space in which they could freely act and seek to control 
their 0\\11 strategic direction. 
It should be noted that the basis for regional peacekeeping extends from 
the UN Charter itself, which describes the nature of the relationship between 
regional organisations and the UN in Chapter VIIII61. Article 52 charges regional 
arrangements to make "every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local 
disputes" before referring them to the Security Council and encourages the 
Council to promote such regional initiatives. An Agenda for Peace also describes 
the possibility for a division of labour between the UN and regional organisations 
and virtually all policy analyses of multilateralism since have emphasised this 
division of labour162. As a result, the visibility and possibility of regional security 
efforts was raised significantly. 
Terminology 
Although Chapter VIII of the Charter is devoted to regional arrangements, 
it does not provide a precise definition of a regional arrangement. This was 
deliberate in order to allow for greater flexibility for groups of states wanting to 
maintain regional peace and security163 , however it has created debate over 
conceptual definitions. The Charter provides little guideline for such a debate 
and its ambiguity allows for a range of definitions for a region, which may be 
based on economics, ideology, culture, or geopolitics. Defence arrangements 
161 Although the Charter preselTes the authority of the universal organisation, Article 52 declares that 
"[n]othing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for 
dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security ... prm ided 
that [they are] consistent \\ith the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations". 
162 Weiss, Forsythe, and Coate, p. 19. 
163 Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Peace, paragraph 62. 
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such as NATO and economic arrangement such as the Organisation of Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) may all be considered regional 
arrangements under Chapter VIII164. Thus, regional or sub-regional groupings 
approved by the UN qualify as SUCh165. 
For the purposes of this paper, the terms regional organisation or 
arrangement are used with reference to organisations with formal and/ or 
organisational infrastructures that are responsible for implementing a regional or 
sub-regional arrangement between governments. The focus is therefore on inter-
state cooperation. For the purpose of succinctness, the sub-regional level 
remains at times undifferentiated where this distinction is deemed unnecessary 
and where the more general regional term is sufficient or appropriate. The 
regionalisation of peace operations refers to the regional responses to regional 
conflicts, where wars spill over national borders, drawing in or impinging on 
neighbouring states166. In West Africa, this latter issue is most significant, as 
conflicts in the region have frequently crossed national boundaries to 
surrounding states, which has set off considerable regional efforts at peace. 
Advantages of Regional Peace Efforts 
The tension between the concepts of regionalism and universalism is an 
old one, which gives weight to the advantages and disadvantages that each 
carries. Indeed, regional peace operations may succeed or fail for many of the 
164 Weiss, Fors)the, and Coate, p. 21. 
16S Sarooshi, Danesh, The United Nations and the Deyelopment of Collectiye Security: The Delegation 
by the United Nations of its Chapter VII Powers (Oxford: Oxford Uniyersity Press, 1999), pp. 1-2, 142-
6. 
166 Ibid. 
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same reasons as UN missions. Hmvever, they offer some advantages unique to 
their regional status. Firstly, regional arrangements have a greater incentive to 
react to conflict because states bordering a country in conflict are more 
immediately affected by the destabilising consequences of war. These 
neighbouring states receive and accommodate refugees, as well as manage the 
political, social, and economic repercussions. The ensuing instability can greatly 
hamper the region's economic development and can therefore generate political 
""ill to manage conflict more easily than a non-neighbouring state unaffected by 
the fighting. 
Secondly, the argument is made that geographic proximity facilitates a 
faster and less expensive response to crises, making peace operations also more 
easily sustained from nearby. Flowing from this proximity is a greater knowledge 
and understanding of local cultures, languages, and customs, making regional 
organisations better-suited to build consensus167 and to act with sensithity than 
an outside multinational force. Thus, familiarity with the region, culture, conflict 
dynamics, and conflict resolution practices lends a natural legitimacy to regional 
efforts. In addition, political leaders within a region are able to cultivate and 
foster relationships that make diplomacy both easier and more likely. Decisions 
made in these circumstances increase the possibility that a resolution may be 
reached and maintained in the long term. ECOWAS' rapid response to 
emergencies in West Africa validates the proximity argument favouring regional 
security initiatives. A third important element aiding the success of regional 
](>7 Diehl, Paul F., "Regional Alternatives to U.N. Peacekeeping Operations." Arms Control, 
Disarmament, and International Security Website. Available at 
http://\\\,,,.acdis. uiuc.edu (Research (S&Ps/J 994 -Wi-Sp(S&P VI I I -2 !regional altern at i\es.html 
55 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
n
peace operations is their ability to secure the support of neighbouring third party 
states. Diehl typifies these third-party states as neighbouring states to the 
conflict, states allied with the combatants, or extra-regional states with a vested 
interest in the outcome of a conflictl68. 
Fourthly, because there is less of a need to follow global precedents in a 
regional context, regional organisations are afforded a flexibility that the UN does 
not possess. In addition, "regional procedures are more likely to give the 'have 
nots' of the UN a voice they are denied by the alleged elitist orientation of 
Security Council decision making."169 In this sense, regional institutions and 
efforts can be a significant source of empowerment for regions that are under-
represented or marginalised in the global order. 
Disadvantages of Regional Peace Operations 
Despite these logical conceptual advantages favouring regional 
arrangements and their conflict management efforts, many argue l70 that the 
optimism for a regionalised framework for peace operations is in fact misplaced. 
The shortcomings are less a reflection of principles and more an outgrowth of 
empirical issues that plague the less-developed regions of the world and their 
respective organisations. For although regional conflict management efforts have 
had some success through regional organisations where membership is 
168 Diehl, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 57. 
169 Lepgold, "Regionalism in the Post-Cold War Era," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 13. 
["II For further reading, refer to: Diehl, Paul F., "Institutional Alternatives to Traditional UN 
Peacekeeping: An Assessment of Regional and Multinational Options," Armed Forces & Society 19:2 
(Winter 1993): 209-230; Dorn, Walter, "Regional Peacekeeping is Not the Way,"' Peacekeeping and 
International Relations 27:2 (July-October 1998): 1; Shaw, Carolyn M., "Regional Peacekeeping: An 
Alternative to United Nations Operations?" The Journal of Conflict Studies 15:2 (Fall 1995): 59-81. 
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composed of wealthier states, such as NATO, it is the less-endowed regions, such 
as Africa, that expose the challenges of the regionalisation of conflict 
management. 
Firstly, Jean-Marie Guehenno highlights the UN's "unique legitimacy" that 
is incomparable, as its "charter is accepted by all countries around the world."171 
Thus, "there is a universality of the UN that is irreplaceable."172 Others are 
concerned that the "division oflabour" could serve to erode the UN's universality 
and ultimately its legitimacy, raising questions as to whether devolution is in fact 
desirable. However, it is clear that this same, or a similar, legitimacy is unlikely 
to be attained through a regional organisation. Furthermore, most regional 
actors support an "UN-first approach, as this provides a check on the possible 
misuse of hegemonic power"173. 
Vested interests in the outcome of a dispute or of a peace operation, prior 
commitment to one side, and the possibility of gains can make it difficult for 
regional interveners to act impartially or to be perceived as such. These political 
ambitions can make regional intervention unwelcome. Thus, although regional 
organisations have the advantage of proximity to conflicts and knowledge of 
issues, they are also more likely to suffer from conflicting national interests as 
there are "simultaneous considerations of absolute gain (stability) and relative 
gain (power)."174 Dennis Jett therefore contends that third-party states are in a 
n Guehenno, Jean-Marie, "The United Nations Post-Brahimi: An Inteniew "ith the UN Under 
Secretary-General for Peace Operations," Journal of International Affairs 55:2 (Spring 2002): 490-
500, p. 495· 
nIbid. 
n Fawcett, Louise, "Exploring Regional Domains: A Comparati\"e History of Regionalism," 
International Affairs 80:3 (May 2004): 429-446, p. 430. 
1-4 Ibid. 
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better position to undermine a peace operation than they are to facilitate its 
success17" by, for example, providing arms and support to one or more ofthe 
factions. Consequently, regional actors are often perceived as partial or biased by 
belligerents, particularly where there is a history or the slightest reason for 
suspicion of predisposition. However, according to Dennis Jett, these states 
A third cause for concern is the historical weakness demonstrated by 
regional organisations in their dealings with civil war176 , the greatest outgrowth of 
the Cold War's end. Many leaders of developing states in Africa, as well as the 
former Soviet bloc and China, continue to view their domestic affairs as their own 
concern and accord other leaders the same consideration, adhering to traditional 
notions of sovereignty to avoid setting legal precedents that would sanction 
external regional involvement in their internal affairs. This tendency has 
perpetuated corrupt and despotic leadership, nepotism, and cronyism at the 
expense of a country's economic, social, and political development. 
Fourthly, the message sent by encouraging undemocratic or weak states to 
assist in maintaining security for other undemocratic or weak states is a 
questionable practice. As Diehl highlights, "collective security actions are 
designed to protect or restore the status quo in the event of an outbreak of violent 
conflict."177 However, this requires that there be consensus on what the status 
quo is, and restoring democracy in a neighbouring country while one's own 
situation is in disorder weakens the legitimacy of peace efforts. Nigeria's 
'-3.lett, Dennis C., Why Peacekeeping Fails, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000). 
,-6 Weiss, Fors)the, and Coate, p. 24. 
,-- Miller, Lynn, "The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security," Global Governance 5 (1995): 303-
332, footnote 10. As quoted in Diehl, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 45. 
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leadership ofthe ECOWAS intervention in Liberia while under Ibrahim 
Babangida's military rule provides an example. 
A fifth matter concerns the presence and potential influence of a regional 
hegemon within a regional organisation. Such a situation gives rise to what 
Adekeye Adebajo calls 'hegemonic peacekeeping', where a powerful state with 
global or regional interests is able bear a greater military and financial weight 
than other less powerful states in a multilateral intervention. According to 
Immanuel Wallerstein's world system theory, hegemony means more than mere 
leadership but less than outright empire178• Thus, although this dominance of 
one state over another is not achieved purely by force but rather requires some 
degree of consent from the subordinate states179 , these circumstances allow the 
regional hegemon to "exert disproportionate influence over military and political 
decisions regarding [a] mission" in a multilateral peacekeeping context 180. 
Nigeria's leadership status and role in West Africa's peace operations provides an 
example of hegemonic peacekeeping, as its leaders were able to advance the 
country's goals through political pressure on other ECOWAS members. 
A sixth argument against regional peace operations draws on the non-
conformity of many of these missions with the procedures set out in the UN 
Charter. ECOWAS's actions in response to Liberia's conflict in 1990, 2003, and to 
the war in Sierra Leone in 1997 were all undertaken without Security Council 
1"< As referred to in Ferguson, Niall, "Hegemony or Empire?" Foreign Affairs 82:5 
(September/October 2003). Ayailable at 
htl p: (1\\"\\ w. foreignaffai rs.org(20030g01fare\·iewessav82 512 (niall-ferguson (hegemon \" -or-
empire. htm I 
]7') See Joseph, Jonathan, Hegemony: A Realist Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
\SO Adebajo, Adekeye, "In Search of Warlords: Hegemonic Peacekeeping in Liberia and Somalia." 
International Peacekeeping lOA (Winter 2003): 62-81, p. 63. 
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approyal. The Council did not condemn these breaches of protocol, nor was there 
much international debate over these actions, in sharp contrast to the 
international uproar generated by NATO's unauthorised intervention in 
KOSOV0 181• This raises perceptions that a Security Council mandate is 
unnecessary and hence concerns over the marginalisation of the UN. Moreover, 
it projects the notion that the lack of international and Council attention requires 
regional organisations to respond to crises with or without authorisation simply 
because no one else will. 
The last point relates to Africa's regional and sub-regional organisations 
and their member-states in particular. African countries' willingness to 
participate in UN and multinational peace operations has dramatically increased 
in recent years. Prior to 1988, only 12 had contributed personnel to a UN 
peacekeeping operation182• Since 1999, 29 countries have contributed to one or 
multiple UN operations183• This involvement extends to Western-led 
multinational missions as well, in which African countries have participated in all 
but one that have received UN authorisation since 1990184• In spite of this 
experience that has been gained, one cannot conclude that African states have the 
financial, logistical, or organisational capability to undertake peace operations 
independently or in a coordinated manner in a regional capacity. 
lSI Boulden, .Jane, "The Role of the Security Council and Regional Organisations in Peace 
Consolidation," Working Paper ofthe Consolidation of Peace in Africa Project (Oxford: Centre for 
International Studies, 2004), p. 16. 
182 Berman, Eric G., "African Regional Organisations' Peace Operations: De\"elopments and 
Challenges," African Security Review 11:4 (2002). Available at 
http://I\"\'''.iss.co.za/Pubs/ASR/11No4/Berman.html 
183 Ibid. 
184 Ibid. 
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Moreoycr, bccause the organisational, military, and financial rcquirements 
of a regional peace operation are similar, if not the same, as at the global level, 
these weaknesses experienced by the UN are only magnified at the regional 
level IRS. Organisationally, the proper rules, procedures, structural mechanisms to 
direct and implement peace operations are often insufficient or lacking altogether 
among Africa's organisations. Many regional peace operations are organised on 
an ad hoc basis, which undermines any possible deterrent effect and jeopardises 
any defensive action that might be needed186• In addition, regional organisations 
have fewer states from which to draw resources and contributions, which places a 
larger share of the burden on each participating state. Where countries are 
already impoverished, as in Africa, this is an immense obstacle to oyercome. The 
limited number of personnel trained in peacekeeping techniques and approaches 
amongst most regional groupings worsens this probleml87. The majority of 
African states have small, ill-equipped, poorly-led, and poorly-trained armed 
forces (by international peacekeeping standards) that emphasise internal 
security. This operational, logistical, and financial reality helps to explain the 
comparatively low quality of peace operations between African and Western 
regional organisations. 
More specifically, in West Africa, it cannot be ignored that 10 of ECOWAS' 
sixteen member-states are ranked among the 30 least developed countries in the 
world according to the UN Development Programme's Human Development 
18., Naldi, Gino, The Organisation of African Unity: An Analysis of its Rule (London: Mansell, 1989). As 
quoted in Diehl, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 58. 
186 Diehl, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 47. 
IS- Diehl, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 59. 
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Index of 20051HH • This limits ECOWAS' structural and organisational capability 
as well as its ability to project effective military power and makes it extremely 
reliant on the few economically developed and powerful states within the 
organisation. Indeed, NATO is an "unusual circumstance" 189, as it remains the 
only regional security organisation militarily capable of launching and sustaining 
complex peace support and peace-enforcement missions. This regional 
discrepancy makes it extremely unlikely that Africa's regional organisations will 
successfully undertake complex peace operations in their neighbourhoods 
v.ithout external support. 
The Security Council's permanent members have shown more enthusiasm 
to invest in the regionalisation of international peace and security than in the 
UN's collective structures. Michael Pugh observes that although successive US 
administrations have supported regional initiatives, they have in reality been 
more interested in effective power projection - hence Washington's post-Cold 
War focus on assertive multilateralism, coalitions, and pivotal and anchor 
states l90 • In this context, regionalisation quickly becomes a fac;ade for harnessing 
regions to a hegemonic agenda and what Pugh calls "proxy policing"191. Whether 
this is true will not be argued here, however such arguments should be 
considered when examining the regionalisation of peace operations, as it 
188 See the United Nations Deyelopment Programme, Human Deyelopment Index 2005: International 
Cooperation at a Crossroads: Aid. Trade, and Security in an Unequal World (New York, 2005), p, 222. 
Ayailable at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/globaI/2005/pdflIIDR05 complete. pdf 
189 Weiss, Fors)the, and Coate, p. 22. 
190 Williams, Paul D., "International Peacekeeping: The Challenges of State-building and 
Regionalisation," International Affairs 81:1 (2005): 163-174, p. 174. 
19 1 Ibid. 
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proyides a possible motive for international rhetoric and actual support for 
regional initiatives in Africa. 
Despite these obvious limitations, many hope that Africa's regional 
organisations ,,~ll execute and fund peace operations in their regions where the 
UN Security Council can and mIl not. In an effort to achieve this reality, a yariety 
of assistance programmes have been created since 1990 aimed at proyiding 
technical and financial assistance as well as military training for African states. 
The general aim of America's African Contingency Operations and Training 
Programme (ACOTA)192, France's Renforcement de la Capacite de la Maintien de 
la Paix (RECAMP), and Britain's Africa Conflict PreYention Pool (ACPP) is to 
increase the capacity for African states to carry out their own peace operations. 
These permanent members of the Security Council hope that building this 
capability will "obviate their military presence or inteITention in African 
conflicts"193. All are part of 'constructive disengagement'194, though their 
methods and approaches differ considerably. 
In 1998 the International Peace Academy (IPA) noted that these "oft-
trumpeted international initiatives are usually very minimal in impact and quite 
192 Pre\iously known as the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACR!). In 2004 President George W. 
Bush announced the creation ofthe Global Peace Operations InitiatiYe (GPO!), to which ACOTA would 
be subsumed. The programme's goal is to increase the capabilities of militaries in areas such as human 
rights, interaction with ci\il society, international law, military staff skills, and small unit operations 
and to train forty thousand troops by 2010 \\ith a projected budget of $650 million. See United States 
GOYernment, Department of State, "Key U.S. Government Assistance Programs for Africa," 
Washington, D.C., 15 June 2005. Available at http:(h\\\w.state.gO\)r(pa(scp/2005(47996.htm 
19J Ohaegbulam, p. 238. 
19.\ See Berman, Eric G., and Sams, Katie E., "Constructh'e Disengagement: Western Efforts to Develop 
African Peacekeeping," ISS Monograph No. 33 (Johannesburg: International Security Studies, 
December 1998). Available at http://\nndssafrica.org(Pubs(Monographs(N033(Contents.html 
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marginal in funding"l'!;). Eric Berman and Katie Sams concur, stating that these 
programmes have been "relatively insignificant" and offer "too little, too late"ly6. 
Sponsoring countries have thus placed a greater emphasis on "training the 
trainer" in recent years with the view that this provides a more sustainable 
platform for continued training after the programmes are finished. Although 
Western officials have tried to temper such scepticisml97, "[t]he general 
perception is that, instead of the international community striving to 
complement African [regional] efforts, endeavours are being made to supplant 
them."ly8 Moreover, their fundamental flaw lies in their inability to fill West 
African states' basic lack of logistical and administrative capability to effectively 
launch the multi-dimensional peace operations that are required to manage the 
complex conflicts in its region. They are mere short-term solutions based on 
donor countries' perceptions of what is needed by the recipients. The 
programmes also demonstrate the tendency among Western states to seek quick 
fixes and short-term solutions to overwhelmingly complex problemsl99 . This top-
down approach to military assistance legitimately breeds concern among West 
African leaders about the motivation and interests of the programmes' creators. 
19' As cited in Cilliers, .Jakkie, "Regional African Peacekeeping Capacity: Mythical Construct or 
Essential Tool?" African Security Review 8A (1999). Ayailable at 
http:/h"",·.issafrica.org/pubs/ASR/8No4/Cilliers.html 
196 Berman and Sams, "The Peacekeeping Potential of African Regional Organisations," in Boulden, 
Jane, (ed.), Dealing with Conflict in Africa: The United Nations and Regional Organisations (New 
York: Palgraye MacMillan, 2003), p. 66. 
1<)- Berman and Sams, "ConstructiYe Disengagement." 
198 Aning, Emmanuel Kwesi, "Towards the New Millennium: ECOW AS' Eyohing Conflict Management 
System," African Security Re,iew 9:5/6 (2000). Available at 
http: I h" \"\ ,'. iss.co.za Ipu bs/AS R/9N o5And6/Aning. ht m I 
199 Donini, Antonio, "Beyond Neutrality: On the Compatibility of Military Interyention and 
Humanitarian Assistance," Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 19:2 (1995): 31-45, p. 33. 
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States have thus approached the initiatives "vith uncertainty, caution, and 
suspicion, advocating instead 'African solutions for African problems'~O(). 
Conclusion 
In a region that has seen significant political instability in a short 17 years, 
ECOW AS has tried to assume some of the responsibilities for maintaining peace 
and security at a time when the UN was unwilling or unable to. However, the 
unique advantages of regional organisations - their geographic proximity, their 
greater understanding of the cultural subtleties, and their greater flexibility to act 
and react quickly to crises - must be considered against the other difficulties they 
encounter: legitimacy issues, complex relations among member-states, the 
propensity to protect traditional notions of sovereignty, the influence of regional 
hegemons, and perceived competition with the UN. African regional 
organisations in particular face significant financial, military, and logistical 
shortcomings that their more developed counterparts do not, which not only 
further constrains their ability to respond to crises effectively, but also leads to 
varying quality of responses to such crises across the globe. 
In West Africa in the 1990S, ECOWAS effectively immersed itself in a 
similar situation to that of the UN in the early 1990S, becoming entangled in 
complex regional civil wars while attempting to keep, enforce, and make peace. 
In spite of the strong political will to act among the majority of ECOW AS 
members, regional political dynamics constricted the organisation's ability to act 
efficiently, while organisational, financial, and military deficiencies were more 
000 Ohaegbulam, p. 235. 
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limited, and thus e\"en more accentuated, than in the global context. This sencd 
to complicate and impair ECOWAS' efforts to bring peace to West Africa. 
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Chapter Five 
The Cases: ECOWAS, the UN, and Major Powers III Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire 
West Africa has seen a number of conflicts in the last two decades that 
have torn the region apart. ECOW AS has been especially willing to undertake 
peace operations in these conflicts and has actively done so when no other actor 
showed the resolve. 
This chapter examines the relations among ECOWAS, the UN, and 
external powers through three cases involving these actors: Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
and Cote d'Ivoire. In examining each case, background to the civil war is given as 
a contextual base to the interventions. As each conflict possessed their own 
individual dimensions, each case is examined somewhat differently; however, the 
ECOWAS, UN, and, where applicable, external interventions are examined with 
respect to their peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peacemaking functions. 
General information on ECOW AS and the development of its security arm is also 
provided. 
It should be noted that the discussion of Liberia focuses primarily on the 
earlier UN operation there, with particular attention to the unilateral efforts of 
the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
in 1990. Being the earliest conflict analysed, the Liberia civil war took place years 
before Western disengagement or its trigger event, Somalia, and of efforts in 
Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. Although it received far less publicity than 
Somalia, its significance lies in the fact that it was the international community 
and the UN's first notable demonstration of its lack of will to act in an internal 
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conflict in Africa in the immediate post-Cold War era. In addition, it was notably 
the first instance of a sub-regional organisation taking military action in a state, 
with the UN in a supporting role. 
West Africa's Conflicts 
West Africa today, locked in an intricate cycle of economic poverty, 
protracted conflicts, and state failure, is one of the poorest regions in the world 
according to the 2005 Human Development Index201 • In this context, 
competition for control over mineral-rich soils has been a common dynamic in 
many of the region's wars, particularly in the Liberian and Sierra Leonean cases. 
Rebel leaders financed their wars and simultaneously enriched themselves 
through the acquisition and plundering of natural resources. This personal gain, 
rather than a coherent political ideology, has driven the majority of the rebel 
leaders to war202 • At the heart of the problem is the inability ofthe state to 
exercise political control over its respective territories and over the means of 
violence within its borders. The UN's response to such conflicts in Africa was 
negligible in the 1990S. Although its presence there has progressively become 
more robust, as demonstrated by the Sierra Leonean and Ivorian cases, it was the 
world organisation's failure to act in Liberia that first prompted ECOWAS to 
intervene. Its monitoring group, ECOMOG, was improvised and has since 
evolved into the sub-regional organisation's security arm that it is today. 
"01 See United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Index 2005. 
"02 Adebajo, Adekeye, Building Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea- Bissau 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), p. 47. 
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ECOWAS 
ECOWAS was founded on 28 May 1975 by 16 West African states20:l to 
promote the region's economic cooperation and integration "in all fields of 
economic activity" in order to "maintain and enhance economic stability" and to 
"foster relations among member-states.''204 Although not conceived as a security 
organisation, ECOWAS had begun to take steps as early as 1978 towards conflict 
management with the adoption of the Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 
Protocol relating to Mutual Assistance on Defence two years later. The latter 
made provisions for managing conflict within the sub-region, but these had yet to 
be implemented at the time of ECOWAS' first peacekeeping expedition in Liberia 
On 10 December 1999, ECOWAS heads of state endorsed an elaborate 
proposal, establishing the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, which transformed ECOMOG into a 
permanent stand-by force. Drawing on ECOMOG's experiences in Liberia and 
two years in Sierra Leone, its stated objectives were to "prevent, manage, and 
resolve internal and inter-state conflict, ... strengthen cooperation in the areas of 
conflict prevention, early warning, peacekeeping operations, [and] the control of 
cross-border crime ... " and to "maintain and consolidate peace, security, and 
203 In 2000, Mauritania withdrew its membership, bringing ECOWAS' membership dO\\11 to 15. 
204 ECOWAS, Treaty ofECOWAS, Chapter 2 Article 3. Ayailable at http://\\,lw.eco,,·as.int/ 
20 5 Since Liberia, ECOWAS has inter,ened militarily in six instances: in Sierra Leone in 1997 and again 
in 1999, Guinea-Bissau in 1999 and 2001, and Cote d'Iyoire in 2002 
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stability" 206. The Mechanism thus sought to streamline the organisation and to 
expand its security-providing activities. 
To achieve these aims, the Mechanism called for the creation of a 
Mediation and Security Council, a Defence and Security Council, and a Council of 
Elders aimed at streamlining the organisation and expanding its security-
providing activities. Although a strict relationship was not delineated, the AU 
and the UN were to be kept informed of decisions made within ECOW AS. 
However, the Mechanism creates an ObserYation and Monitoring Centre within 
the Secretariat, which is to collaborate with the AU, the UN, and other relevant 
organisations as part of an early-warning system. 
In doing so, it aimed to keep the AU and the UN informed of all its 
decisions, although guidelines to a relationship with these organisations were not 
delineated. An early-warning system is also incorporated into the Mechanism, 
which foresees some collaboration with the AU, the UN, and other relevant 
organisations through an ObserYation and Monitoring Centre within the 
ECOWAS Secretariapo7. The powers of the Executive Secretary are also 
broadened, allowing him to "initiate actions for conflict prevention, management, 
resolution, peacekeeping and security in the sub-region [through] fact-finding, 
mediation, facilitation, negotiation and reconciliation of parties in conflict.''208 
Significantly, the Mechanism appoints a Special Representative for each 
ECOMOG operation who is "responsible for the political orientation of the 
206 ECOWAS, Protocol relating to the Mechanismfor Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping, and Security, Lome, 10 December 1999, article 3. Available at http://m\"\,·.ecowas.int/ 
20- ECOW AS, Protocol relating to the Mechanismfor Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping, and Security, article 24. 
20R ECOWAS, Protocol relating to the Mechanismfor Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping, and Security, article 15. 
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mission" through the direction of peacekeeping actiyities, the initiation of 
diplomatic negotiations, and coordination of actiyities between ECOWAS and 
internationalorganisations209 • This measure was taken from lessons learned in 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, where military commanders, unskilled in diplomacy, 
often haphazardly directed both the military and political aspects of the missions, 
to the detriment of the operation. As for the troops themselves, the Mechanism 
calls for the creation of a fully-equipped stand-by force capable of deploying at 
short notice. AllIS ECOWAS member-states pledge one battalion each towards 
the ECOWAS Standby Brigade (ECOBRIG), whose actiyities will range from 
preventive deployment, humanitarian assistance, peacebuilding, to the control of 
trans-border crimes in intra- and inter-state conflicts21O. 
The ECOWAS Mechanism is significant because it recognises the 
organisation's need for a much-needed framework for the management of sub-
regional conflicts. But, as the UN itself has struggled to implement and fund such 
an elaborate security system, it is not surprising that the ECOWAS Mechanism 
has encountered various difficulties. Firstly, it is important to note that the 
Mechanism makes no conceptual differentiation between peacekeeping and 
peace-enforcement. Although it may seem an academic debate, the lack of such a 
distinction raises questions over the potential for abuse of the mechanism by 
autocratic leaders. 
Secondly, the Mechanism does little to address the internal politics of the 
region or the organisation. In West Africa's regional collective security context, 
"09 ECOWAS, Protocol relating to the Mechanism/or Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping, and Security, article 32. 
210 ECOWAS, Protocol relating to the Mechanism/or Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping, and Security, chapters VI-X. 
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which is diyided between French- and English-speaking countries cross-
sectioned by yarying informal alliances between leaders and the search for a 
regional balance of power between Nigeria and France, there is the potential that 
an operation be blocked by partisan interests at the expense of the interests of the 
greater region. This issue will need to be resolved for the ECOWAS Mechanism 
to function efficiently. 
Thirdly, in light of the internal economic and political state of the majority 
of West African states and of ECOW AS' own financial and military realities, the 
Mechanism is extremely ambitious. The system of funding as described in the 
Mechanism, which relies on a combination of funds from ECOWAS' annual 
budget, special requests, and voluntary contributions made from the UN, the 
OAU, and other international groups211, does little to correct ECOMOG's previous 
ad hoc funding difficulties as experienced in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The 
scheme is only exacerbated by troop-contributing states being asked to pay for 
the first three months of a peace operation, with the costs incurred to be refunded 
by ECOWAS within a maximum period of six months. This is highly unrealistic 
given that only four members, Nigeria, Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and Togo, haye 
contributed regularly to the ECOWAS budgeP12. To date, the implementation of 
the ECOW AS Mechanism has been slow. Its measures were only partially 
operational when civil war erupted in Cote d'Ivoire. 
When the Liberian conflict exploded, ECOW AS had no procedural 
guideline or security framework. It improvised ECOMOG, which remained in 
ell ECaWAS, Protocol relating to the Mechanismfor Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping, and Security, chapter VII. 
e12 Adebajo, "The ECaW AS Security Mechanism." 
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Liberia for eight years in a first attempt by an African sub-regional organisation 
to take military action in a member-state overtaken by civil war. However, its 
efforts were unable to prevent the violence and instability from spilling over into 
Liberia's neighbouring countries, with Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and 
Senegal213 also falling prey to internal protracted fighting. In Sierra Leone, 
ECOWAS responded to the civil war in 1997 following Nigeria's unilateral 
intervention. Its operation there preceded the UN's substantial, and successful, 
peacekeeping and peace-building mission. However, as the violence was 
dissipating in Liberia and Sierra Leone, war erupted in Cote d'lvoire when it 
suffered its first military coup. Although the civil war has remained relatively 
contained, there are fears that the fall ofthe prosperous and stable heart of West 
Africa could again de-stabilise the entire region. Thus, concerted efforts have 
been made towards bringing security to the region in recent years. Together, the 
three neighbouring countries examined - Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'lvoire 
- provide the setting for 10 ECOWAS and UN peace operations in the last 17 
years214 • 
213 Zartman, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 86. 
214 These are: ECOMOG in Liberia (1990), the United Nations Obser\'er Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) 
(1993), ECOMOG in Sierra Leone (1997), the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNOMSIL) (1998), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) (1999), ECOWAS Force 
in Cote d'I\"oire (ECOFORCE) (2002), the United Nations Mission in Cote d'I\,oire (MINUC!) (2003), 
ECOWAS in Liberia (ECOMIL) (2003), the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) (2003), and 
the United Nations Operation in Cote d'I\'oire (UNOC!) (2004). 
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Liberia 
I. The Civil War - A Summary 
Civil war in Liberia began in December 1989 when the National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia (NPFL), a rebel group under the leadership of Charles Taylor, 
invaded the northeast of Liberia from Cote d'Ivoire, ushering in a 16 year civil 
war. Ethnic violence became widespread, leading to 200,000 deaths215 and close 
to a million refugees fleeing to neighbouring Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Guinea, 
Ghana, and Nigeria. 
ECOW AS was able to stop the wanton killing of innocent civilians and to 
establish sufficient order in Monrovia to allow for the return of humanitarian 
agencies. However, the peace-enforcement and peacemaking processes were 
marred by inexperience, division between member-states, and perceptions of 
ECOMOG being a vehicle for Nigeria's hegemonic policy. The UN was needed to 
lend legitimacy and support. Its involvement, though three years after 
ECOMOG's, was crucial to ending the war in 1997. However, the peace was 
short-lived as violence again erupted two years later and the country once again 
saw the presence of ECOMOG and UN forces, which remain at the time of 
writing. Democratic elections were held in October and November 2005. 
II. History and Conflict Dynamics 
i) Settlement, Colonialism, and Ethnic Tension 
215 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 43. 
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Liberia was established follmving its settlement by freed American slaves 
in 1821. The Americo-Liberian settlers replicated the exploitati,'e relationship 
from which they had been liberated and came to dominate the modern sector of 
the economy and the government at the expense of Liberia's majority indigenous 
population. The social system came to be based "on a paternalistic ideology of 
the civilising mission or 'the westernised black man's burden"'216 so that, over 
time, "correlations began to develop between ethnicity, class, and social 
mobility"217• This created a situation where "ethnic grievances [were] never too 
far from the surface, and ... therefore always available for politicians to 
exploit."218 
The Americo-Liberians governed Liberia from independence until April 
1980, when Master Sergeant Samuel Doe, of the Krahn tribe, overthrew William 
Tolbert's regime. Doe promptly suspended the constitution and assumed 
dictatorial powers, alienating the indigenous population as well as the Americo-
Liberians by favouring his own tribe. He implemented repressive policies and the 
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) committed atrocities against citizens in his name. 
In strongly contested elections held in 1985, Doe was elected president of Liberia. 
ii) The 'Historical' Motherland 
The elections that brought Doe into the presidency were applauded by the 
US, Liberia's most significant foreign supporter. Indeed, the 'special relationship' 
between the US and Liberia can be traced to its settlement. The US had extended 
diplomatic support since the 1800s and Liberia adopted a constitution and a flag 
216 Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., "Regional Organisations and the Resolution of Internal Conflict: The ECOW AS 
Inter .. ention in Liberia," International Peacekeeping 1:3 (Autumn 1994): 261-302, p. 264. 
21- Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., "Regional Organisations," p. 265. 
218 Ibid. 
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modelled on those ofthe US while its capital, MonrO\i.a, was named after US 
President James Monroe. The us has gained considerably from this relationship, 
acquiring a million acres of Liberian land for the Firestone Tire and Rubber 
Company, establishing the world's largest rubber plantation, and for the 
construction of Pan-Am's Roberts Field219. In 1959 a mutual defence pact was 
signed. During the Cold War, Liberia was Africa's largest single recipient of 
American financial and military aid, which totalled $278 million between 1962 
and 1980220 • This amount increased under Reagan's tenure, during which $500 
million a year was donated between 1981 and 1985221 • Due to these factors 
indicating a special relationship, many Liberians looked to the US for military 
assistance and expected this to be offered. It was not. As war broke out, the US 
did not intervene to aid Doe and this provided Charles Taylor, of Americo-
Liberian descent, "'lith the opportunity to launch his rebellion222 • He did this with 
a small band of Libyan-trained rebels, invading from Cote d'Ivoire on 24 
December 1989. With support from neighbouring states and a large section of 
Liberia's opposition, Taylor's NPFL quickly gained in popularity among ordinary 
Liberians due to the repressive nature of the Doe regime. 
iii) Regional Dynamics 
Personal and strategic alliances complicated resolution efforts to Liberia's 
conflict. The Anglophone-Francophone rivalry, as illustrated by COte d'Ivoire 
219 Roberts Field became a major World War I transit point for US soldiers and their Allied operations 
in North African and southern Europe. 
220 Kramer, Reed, "Liberia: A Casualty of the Cold War's End?" in CSIS Africa Notes (Washington, 
D.C.: Centre for Strategic and International Studies, July 1995), p. 4. 
221 Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organisations," p. 269. 
222 Mekenkam, Monique, van Tongeren, Paul, and van de Veen, Hans, (eds.), Searching for Peace in 
Africa: An O\'ef\iew of Conflict Prevention and Management Acthities (Utrecht: European Platform 
for Conflict Prevention and Transformation, 1999), p. 310. 
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and Nigeria~23, reyeals some of the problems of regional conflict interyention. 
Ivorian president Felix Houphouet -Boigny supported Taylor out of his OVI'l1 
personal animosity towards Doe, whom he blamed for the death of his son-in-
law224 • Howeyer, strategic calculations also came into play, as Cote d'Ivoire, with 
substantial French support, sought to counterbalance what it saw as Nigeria's 
hegemonic and Anglophone designs within the region, which had been growing 
since the 1970s. Burkina Faso also provided support to Taylor in the form of 
troops and facilities for the shipment of military supplies225 • 
Doe, on the other hand, had "nurtured something of a special relationship 
with West Africa's regional hegemon, Nigeria", which had provided material 
support to his regime at the beginning of the conflicp26. In helping his friend and 
ally, President Babangida saw it as a means of "keeping out a protege of 
Houphouet's"227, whom he viewed as an extension of Paris promoting the anti-
Nigerian attitude prominent among West Africa's Francophone states228 . Nigeria 
sought to minimise such external influence. In addition, its objective of 
establishing itself as the regional, and potentially the continental, hegemon229 
was its inspiration for leading ECOMOG230 • However, it was Nigeria's relations 
",;th Doe that led Taylor's NPFL to view ECOWAS as a biased intervener. 
221 This riyal!)' dates back to Cote d'Iyoire's milita!)' assistance to, and recognition of, the Biafra 
secession, which occurred during the Nigerian ciyil war from 1967 to 1970. 
224 Houphouet-Boigny's son-in law had been arrested "'ith President Tolbert and was later murdered in 
jail by Doe's forces. 
22:; Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organisations," p. 271. 
226 MacQueen, p. 176. 
22- Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organisations," p. 272. 
228 Gberie, Lansana, "Liberia's War and Peace Process: A Historical Oyef\iew" in Aboagye, Festus, and 
Bah, Alhaji, M.S., (eds.), A Torturous Road to Peace: The Dynamics of Regional, United Nations, And 
International Humanitarian Intef\'entions in Liberia (Pretoria, Institute for Security Studies, 2005), p. 
56. 
229 Howe, Herbert M., "Nigeria," in Sorensen, D3\id S., and Wood, Pia Christina, (eds.), The Politics of 
Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 179. 
230 See Adebajo, "Hegemonic Peacekeeping" for further information. 
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Perceptions of Nigeria hegemonic aims only aggravated this and discredited 
ECOMOG's efforts. 
III. International Inaction 
Preoccupied with the Gulf War, and then later \-vith operations in Somalia 
and the former Yugoslavia, the international community lent limited support to 
peace efforts in Liberia. The UN, overstretched in 1990, was unable, and in fact 
its member-states unwilling, to intervene in Liberia until November 199223\ 
when the organisation imposed the ECOWAS arms embargo against Liberia. For 
the US, to whom many West African leaders looked for intervention, there was 
tremendous fear of permanent involvemenP32. It therefore acted on the belief 
that "this was something for the Liberians to work out themselves"233 and limited 
its action to arms-length diplomacY2 34 in the form of rhetorical condemnation of 
the war, the provision of emergency aid, and the protection of American 
nationals. In May 1990, a US naval-marine task force was deployed to the 
Liberian coast to evacuate American citizens. Though these troops could have 
lent a decisive hand to help end the war, it remained there for months "sailing 
and sailing" 235, doing nothing to stop the conflict or the slaughter. 
IV. The ECOWAS Intervention 
i) Peacemaking 
The vacuum left by the international community was filled by ECOWAS. 
With the view that West Africa's economic prosperity was being endangered by 
2:11 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 788,7 November 1992. 
232 Kramer, p. 7. 
2:13 Kramer, p. 5. 
2:1. Kramer, p. 8. 
235As quoted in Woods, "US Decisionmaking," in Clarke and Herbst, p. 172. 
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the ciyil war in Liberia and citing humanitarian grounds, it deyised the Standing 
Mediation Committee (SMC) on 28 May 1990, which was charged to mediate the 
ciyil war~:16. The SMC was composed of Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana, Togo, and Mali, 
the only Francophone state~37. However, the exclusion and dissent of key 
francophone states from the committee, namely Cote d'lvoire and Burkina Faso, 
marred ECOWAS' political exercise from its inception238 • 
Exacerbating the political process, and the later peacekeeping operation, 
was the strong enmity between Cote d'lvoire and Nigeria; both saw ECOWAS as a 
political playing field and acted accordingly, continually seeking to 
counterbalance one another's power. Their antagonism was manifested in their 
differing approaches to the conflict: while Cote d'lvoire and its allies sought 
political dialogue and negotiation, Nigeria had an overt preference for military 
action against Taylor's NPFL. This internal division continued to plague the 
organisation for years until Francophone states agreed to contribute troops to 
ECOMOG in 1995. Until that time, strategic alliances and the Anglophone-
Francophone rift prevented ECOWAS from reaching any consensus internally, 
and therefore from managing Liberia's conflict effectively. In the interim, the 
first Yamoussoukro Process of June 1991 tried to correct the regional divisions 
within the SMC by transforming the committee into a Francophone-dominated 
Committee of Five to include Ghana, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Togo, and Cote 
d'lvoire. This was designed to restore a diplomatic role to the Francophone 
23" Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 51. 
"r Nigeria prO\ided the largest component followed by Ghana. Sierra Leone, Gambia, and Guinea also 
prO\ided troops. These states formed part of the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC). 
"3R Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 50. 
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states and ,,;'as indeed a significant first step towards expanding the general 
consensus between ECOMOG members on a settlemenP:l9. 
Yet another contributing factor to the SMC's inefficiency was its lack of 
procedural guidelines. Indeed, the committee had barely existed for three 
months when ECOMOG's first troops arrived in Liberia in August 1990. The fact 
that its mandate was constructed to deal with conflict between "two or more 
member-states" 240 only made the operation more difficult. Therefore, it was 
largely unprepared to intervene in a civil war context, as it had neither the formal 
structure nor framework method to guide its actions. 
Shortly after the arrival of ECOMOG troops, the SMC created Liberia's 
Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) headed by Dr. Amos Sawyer, a 
Liberian political scientist. However, the IGNU was rejected by Taylor as a 
puppet of ECOMOG, on whose security it had come to rely on. This as well as its 
protection of humanitarian supplies and its clear opposition to Taylor's NPFL 
drew ECOMOG into the conflict as one of the actors. 
Between November 1990 and October 1991, the SMC initiated a number of 
unsuccessful peace talks between Doe and Taylor. However, Taylor continually 
refused to be disarmed by ECOMOG, which he saw as a Nigerian-led invasion 
force. ECOW AS' reliance on Nigeria for the brunt of the peacekeeping effort left 
it with little room to manoeuvre beyond Nigeria's purpose and Taylor's 
perceptions. Economic sanctions introduced in 1992 were also largely ineffective 
239 Mortimer, Robert A., "ECOMOG, Liberia, and Regional Security in West Africa," in Keller, Edmond 
.T., and Rothchild, Donald, (eds.), Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State SOYereignty 
and Regional Security (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 154. 
240 Official Journal of the Economic Community of West African States, decision A/DEC 9/5/90 
Relating to the Establishment of the Standing Mediation Committee, (NO\'ember 1991). As quoted in 
Mortimer, "ECOMOG, Liberia, and Regional Security," in Keller and Rothchild, p. 151. 
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and were undermined by the support certain ECOWAS members, such as 
Burkina Faso, gave to rebel factions. 
Liberia's ,'\'ar involved numerous actors and interests far beyond its own 
borders, which complicated ECOWAS and ECOMOG efforts from the onset. 
Indeed, the number of actors alone was cause for significant obstacles in trying to 
resolve the crisis. By 1991, there were no fewer than four factions taking part in 
the war: Taylor and his NPFL, ECOMOG forces, the Independent-NPFL (INPFL) 
under Prince Yormie Johnson, and the United Liberation Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia (ULIMO)241. Thus, ECOWAS' diplomatic efforts heeded 
little results until broader international support was forthcoming from the UN 
with the Cotonou Accords of 1993. 
ii) Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement 
The problems within ECOWAS inevitably extended to ECOMOG and 
prevented it from managing the conflict effectively. Firstly, the inability of 
ECOWAS members to reach a consensus compromised ECOMOG's peacekeeping 
and peace-enforcement efforts. Burkina Faso, along with the NPFL, continued to 
oppose the presence of peacekeepers, while ECOMOG itself collaborated ""ith 
anti-NPFL factions in pursuit of its mandate. These dynamics "deprived the 
intervention of universal legitimacy and support."242 
Secondly, perceptions held by rebel groups, and indeed by various 
ECOWAS member-states themselves, of Nigeria using ECOMOG as a vehicle for 
its regional policies severely hampered the operation. These perceptions were 
24' ULIMO was formed in Guinea and Sierra Leone in early 1991 through the amalgamation of three 
anti-Taylor groups: the Liberian Peace Council (LPC), the Liberian United Defence Force CLUDF), and 
the Moyement for the Redemption of Liberian Muslims CMRLM). 
242 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 50. 
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present from the moment of ECOMOG's creation and Nigeria's clear military, 
financial, and political domination of the operation did little to dispel such 
anxieties. Thus, when 3,000 ECOMOG forces arrived in MonrO\ia on 24 August 
1990, Taylor condemned its presence as Nigerian policy aimed at restoring the 
Doe regime and as an 'invasion force' to be resisted2 43. The peacekeepers 
therefore came under immediate attack from the NPFL. 
Even so, the absence of a ceasefire and of Taylor's consent to ECOMOG as 
a peacekeeping force did not stop the peacekeeping troops from continuing its 
mission. It did, however, make traditional peacekeeping impossible and led 
ECOMOG to use considerable force to physically insert itself into the conflict. As 
a result, it amended its peacekeeping mandate to one ofpeace-enforcemenP44, 
deploying a total of 6,000, mostly Nigerian, troops. This adjustment allowed 
ECOMOG forces to engage in combat operations against the NPFL, which was 
subsequently driven out of the capital. Although the \iolence subsided and 
humanitarian agencies returned to deliver desperately needed supplies, 
ECOMOG had instantly compromised its neutrality by fighting alongside the AFL 
and the INPFL, two NPFL foes. 
The enforcement action once again brought to light the tensions among 
ECOW AS member-states, as many were strongly opposed to this approach. Such 
differing military approaches and the Nigerian government's lack of consultation 
y,ith other contingent commanderS245, an accusation made again during 
ECOMOG's intervention in Sierra Leone, were a constant undercurrent of 
24J Cberie, "Liberia's War and Peace Process," in Aboagye and Bah, p. 55. 
244 Olaiya, Lt. Col. A., "ECOMOC Mission and Mandate," The Peacemaker 1 (September 1991-March 
1992). As referred to in Olonisakin, Funmi, "Liberia," in Boulden, Dealing with Conflict, p. 116. 
245 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 56. 
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ECO\'V AS' internal friction. Indeed, as Adebajo notes, "[ e ]yen judged by the 
terms of ECOWAS' own charter and defence protocols, ECOMOG was on shaky 
legal foundations, with no specific clauses allowing for military interyention in a 
member-state's internal conflict."246 Doe's brutal murder on 9 September 1990 
by INPFL forces under ECOMOG's watchful eye led many more to question why 
the peacekeepers did not act to save Doe. This was one of many events that 
undermined ECOMOG's credibility as a legitimate peacekeeping force. 
V. The Conflict Regionalised 
On 23 March 1991, Taylor encouraged a group of Liberian-based Sierra 
Leonean rebels, known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), to spread the 
conflict from northern Liberia into Sierra Leone's diamond mining area. He 
argued that Sierra Leone had made itself a legitimate target by allowing its 
territory to be used as an ECOMOG base. However, Taylor had much to gain by 
deliberately extending the conflict into Sierra Leone: he calculated that acquiring 
the diamond region of Sierra Leone could serve to fund his own war while 
simultaneously destabilising Sierra Leone's weak government, thus pressuring it 
into withdrawing from ECOMOG. In addition, as civil war in Liberia escalated 
into a war between Taylor's NPFL and ECOMOG forces, Taylor looked to Sierra 
Leone's border to open up a second front against ECOMOG247. This would 
weaken its efforts in Liberia and expose its inability to keep peace and to prevent 
the war from spreading248. However, his plans were frustrated by ECOMOG's 
246 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 50. 
or Cleayer, Gerry, "Sierra Leone: A Victim of Intervention," in Furley, OIiyer, and May, Roy, (eds.), 
African Interyentionist States (London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2001), p. 215. 
248 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 54. 
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growing presence in Sierra Leone, which also reinforced his perceptions of the 
peacekeeping force as his riyal. 
By 1992, ECOMOG's financial constraints had become more \'isible. In 
October, Taylor launched Operation Octopus, a major attack on Monroyia, which 
further exposed ECOMOG's reliance on Nigeria. Howeyer, ECOMOG's 
dependence on the Nigerian army and navy, which supplied more troops and 
heavy weaponry in an otherwise conventional battle, and its fighting alongside 
ULIMO and AFL, renewed doubts over the regional force's stated impartiality. 
Its ever-changing role from one of peacekeeper to peace-enforcer only increased 
the NPFL's suspicion, hardened Taylor's uncompromising attitude, and 
constrained ECOMOG's ability to stop the fighting. 
VI. The UN 
In November 1992, Liberia's civil war finally received high-level attention 
when the UN, in support ofthe ECOWAS arms embargo, imposed the embargo 
on all parties to the conflicP49. Prior to this international backing, ECOMOG 
had been unable to implement the ban due to Taylor's refusal to be disarmed by 
ECOMOG forces. Following the appointment of a SRSG, however, Taylor's tone 
changed immediately and he declared his willingness to abide by the 
Yamoussoukro IV decisions under UN, rather than ECOMOG, supen'ision250 • 
VII. The First Joint ECOWAS-UN Collaboration 
The Cotonou peace agreement was signed on 25 July 1993 between Taylor, 
ULIMO, and the IGN. An attempt was made to legitimise ECOMOG by, firstly, 
2~9 UN Security Council Resolution 78819 Noyember 1992. 
250 Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Regional Organisations," p. 278. 
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"de-Nigerian ising" and expanding it by bringing in Francophone states, some of 
which were openly supportive of Taylor, as well as troops from Tanzania and 
Uganda. Secondly, a small UN monitoring force of 368 personnel v,'as created 
under Security Council Resolution 8662 .')1 and launched in September 1993 to 
supervise and monitor ECOMOG's implementation ofthe agreement. The United 
Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) was to support ECOWAS and the 
Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) in implementing the peace 
agreement, investigating ceasefire violations, assisting in the demobilisation of 
combatants, investigating human rights violations252 • 
However, difficulties in the ECOMOG-UNOMIL relationship quickly 
emerged. Firstly, friction between the organisations at all levels - from political 
direction to local command to personnel on the ground - was high, creating an 
undercurrent of mistrust and mutual disrespecps3. The hostility underlying this 
'partnership' was partly rooted in the West African forces' resentment that they 
required supervision and that their authority had been usurped by the 
international organisation, which had conceded Liberia little attention in the past 
three years. Also contributing to the underlying hostility were perceptions that 
the UN was naIve and insufficiently robust in dealing with the armed factions, 
especially the NPFU54. UNOMIL's legitimacy and authority suffered even more 
due to its powerlessness to investigate, or to act against, increasing accusations 
2 0' United Nations, Security Council Resolution 866,22 September 1993. 
20 2 See UNOMIL on the UNDPKO website. 
http://\nnull1.org!Depts!dpko!dpko!comission!unomil.htm. See also The Cotonou Agreement, 
Section E, paragraph 1. Ayailable at http://www.c-r.org/accord/lib/accordl/cotonou.shtml 
2,i3 MacQueen, p. 185. 
2J4 Tuck, Christopher, '''EYery Car or Moving Object Gone': The ECOMOG IntelYention in Liberia," 
African Studies Quarterly 4:1 (2000). Available at b.!1RJ.D\'eb.africa.ufl.edu!asqh--th4ila1.htm 
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m'er ECOMOG's bad behmiour, which led to its nickname "Every Car or Moying 
Object Gone." 
Lastly, because UNOMIL was simply there to "support" ECOWAS, UN 
monitors were completely dependent on ECOMOG for their own personal 
security and that of their mission as a whole25.'i. As a monitoring and legitimating 
mission, this severely hampered UNOMIL's independence and its ability to carry 
out its mandate, particularly the investigative tasks. When ECOMOG protection 
was not forthcoming, UNOMIL's redundancy was obvious. Its weakness was 
revealed in September 1994 when 40 UN observers were captured, abused, and 
had their transport and equipment seized by elements of the NPFL in a number 
of locations throughout eastern and northern Liberia. As a result, UN observers 
were withdrawn from areas of high risk until they remained only in Monrmia, 
severely limiting the UN's role outside the capital. UNO MIL's role was again 
diminished following some of the worst fighting to date in Monrovia at the 
beginning of 1996. As the US moved to evacuate its foreign nationals UNOMIL 
personnel were reduced to single digit figures. 
VIII. The War's End and Resumption 
On 19 July 1997, with the second Abuja Accord signed and disarmament 
scheduled, Charles Taylor was elected President with a 75% majority. His win, 
denounced as a 'farcical affair'2s6 within Liberia, has largely been attributed to the 
general fear of a resumption of war if he lost. Upon election, Taylor's government 
"continue[d] to function without accountability, exacerbating the divisions and 
2,>., MacQueen, p. 182. 
2,6 Gberie, "Liberia's War and Peace Process," in Aboagye and Bah, p. 61. 
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resentments fuelled by the war, "",,7 according to a 2002 Human Rights Watch 
report. Violence continued and, as Lansana Gberie contends, "the war neyer 
really ended with the elections ... , because pockets of fighting began soon 
afterwards, in 1998.""SR Full-blown civil war erupted once again in 1999 when 
fighting began along the Liberian-Guinean border. The Liberians United for 
Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), consisting offormer ULIMa fighters 
actiyely supported by the Guinean goYernment, emerged in protest against 
Taylor's rule. The fighting soon spread from the north of Liberia into the west 
and the centre of the country. 
In April 2003, the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), a 
faction of LURD armed and supported by the Ivorian government, also appeared, 
extending the fighting into Liberia's south while LURD rebels attacked from the 
north. Within months, Taylor barely controlled one third of the country and 
LURD rebels approached Monrovia. This second leg of the Liberian civil war 
occurred amid ECOW AS and UN efforts to consolidate peace in neighbouring 
Sierra Leone and overlapped with Cote d'lvoire's first military coup in September 
2002. Thus, Liberia's war once again reached into its neighbouring countries. 
i) The ECOW AS Mission in Liberia 
Like a decade earlier, Liberians and the international community looked 
for an American-led intervention. Instead, President George W. Bush's urged 
2,- Human Rights Watch, "Back to the Brink: War Crimes by the Liberian Goyernment and Rebels," 
Human Rights Watch Report 14:4 (May 2002), p. 2. Available at 
http://\\"\\"\\.hm.org/reports/2002/liberia/Liberia0402.pdf 
258 Gberie, "Liberia's \Var and Peace Process," in Aboagye and Bah, p. 62. 
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Taylor to leave Liberia immediately:!fi9 in order for there to be peace and 
stability:!60. Though this was one of his administration's firmest statements on an 
African crisis, it fell short of expectations. Rather than send its own troops, the 
US provided logistical support to ECOWAS, which intervened on 4 August 2003· 
The fighting stopped almost immediately. Howeyer, the ECOWAS Mission in 
Liberia (ECOMIL) experienced similar military, personnel, and financial 
limitations as its predecessor. This was due to the continuing limited capacity of 
ECOWAS member-states, which was heightened by the changing internal politics 
of West African states at this time. Their transition towards more democratic 
conditions made newly-elected regimes sensitive to public opinion and subject to 
parliamentary constraints. Nigeria in particular, which had footed the majority 
of ECOMOG's bill, could no longer uphold ECOMIL single-handedly as it had 
previously. Thus, at its strongest, ECOMIL stood at just 3,500 troops, 
contributed from eight member-states261. As a result, ECOMIL was unable to 
establish security beyond the capital262. 
Neyertheless, Charles Taylor relinquished power on 11 August 2003 and 
departed Liberia for exile in Nigeria. He remained there until March 2006, when 
he was transferred to Sierra Leone's Special Court for charges of war crimes 
259 United States GoYernment, Office of the Press Secretary, "President Reaffirms Strong Position on 
Liberia," 14 July 2003. Ayailable at http://\\'\\'\\".\\hitehouse.gO\)ne\l·s!releascs/200'3/07/20030714-
'3.html 
260 Swart, Gerrie, "The Current Crisis in Liberia: On the Bring of Africa War Two?" AlSA Electronic 
Monograph, 15 July 2003. Ayailable at http://www.ai.org.za/electronic ll1onograph.asp"!ID=8 
26. Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Benin, Gambia, and Togo contributed troops. 
262 US Agency for International DeYelopment, "Liberia - Complex Emergency," Situation Report #11, 
17 September 2003. Ayailable at 
http://II'I'I. humanitarianinfo.org/liberia/i nfocent re Isitrepsl doc ILi beria %20Situat ion%20 Reportll % 
20FY%202003·doc 
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committed by rebels suppOlted and controlled by him during the war26:l • He is 
currently awaiting trial by the Special Court at The Hague. On 18 August, the 
Government of Liberia, LURD, and MODEL signed a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) in Accra. The agreement called for the establishment of the 
LNTG, comprised of LURD, MODEL, and elements from Taylor's regime, that 
would assume power in October 2003. ECOMIL was to be subsumed within a 
multi-dimensional UN peace support mission. 
ii) The UN Mission in Liberia 
Following Taylor's resignation, Security Council adopted Resolution 1509 
on 19 September 2003, which called for the deployment of 15,000 peacekeeping 
troops and 1,115 civilian police officers. The United Nations Mission in Liberia 
(UNMIL) was mandated to carry out DDR programmes, provide security for 
government installations, facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, 
protect civilians, and assist the transitional government, along with ECOMIL, to 
prepare for the October 2005 elections. Given this closer collaboration between 
ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN from the inception of the peace process, UNMIL 
was established with considerable ease, in sharp contrast to the tenuous relations 
between the UN and ECOMOG in the 1990S. 
Although ECOMIL's "advance force [in] Liberia provided a critical 
breathing space for the deployment of UNMIL,"264 the transfer from ECOMIL to 
the UN was not without its own challenges. The handover is said to have taken 
place before the UN was even ready to take command. This appears to have been 
26:1 This marked the first time a former African head of state had been arrested and charged \,ith 
human rights abuses committed in office. 
264 Jones and Cherif, p. 22. 
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motivated by a desire to shift rapidly towards financial burden-sharing2fl5 • The 
UN subsequently took over from ECOMIL in October 2003. Elections were held 
as scheduled in October 2005, which saw Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf elected as 
Africa's first female president. 
Sierra Leone 
I. The Civil War - A Summary 
Civil war in Sierra Leone began in March 1991 when the RUF under Foday 
Sankoh invaded the east of the country, ostensibly to overthrow Siaka Stevens' 
repressive regime. The rebels, and later its allies, the Armed Forces 
Revolutionary Council CAFRC), quickly demonstrated their brutality by using 
mass rape, physical mutilation, and young children as soldiers in an effort to 
instil terror among civilians. The country's diamond-mining regions were 
captured and used to finance their war. This plundering, practiced for over a 
decade by successive regimes, has led to Sierra Leone's ranking as the world's 
second poorest country according to the 2006 Human Development Index266 . 
As in Liberia, ECOW AS was the first organisation to send troops to Sierra 
Leone. However, its new-born security efforts continued to be hampered by 
internal rifts between Anglophone-Francophone member-states and their 
divisive support for various rebel factions involved in the conflict. ECOWAS was 
again militarily, financially, and institutionally unable to provide the decisive and 
205 Ibid. 
266 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2006: Beyond 
Scarcity: Power. Pm"ert)'. and the Global Water Crisis (New York, 2006). Statistics available at 
hi Ip: IIhdr. u ndp.org/ hdr2oo6/sta tis tics! 
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sustained support required. These were eventually supplied by the country's 
former colonial master, Britain, which was instrumental in establishing 
UNAMSIL. 
The civil war was officially declared over in 2002 by President Kabbah 
follmving the completion of the demobilisation and disarmament programme of 
former-combatants. To "create an impartial historical record of violations and 
abuses of human rights"267, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, loosely 
modelled on South Africa's, was established and a Special Court created to try 
those "bear[ing] the greatest responsibility for the commission of crimes against 
humanity"268. 
II. History and Conflict Dynamics 
i) Settlement, Colonial Rule, and Exploitation 
Sierra Leone's capital, Freetown, was first settled by freed slaves from 
Britain in 1787. Five years later, it became Britain's first official West African 
colony and in 1808 the surrounding area was integrated under colonial rule. As 
the Americo-Liberians in Liberia, the freed British slaves, known as the Creoles, 
formed a minority 2% of the population. These "Black British" governed Sierra 
Leone until its independence on 27 April 1961 and implemented Britain's 
imperial policy of exploitation and extraction; a policy that generated poverty, an 
uneducated population, and massive unemployment. Emphasis on the country's 
diamond industry distracted from its agricultural base, which aggravated poverty 
26- Government of Sierra Leone, The Truth and Reconciliation Commissionfor Sierra Leone, 9 April 
2003. A\"ailable at http://mn,·.sierra-leone.org/trc-trcforsierraleone.html 
268 See Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Courtfor Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002. Available at http://mm.sc-
sl.orgl scsi-agreement. ht III I 
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and unemplo}111enpb9. As a result, politics became "a contest in which the 
objective was to seize control ofthe state and use it for the good of one's ethnic 
group"270. In 1978, a one-party system was established by President Siaka 
Stevens (1968-1985) under his party, the All People's Congress (APC). His 
successor, Major General Joseph Momoh (1985-1992) ruled under a self-declared 
state of emergency, which granted him greater access to the country's diamond 
mining industry. This misrule perpetuated the economic, social, and political 
unrest that began in the 1960s, as well as the government's reputation for 
participating in the extraction of the country's natural resources, namely its 
diamonds2 7 1• 
ii) Civil War in Liberia 
Regional events in the 1990S impacted heavily on Sierra Leone's stability. 
In March 1991, Sierra Leone was deliberately targeted by Charles Taylor, who 
imported his war to achieve strategic goals. The country was targeted specifically 
because Nigerian air forces were based at Freetown's Lungi Airport for their 
bombing missions against NPFL forces in Liberia272 • Sierra Leone's association 
v.ith ECOMOG and its integral role as a part of ECOMOG's logistical supply route 
made it a natural target and enemy for Taylor. 
III. The Civil War 
269 Ofuatey-Kodjoe, W., "Sierra Leone," in Boulden, Dealing with Conflict, p. 129. 
2-0 Ibid. 
n Ofuatey-Kodjoe, "Sierra Leone," in Boulden, p. 131. 
2-2 Africa Confidential, "How Diamonds Fuelled the Conflict," Special Reports, April 1998. Available at 
http: (h,"\ 1\ , .. africa -confidential.com (index.aspx'?pagei d = 17 &special report id =4 
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The RUF attacks on Sierra Leone in March 1991 marked the beginning of 
the country's 11 year civil war. Within a year, the rebel groUP"7:l controlled over 
halfthe country, including most ofthe diamond-producing areas. Nigeria was 
the first regional actor to intervene in March 1993. Since ECOMOG was deeply 
engaged in Liberia, it did so unilaterally based on a bilateral defence treaty ",ith 
the Government of Sierra Leone. Indeed, it was not until 1997 that ECOMOG 
officially became involved in Sierra Leone as a peacekeeping force. In the 
interim, Nigeria acted in support of Strasser's Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and its 
attempt to consolidate security and to reclaim the north of the country. Although 
no fighting took place, Nigeria's pro-Strasser gesture put it at the head of the 
anti-RUF campaign and severely compromised ECOMOG's efforts when it later 
entered as a peacekeeping force274. 
Following the RUF's occupation of the diamond-mining regions of Sierra 
Leone in January 1995 and its approach towards Freetown, Strasser solicited help 
from ECOMOG in Liberia and Executive Outcomes (EO), a South African PMC, 
in his fight against the RUF.27.') EO successfully re-established security for the 
return of 300,000 refugees, drove the RUF out of Freetown into the interior, and 
recaptured the mines 
27:l The RUF consisted mostly of disenfranchised youths, Burkinabes, and members ofTay]or's 
NPFL. 
0-4 MacQueen, p. 181. 
2-5 In exchange for its senices, EO was paid $1.8 million per month and its partner company was 
awarded access to the country's diamond-mining areas. See Montague, Dena, "The Business of War 
and the Prospects for Peace in Sierra Leone," Brown JOllrnal of World Affairs 9:1 (Spring 2002): 229-
237· 
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EO's involvcment in the civil war offers an cxample of a growing trend 
witnessed in conflicts "in over fifty nations, on every continent but Antarctica" ~76 
that has raised questions over the drafting of these modern-day mercenaries. For 
PMCs are business ventures and have been hired by democratic governments, the 
UN, humanitarian organisations, as well as dictatorships, rebel groups, and drug 
cartels277. These freelance guns-for-hire companies can be extremely precarious 
if employed by the \\Tong group, acting as destabilising agents in a conflict and 
obstructing the end of violence. Moreover, as businesses seeking a profit, PMCs 
have limited interests in providing security beyond their mandate or in 
productively working towards ending the violence. In Sierra Leone, EO's services 
were narrowly focused and "civilians unfortunate enough to be living outside of 
[the mineral rich enclaves of Kono and the Kangari Hills] would have been 
foolish to count on Executive Outcomes' protection."278 
Secondly, the hiring of PMCs by impoverished governments can hinder a 
country's long-term recovery. Thus, the short-term security provided by EO tied 
the Government of Sierra Leone to a mining deal secured at a time of 
desperation. It left the government with a $30 million debt to EO 2 79 , which was 
aggravated by a 10% reduction of GDP and a 35% rise in inflation280 • This 
severely impeded the government's ability to economically rebuild the country or 
to develop its resources in the long-term. Lastly, the largest problem lies with the 
2-6 Singer, P.W., "Outsourcing War," Foreign Affairs 84:2 (March-April 2005): 119-125; p. 119. 
2-- Singer, p. 121. 
2-8 \'an Maanen, Michael, "Sa\ing the Sum of Things for Pay: Executi\'e Outcomes in Sierra Leone," in 
Hirsch, John, Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy (Boulder: L~l1ne Rienner, 
2001), p. 6. 
2-9 Others report that the total cost of Executive Outcomes' acthities totaled $60 million. See McGhie, 
Stuart, "Private Military Companies: Soldiers, Inc.," Janes Defence Weekly, 22 May 2002. Available at 
http://lnn,.sandline .com/hotlinks/20020518-jallesl default.ht ml 
280 Montague, p. 233. 
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contracting goyernment. Once the company's mandate is over, governments are 
often left to their own inadequate security devices in the ensuing vacuum. The 
Government of Sierra Leone was thus wholly dependent on EO to maintain 
security in order for it to remain in power. As a result, although elections were 
held in March 1996, only a year after EO's entry in the conflict, the new regime 
under Ahmad Tejan Kabbah faced no less than three coup attempts ",ithin its 
first 10 months in office281 • 
Indeed, EO's withdrawal from Sierra Leone in January 1997 in accordance 
",ith the Abidjan peace agreement, signed on 30 November 1996, was quickly 
followed by Kabbah's overthrow by army general Johnny Paul Koroma, leader of 
reconstituted units of the SLA, known as the AFRC. Almost immediately, 
Koroma suspended the constitution, established the AFRC as the ruling party and 
unpredictably imited the RUF, against whom they had reportedly been fighting 
for the last six years, to join his government. The RUF accepted, declaring its 
rebellion over and ruled with terror as part of the Government of Sierra Leone. 
This unlikely alliance confirmed many suspicions that these sobels282 fought the 
war in Sierra Leone as a means to profit from the exploitation of the country's 
diamond resources under the pretext of warfare, rather than for political 
IV. The UN: Non-Interventionism 
281 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 85. 
282 This term was used to describe SLAI AFRC soldiers who killed, maimed, and looted alongside the 
RUF rebels by night. 
28J For further reading, see Smillie, Ian, Cberie, Lansana, and Hazleton, Ralph, The Heart of the 
Matter: Sierra Leone, Diamonds & Human Security (Ontario: Partnership Africa Canada, January 
2000). 
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The UN's contribution to re-establishing Sierra Leone's security was 
minimal until 1999, when the Chapter VII-mandated United Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established. Prior to this, UN inyolvement was 
limited to verbal condemnations of the humanitarian crisis generated by the 
fighting284, as reported by the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 
(UNOMSIL)28s. Even support to ECOWAS was limited until October 1997, when 
the UN placed an oil and arms embargo against Sierra Leone, charging ECOW AS 
"'lith its implementation and declaring that it would take 'appropriate measures' 
to restore Kabbah 286. However, this measure was negligible due to ECOMOG's 
inability to reinforce Liberia's permeable borders, which made the embargo easily 
and widely breached. 
Of particular significance was the Security Council's silence regarding 
Nigeria's unilateral intervention in Sierra Leone. This had the effect of silently 
legitimating the attacks and stands in sharp contrast to the international 
condemnation faced by NATO's unilateral action in the Balkans two years later in 
1999. The UN's hands-off approach at this time was shaped by the backlash of 
the humiliation of the failed peace operations in Somalia and Rwanda. Indeed, 
Sierra Leone's civil war occurred amidst the UN's withdrawal from peace 
operations in Africa. In particular, the US, with its policy of non-involvement 
codified in PDD-25, "watched attentively and approved regional mediation efforts 
28-1 For an example, refer to United Nations, Statement by the President of the Security Council, 11 .July 
1997· 
21'5 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1181, 13 July 1998. 
086 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1132, 8 October 1997. 
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in Sierra Leone ... but took no active role and worked to send late and 
inappropriately limited UN forces to Sierra Leone as UNOMSIL."~H7 
V. The ECOWAS Intervention 
i) Peacemaking 
The void left by the international community in Sierra Leone brought 
action from the sub-regional level. Thus, while the UN looked to the Balkans, 
Kabbah's overthrow triggered Nigeria, supported by ECOMOG troops and 
Sandline, EO's sister company288, to attack Freetown on 1 June 1997 in a quest to 
force the junta to step down. This intervention was a unilateral one based on a 
bilateral defence treaty between the Nigerian and Sierra Leonean governments; it 
was not authorised by the UN or ECOW AS, which did not formally give its 
authorisation until August 1997 after substantial persuasion from Nigeria. Less 
than a year later, ECOW AS leaders formally decided that it would not be 
necessary for the organisation to seek Security Council authorisation prior to 
launching future ECOMOG interventions289. This was determined based on the 
Security Council members' own unwillingness to intervene or to sanction UN 
peace operations in Liberia or Sierra Leone and with the belief that autonomy 
over this decision should remain within ECOWAS290 • 
To the detriment of later peacekeeping efforts, Nigeria's natural alliance 
with the Government of Sierra Leone caused the AFRC and the RUF to declare 
28- Zartman, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 97. 
2R8 For more information, see British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "PriYate Military Companies: 
Options for Regulation," 24 June 2002. Links available at 
http://m, ,'. fco.goY. u kl sef';letl Front '?pagena m c =0 pcnMarkctlXcclcratc I Show Page&c = Page&cid = 10 
24678808748 
289 Adebajo, Adekeye, "The ECOW AS Security Mechanism: Towards a Pax West Africana," paper 
presented at the CODESRIA General Assembly Meeting, Kampala, December 2002. Ayailable at 
htl p: I/ln\"\\.codesria.org/ Archi\es/ga1O/papers ga 10 12/Eco\\as Adebajo.htm 
290 Ibid. 
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their fight against the inyading force, as the NPFL had in Liberia. Howe\'er, 
Nigeria's initiati\'e failed to bring dmvll Koroma and an emphasis was placed on 
peacemaking. In August 1997, ECOWAS leaders implemented a "total embargo 
on all supplies of petroleum products, arms and military equipment" against 
Sierra Leone and required all member-states to abstain from conducting business 
v-.ith it. These sanctions, along with political dialogue and the use of force, 
formed the core of ECOWAS' effort to restore Kabbah291• A Committee of Four 
was created292 to oversee the implementation of these measures293 and differed 
from its predecessor in that Francophone countries were involved from the start, 
resulting in fewer criticisms of Nigerian domination as well as less hostility 
between the Anglophone and Francophone states. 
ii) Peacekeeping and Peace-enforcement 
Although ECOMOG successfully restored the democratically-elected 
Kabbah on 10 March 1998, its peacekeeping and peace-enforcement efforts were 
plagued by problems that had already been encountered in Liberia. Nigeria's 
support for Kabbah made ECOMOG's peacekeeping efforts "dead on arrival"294. 
Moreover, the support given by certain ECOWAS members towards various 
factions of the conflict divided the organisation and prevented it from functioning 
effectively. In particular, Burkina Faso and Liberia had a clear preference for the 
RUF and both countries had provided military training and arms to the RUF 
291 Ofuatey-Kodjoe in Boulden, p. 133. 
292 The Committee consisted of Nigeria, Guinea, Cote d'Ivoire, and Ghana. This later became the 
Committee of Five when Liberia joined. In 1999, it expanded once again to become the Committee of 
Se\'en after Togo and Burkina Faso also joined. 
293 ECOWAS, "Decision on Sanctions against the junta in Sierra Leone," 26 June 1997. Available at 
htl p: / /\\W\\' .sierra-leone.org/ ecowaso62697.html 
294 Ofuatey-Kodjoe in Boulden, p. 142. 
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prior to ECOMOG's launch. They were countered by Nigeria's support for the 
GoSL, which proyoked significant criticism from the afore-mentioned members. 
Secondly, ECOMOG continued to face difficulties as a result of issues oyer its 
funding. The monitoring group's improvised creation in reaction to ciyil war in 
Liberia made its financing based purely on voluntary contributions from 
ECOW AS members and international donors. Thus, it had neither a reliable nor 
a broad financial base, which limited its ability to respond to crises. 
Consequently, ECOMOG remained ill-equipped throughout its operation in 
Sierra Leone and this contributed to its inability to defeat the AFRC and the RUF 
in a conventional war. 
More significantly, the financial scheme encouraged near-impunity for any 
country willing to cover the costs of an operation. As in Liberia, Nigeria bore the 
greatest financial burden in Sierra Leone, militarily dominating 90% of 
ECOMOG's troops. As a result, "[t]he spectre of Nigeria as a bullying hegemon 
continued to haunt multilateral peacekeeping efforts in Sierra Leone, as it had 
done in Liberia."295 This led many Nigerian commanders to compare their 
dominance ofthe force to the US role in NAT0296 . However, according to 
Adebajo, in spite of Nigeria's dominance over ECOWAS, it was in reality an 
aspiring hegemon at best because it lacked the legitimacy and the capability 
required of a hegemon297. Nevertheless, when Nigeria's General Abdulsalam 
Abubukar called on ECOW AS members to provide more troops in order to 
expand and diversify ECOMOG's presence in May 1998, no ECOWAS member 
293 Ibid. 
2<JU Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 91. 
2<)- Adebajo, "In Search of Warlords", p. 64. 
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responded. Accordingly, as Adebajo notes, while many ECOWAS members 
criticised Nigeria for its unilateral military actions in Sierra Leone, little could be 
done to dilute Nigeria's strength2 9H. Thus, for all its criticisms, there ,,,"as no other 
state in West Africa that was able to counter or neutralise Nigeria's perceived 
dominance. 
VI. The Second ECOWAS-UN Collaboration 
UNAMSIL, the second UN mission to Sierra Leone, was dispatched in July 
1998. Though authorised with 70 military observers, only 40 were deployed to 
monitor ECOMOG's provision of security, its demobilisation of combatants, and 
its respect for humanitarian law over a six month period299 • Rebel activity 
intensified in October 1998 in reaction to Sankoh's death sentence, handed in 
abstentia by Kabbah in October 1998 during a series of trials for captured junta 
soldiers30o . By December 1998, the AFRC and the RUF, strengthened by support 
from Burkina Fas0301 , were once again on the outskirts of Freetown and on 6 
January 1999 launched a devastating attack on the capital. The fighting was so 
intense that thousands, including President Kabbah, fled the city. In a replay of 
UNOMIL's withdrawal from Monrovia in 1996, UNOMSIL personnel were 
quickly evacuated. 
UNOMSIL's early withdrawal rendered another UN mission ineffectual 
when it was most necessary. As a result, it failed to successfully oversee 
ECOMOG's collection and destruction of arms, although this part of their 
mandate had become irrelevant even before the fighting in Freetown began due 
298 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 89. 
299 United Nations, Security Council Resolution U81, 13 July 1998. 
:lOO Sankoh was detained in Nigeria in March 1997. 
301 MacQueen, p. 52. 
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to the deteriorating situation, which effectively ended any possibility of voluntary 
disarmament from either side. The Secretary-General's report to the Security 
Council reflected the failure ofthe UN's monitoring mandate, citing ECOMOG's 
abuse of its powers in instances of arbitrary execution of suspected rebels and 
their supporters as well as the indiscriminate use of air power302 • 
By the beginning of 1999 it was clear that the situation was deteriorating: 
Kabbah lacked the resources and national support to exercise political control 
over the country and ECOMOG could not continue maintaining the balance of 
power on Kabbah's behalf on an ad hoc basis. Thus, ECOWAS, at the urging of 
the UN, Britain, and the US, Kabbah settled with Sankoh and the RUF, which led 
to the signing of the Lome Agreement on 7 July 1999. The agreement called for 
the DDR of all warring factions, lifted the death sentence on Sankoh, and brought 
the RUF and AFRC into a new government of national unity with Kabbah's Sierra 
Leone People's Party (SLPP). A controversial blanket amnesty for all crimes 
committed was granted to all belligerents and a truth and reconciliation 
commission was to be established. 
To maintain this tentative peace, the "Liberian peacekeeping model", in 
which the UN acted as a legitimating force to ECOMOG's intervention303 , was 
expanded into a "hybrid peacekeeping model". Accordingly, ECOMOG continued 
to act as the government's protection force and to exercise control over the areas 
it held. It also worked alongside and coordinated with UNAMSIL3°4 under a 
separate command structures. The West African force was later to be subsumed 
302 United Nations, Special Report ofthe Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission of 
Obser.'ers in Sierra Leone, 7 January 1999, 
303 MacQueen, p. 55. 
30~ United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1270, 22 October 1999. 
101 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
by the UN operation, or "blue-hatted". The joint mission was gi\'en Chapter VII 
pm,\'crs in order to assist the new government in implementing the ceasefire, 
complete the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration process, restore 
law and order, provide security throughout the country, and to facilitate the flow 
of people and humanitarian assistance3os . 
The operation faltered at the beginning of 2000 as the last ECOMOG 
personnel were departing and as UNAMSIL was preparing to move into the RUF-
held diamond mining areas306 . In May, cantonment centres in rebel areas were 
destroyed and UNAMSIL troops were attacked and abducted. By the middle of 
the month, 500 UN peacekeepers were being held hostage by the RUF and the 
West Side Boys:107 and another attack on Freetown was imminent. Morale within 
UNAMSIL was low and the operation seemed on the verge of collapse again. 
VII. The British Intervention 
On 7 May 2000, British troops launched Operation Palliser, which stepped 
in as a major independent force to sustain the UN-sponsored Lome Accord, 
bolster the failing UN operation, and to rescue the UN hostages and British 
nationals. However, as British forces occupied strategic positions around 
Freetown, "it was soon clear that this was largely a pretext for a more substantial 
intervention"308. The hostage crisis brought to the fore criticisms of the UN's 
failure to advance the peace process, which contrasted sharply with Britain's 
rapid deployment and quick stabilisation of the hostage crisis. This public fiasco 
30., United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1289, 7 February 2000. 
306 United Nations, Fourth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone, 19 May 2000. Ayailable at http://ww\\.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/UnamsilR1.htm 
:1°7 The West Side Boys were a gang composed of remnants of the SLA, the RUF, the AFRC, and 
ci,ilians who fought against both government and rebel forces. 
308 MacQueen, p. 56. 
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"led to perhaps the greatest crisis for United Nations peacekeeping in Africa since 
the Rwanda genocide of 1994.":10 9 British troops therefore remained deployed 
next to UNAMSIL in a separate but complementary military mission. Their high 
\lsibility actively deterred the RUF from moving into the capitaL British troops 
also undertook extensive re-training of the remnants of Sierra Leone's national 
army. This commitment came as part of the African Conflict Prevention Pool 
(ACPP) programme and has been a significant contribution to the post-conflict 
reconstruction of the country. The British intervention re-established security to 
Freetown and helped to sustain UNAMSIL, which peaked at 18,329 personnel in 
March 2002 to make it the UN's largest peacekeeping force at that time. 
VIII. The War's End 
A new peace agreement sponsored by ECOW AS and the UN was signed in 
Abuja on 10 November 2000, following Sankoh's arrest in Freetown. Issa Sessay, 
the RUF's new leader, was not the spoiler his predecessor was and agreed to 
UNAMSIL's deployment throughout the country while pledging to return 
equipment stolen during the May crisis and to resume the DDR process31O • By 
March 2001, UNAMSIL personnel were deployed throughout Sierra Leone, 
including the diamond mining areas, and DDR was taking place at an 
unprecedented pace. On 18 January 2002, President Kabbah formally declared 
an end to the civil war, marked by the disarmament of some 72,000 former 
combatants. 
309 MacQueen, p. 56. 
:lIO United Nations, Eighth Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra 
Leone, 15 December 2000. A\'ailable at 
http://\\\\\\·.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamsil/lJ namsilR I.htm 
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Cote d'Ivoire 
I. The Civil War - A Summary 
Cote d'IYoire, once one of Africa's most stable countries, recently joined 
the ranks of its West African neighbours overcome by destructive ciyil war. Its 
stable system began to fall apart in the late 1980s due to concerns oyer President 
Houphouet-Boigny's succession, the falling prices ofthe country's primary 
exports, and the disintegration of the army's command and control. Houphouet's 
successor stirred tensions over the issue of Ivorian nationality, bringing to the 
fore nationality and identity issues in a country with a substantial foreign 
national and immigrant population. In 2002, the disgruntled army launched 
coordinated attacks on government facilities, signifying the start of the civil war. 
Fighting between rebel forces in the north and government troops in the south 
effectively divided the country in two with French troops interposed along this 
line to guarantee a ceasefire. 
France in particular has demonstrated a return to its neo-colonial 
interventionist policies after its political and military failures in Africa in the 
1990S311 • However, its involvement in Cote d'Ivoire has led various factions to 
accuse the former colonial power of siding with the other, resulting in anti-
French, anti-West, and anti-UN demonstrations throughout the country. The 
ECOWAS operation, which was again the first international presence, was "blue-
.111 Most significantly. in 1998, the French Parliamentary Information Committee on Rwanda (Le mission 
d'in/ormation parlementaire /ra/ll;:aise sur Ie Rwanda) revealed that the French government had provided 
diplomatic, financiaL technical. and military support to the Rwandan government before and during the 
genocide in spite of an arms embargo. as well as to the Illterhamwe, and the/orees armees rH'andaises 
(FAR) who had carried out the genocide. (See Prunier for further reading.) Following these revelations, 
France slowly phased out its military bases and withdrew the number of its permanent troops and political 
support from many of its former colonies. It thus pulled out of Togo, closed its militiary base in the Central 
African Republic, and stopped its military support to Niger and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
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hatted" and subsumed within a larger Chapter VII UN peace operation in 2004 
and remains there at the time of writing. 
II. Background and Conflict Dynamics 
i) The Jewel of West Africa 
Cote d'lvoire became a French colony in 1893 and gained independence in 
1960 to become a model of political stability and economic prosperity. It avoided 
the military coups and internal wars that have plagued other African states since 
the independence era. Until the recent conflict began in 2002, Cote d'lvoire was 
West Africa's success story. In spite of its size, pre-1999 Cote d'lvoire was sub-
Saharan Africa's fourth largest economy, with a per capita gross domestic 
product (GDP) rate that was more than double Nigeria's, Africa's second largest 
economy312. 
ii) Felix Houphouet-Boigny 
Cote d'lvoire, which is predominantly Muslim in the north and Christian 
in the south, was united under Houphouet-Boigny, who ruled from independence 
until his death in 1993. Stability stemmed in part from Houphouet's close 
personal relations with the West, most notably with a string of governments from 
the country's colonial motherland, France. International investment in the 
country's coffee and cocoa industries helped it to develop economically in the 
1960s and 1970S to become the world's largest producer of cocoa and sub-
Saharan Africa's third largest economy after South Africa and Nigeria313. 
Houphouet began a policy of openly encouraging workers from poorer 
312 Gberie, Lansana, "The Crisis in Iyory Coast" Global Policy Forum, 24 June 2004. A\'ailable at 
http://I''I\'',globalpolicy,org/security/issues/iYOf\'/2004/0624anal \'ze, h tm 
313 Robinson, Simon, "Africa's 'Good Coup,'" Time Europe, 155:2 (New York: Time, Inc" 17 January 
2000), p, 27, 
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neighbouring countries into Cote d'Ivoirc in order to work its coffee and cocoa 
plantationS~14. The new immigrants, mostly employed in the agricultural sector, 
helped to form the basis of Cote d'Ivoire's economic boom and were integrated 
into Ivorian society, with many holding important governmental positions. 
In 1990, Houphouet legalised political opposition in an effort to 
democratise and won his first democratic election. His death three years later left 
a vacuum that contributed to the country's fall into civil war and signalled "not 
only the end of a political era ... but perhaps as well the end of the close French-
African relationship that he came to symbolise"315. 
iii) Regional Dynamics 
The regional dimensions of Cote d'Ivoire's civil war are numerous and are 
related to conditions in its neighbouring countries as well as to those within. The 
recent conclusion of brutal and protracted civil wars in neighbouring Liberia and 
Sierra Leone makes the outbreak of conflict in Cote d'Ivoire all the more 
significant. Porous borders between Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire have 
made the implementation of DDR programmes all but impossible. The Security 
Council has noted instances where arms are being smuggled from Liberia across 
the border into Cote d'Ivoire where, ifthey are not used, will attract more 
compensation once Ivorian disarmament begins316• This regional dynamic is 
further enhanced by allegations that Liberian President Charles Taylor and 
314 Ibid. 
31, Noble, Kenneth B., "Iyol)' Coast Buries its Father of Freedom," The New York Times, 8 Februal)' 
1994, pp. AI, As. 
316 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretal)'-General on the United Nations Mission in 
Cote d'lyoire submitted pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1514 (2003) of 13 Noyember 2003, 23 
Februal)' 2004. Link ayailable at http://w\.w.un.org/Docs/sc/sgrepo4.html 
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Burkinabe President Blaise Compaore have sponsored various rebel factions 
im'olved in the Cote d'Ivoire conflict. 
Fears that continued conflict in Cote d'Ivoire could stall the tenuous peace 
conditions in both Liberia and Sierra Leone are real and make concerted regional 
solutions necessary. Internally, COte d'Ivoire's large immigrant population from 
surrounding Burkina Faso, Mali, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea has made for 
an extremely volatile situation for the country itself and for the regions as a 
whole. Questions over Ivorian nationality have sparked widespread violence 
while the return of Cote d'Ivoire's immigrants to their homeland and Ivorian 
refugees have contributed to increased poverty in the receiving countries, placing 
more stress on regional relations. 
iv) The Motherland 
France's former colonial and political linkages, particularly among its 20 
former colonies, have profoundly impacted on contemporary African 
international relations and continue to shape West Africa's regional politics317• 
France's relationship with its African colonies during and since the colonial 
period has been characterised by an all-encompassing concept of relations based 
on cultural, political, economic, and military relations. These have been achieved 
through French cultural rayonnement, Paris' close personal ties with 
Francophone African leaders, the creation of a preferential economic zone (the 
Communautefranc;aise d'afrique (CFA) franc), and a series of bilateral defence 
and military cooperation agreements, of which one is with Cote d'Ivoire. Former 
:W Young, Cra\\ford, "The Heritage of Colonialism," in Harbeson, John W., and Rothchild, Donald S., 
Africa in World Politics: The African State System in Flux (Boulder: West,iew Press, 2000), p. 25. 
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President Mitterand's statement that "without Africa, France will no longer have 
a history in the twenty-first century" 318 demonstrates the thinking behind Paris' 
policy-making and helps to explain its strong presence - political, ecnomic, and 
military - in Cote d'Ivoire. As Boubacar Diop points out, "France is a central, and 
increasingly open, player in the [Ivorian] crisis"319. 
a) Post-Cold War Relations 
Although France has continued to regard most of its former-colonies in the 
region as its traditional sphere of influence, in the post -Cold War era, France 
disengaged somewhat from its former chasse gardee. Major steps were thus 
taken towards loosening France's economic and military grip in Africa: the CFA 
franc was devalued by 50% in January 1994 and France reduced many of its 
permanent troops and military bases. Adapting a more multilateral approach, 
France also extended its relations beyond the remit of its traditional pre-carre 
through greater cooperation with Anglophone African countries such as Rwanda, 
Zimbabwe, and South Africa, leading to a steady decline of bilateral aid to Cote 
d'Ivoire and its former colonial dependencies. 
b) Current Relations 
Within West Africa, France has sought to balance Nigeria's regional 
power, which it perceives as a potential threat to its small francophone ex-
colonies32o. COte d'Ivoire is a priority in this balance of power strategy, as 
demonstrated by France's permanent military presence there (and 22 other 
318 Andrew, Christopher M., "France: Adjustment to Change," in Bull, Hedley, and Watson, Adam, 
(eds.), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 337. 
]19 Diop, Boubacar Boris, "Ivory Cost: Colonial Adventure," Le monde diplomatique, April 2005. 
A\'ailable at http://mondediplo.com!2005!04l1Odiop?\ar rechen:he=diop 
320 Nigeria, on the other hand, \iews France's presence in the region as a 'Trojan Horse' strategy. See 
Adebajo, Adekeye, Building Peace, p. 31. 
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African states), which facilitates its ability to intervene in the rcgion "whcncver 
an unacceptable situation [has] to be remcdied":121. Although France has reduced 
its traditional presence from its former colonies and has v.idencd its policy to 
include non-traditional partners, its most recent military involvement in Cote 
d'Ivoire is an indication that a policy of intervention is again on the rise. 
A recent International Crisis Group (lCG) report stated that "[t]he stakes 
in Ivorian politics are largely economic, although the debate is predominantly 
phrased in ethno-nationalist terms. Violence or the threat of violence facilitate 
economic gain at many levels simultaneously." :322 Thus, the current crisis is 
perhaps better understood in the context of France's economic interests, which 
represent 33% of Cote d'Ivoire's foreign investments and 30% of the country's 
GDP32 3. French companies dominate Cote d'Ivoire's transport, water, electrical, 
communications, and banking sectors324 and France remains Cote d'Ivoire's 
biggest trading partner, with 13.3% of its exports headed there as of 2001325. 
France's political actions are therefore strongly framed and informed by its 
economic interests. 
v) Ethnicity and I'Ivoirite 
The predominantly Christian south has traditionally dominated Cote 
d'Ivoire's business, civil service, and government positions while the chiefly 
321 As stated by former president Giscard d'Estaing in Le Monde, 29 January 1981. 
:J22 International Crisis Group, "Cote d'Ivoire: No Peace in Sight," ICG Africa Report No. 82, 12 .July 
2004, p. 2. A\'ailable at 
http://\\\Y\\.icg.org!/librar\'/documents/africa/\\'est africa/082 cole d i\'oire no peace in sight. 
lllif 
323 Diop, "I\'OI')' Coast: Colonial Adventure." 
324 Ibid. 
323 According to the Economist Intelligence Unit 2003, as cited in Kohler, Jessica, "From Miraculous to 
Disastrous: The Crisis in Cote d'Ivoire," Centre for Applied Studies in International Negotiations, 
Geneva, August 2003, p. 31. Available at http://\\\\,\\.casin.ch/\\eb/pdf/cotedhoire.pdf 
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Muslim population in the north has been relatively impoverished and politically 
marginalised. This dynamic was aggravated by the country's 23% immigrant 
population:p6 , who mostly settled in the northern cocoa- and coffee-rich regions. 
This line between economics-driven migration and the patterns of new 
settlements of migrants, creating a north-versus-south mentality, "constitutes 
one of the major sources of [the country's] socio-political conflict."32 7 
United under Houphouet's rule, the drastic fall of world market prices in 
the early 1990S for coffee and cocoa triggered many Ivorians to view the presence 
of foreign workers as a burden, sowing seeds for the current disagreement over 
"who is, or should be, an Ivorian citizen."328 This notion of Ivoirite 
("Ivorianness") became the ultra-nationalist rhetoric of the ruling Front 
Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) in the late 1990S. 
III. The Deepening Crisis 
Controversies over Cote d'Ivoire's nationality laws exploded when 
President Bedie, Houphouet's successor, altered the country's constitution to 
stipulate that all presidential candidates must be born in Cote d'Ivoire to parents 
who are themselves born in the country. It is widely believed that this was 
adopted as a policy to block Bedie's main rival and threat, Alassane Ouattara of 
the Rassemblement des republicains (RDR), from running in the presidential 
326 It is estimated that there are 3 million Burkinabes, 2 million Malians, 500,000 to 1 million 
Ghanaians, oyer 250,000 Guineans and tens of thousands of Liberian refugees in Cote d'Iyoire. See 
Assie-Lumumba. 
32- Assie-Lumumba, N'Dri Therese, "Historical Perspectives on the Conflict in Cote d'Iyoire: A Critical 
Analysis in the Quest for Solutions," Africa Update 10:3 (Summer 2003). A\'ailable at 
http://\I'\\'\\.ccsu.eelu lafstuely lUDell 0-'3. html 
32 8 Ibid. 
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elections32 l). Ouattara, a Muslim northerner and a Prime Minister under 
Houphouet, was seen by the north as the fulfilment of its cry for justice and 
power-sharing.":l:;') 
President Bedie was overthrown by the military under General Guei in 
Cote d'Ivoire's first coup on 24 December 1999. This was viewed by most as a 
positive development: Western media described it as "Africa's good coup"331; 
Ouattara called it a revolution that would restore Cote d'Ivoire to democracy332 • 
However, General Guei began promoting Bedie's xenophobic policies, endorsing 
even stricter constitutional amendments that limited eligibility for those seeking 
political office. This sparked a fight for the presidency between Guei and his 
main rival Laurent Gbagbo, a Christian from the south. With Ouattara 
continually and deliberately marginalised in elections, Gbagbo was declared 
president in 2000333, leading to violent clashes between FPI and RDR supporters. 
The situation teetered between peace and violence until a new government of 
national unity was formed on 5 August 2002 that included all of the main 
opposition parties. 
IV. The Current Crisis 
Steps towards resolution and reconciliation were stopped short on 19 
September 2002 when attacks on military installations were launched 
simultaneously in Abidjan, Bouake, and Korhogo by soldiers protesting their 
329 Ouattara's mother was Burkinabe, 
330 Akarue, Josephine, "Cote d'Iyoire: The French Connection," New African 435 (December 
2004), p. 27. 
331 Robinson, p. 27. 
332 Ibid. 
333 Guei fled to Benin after the October 2000 elections, during which he dissolyed the National Election 
Commission. 
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unpaid wages. The number of rebels grew as civilians joined their ranks. 
Although the IYorian army, les Forces arnuies nationales du COte d'ivoire 
(FANCI), quickly repelled the rebels from the capital, it was unable to stop them 
from consolidating power in the northern and western regions of the country. 
Many students rallied behind the Mouvement patriotique de la Cote d'Ivoire 
(MPCI) under Guillaume Soro334. By the end of September 2002, Gbagbo, along 
with the Young Patriots:135, an umbrella group consisting of three student 
organisations336 held the south of Cote d'I voire. The emergence of the 
Mouveme1lt pour lajustice et la paix (MJP) and the Mouvement populaire du 
grand-ouest (MPIGO) 337, which held remnants of Liberian mercenaries, 
MODEL, and the RUF338, in October 2002 increased the number of actors to the 
conflict to no less than six factions competing for power, adding new dynamics to 
the conflict. 
V. The French Intervention 
i) Peacemaking 
In January 2003, France brokered the Linas-Marcoussis Peace Agreement 
between Gbagbo's FPI and nine of the major rebel factions339. The agreement 
called for: the establishment of a Government of National Reconciliation in which 
Gbagbo was to remain President, the appointment of a Prime Minister with wide-
ranging powers in agreement with the rebels, and the re-organisation of the 
314 The Nouvelles forces (NF) were the armed faction of the MPCI. 
:3:lS Also known as the Congrf!s panafricaine desjeunes patriots. 
336 These are the Front pour la liberation du grand-ouest (FLGO), the Front pour la securite du 
centre-ouest (FSCO), and the Groupe de patriotes pour la paix (GPP). 
33- These groups haye since joined forces and are collectiyely known as the Nouvellesforces. 
338 International Crisis Group, "Cote d'Ivoire: No Peace in Sight," p. 6. 
:<39 For a copy of the full text of the Linas-Marcoussis Accord, see International Crisis Group, "No Peace 
in Sight," appendix C. 
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army. On the issue of Ivorian citizenship, the agrecmcnt urged that it be resolved 
constitutionally, although the matter remains a contested point of the peace 
process at the time of \\Titing. French and ECOWAS peace operations were to 
support the implementation of the agreement. However, the agreement was met 
with widespread dissatisfaction and set off an increase in attacks against French 
foreign nationals and military bases340. Accusations flew and France was charged 
with complicity by both the Gbagbo government and rebels. 
ii) Peacekeeping 
Although Gabgbo himself favoured a French intervention, his wife 
adamantly insisted that the French were better off leaving Ivorians to their own 
devices341 . To Gbagbo's disappointment, following a succession of non-
interventionist governments in Paris that sought to "normalise" ties with Africa, 
France did not act to put down the September 2002 coup. The external power 
sought instead to protect its own interests and foreign nationals in the country. 
Approximately 700 French troops were sent on 22 September 2002 to stage a 
major evacuation of Western nationals from Bouake while thousands ofIvorians 
fled on foot. It was President Gbagbo who subsequently requested France to 
monitor the ceasefire pending the deployment of ECOW AS troops. France 
therefore launched Operation Licorne to facilitate the implementation of the 
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. Backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1464 of 
4 February 2003, the French, and later ECOW AS, were given Chapter VII powers 
"to take the necessary steps to guarantee the security and freedom of movement 
340 International Crisis Group, "Cote d'Iyoire: No Peace in Sight," p. 9. 
34 1 "Simone Gbagbo rejette les accords de Marcoussis," Le Figaro, 5 February 2003. Ayailable at 
http://leflgaro.figaro. net! cgi/ edition/genimprime'?cle=20030205. FI Go 117 
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oftheir personnel and to ensure ... the protection of civilians immediately 
threatened ,,,,ith political violence"342 • French troops, in cooperation the 
ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire (ECOMICI) and the United Nations Mission in 
Cote d'Ivoire (MINUCI)343, were deployed across Cote d'Ivoire and were able to 
contain the spread ofviolence344 by enforcing the zone de confiance, which 
effectively prevented both the government forces and the rebels from moving 
further north or south. 
However, the buffer line raised further suspicions from both sides over 
France's true intentions for its involvement in the country. The rebels perceived 
the ceasefire line as Paris' political manoeuvring to keep Gbagbo in power veiled 
under a peacekeeping smokescreen. Acknowledging the role of French troops, 
SOl'O conceded that the "only thing separating us [the NF] from taking power in 
Abidjan was the French."345 On the other hand, pro-Gbagbo factions also accused 
France of aiding and protecting the rebels, with some accusing France of helping 
to stage the September 2002 COUp346 . Regardless of France's true motivations, it 
is clear that it's peacekeeping and peacemaking roles were inappropriate for an 
external power with such an involved history with the region. 
France's role in Cote d'Ivoire's crisis deepened significantly when nine of 
its peacekeepers were killed on 4 November 2004 in air strikes conducted by 
government forces and FANCI. Though the government insisted that the deaths 
were accidental, France's foreign minister, Michel Barnier, described the attacks 
342 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1464, 4 February 2003. 
34:1 MINUCI was established on 13 May 2003 in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1479. 
344 Gberie and Addo, p. 18. 
:145 "France Got them There," The Economist, 18 January 2003, p. 50. 
346 "A Bloody Mess in Cote d'I\'oire," The Economist, 11 November 2004. 
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as "inexplicable and unjustifiable", believing that a firm response by France was 
required in order to stop the violence:H7. France quickly and unexpectedly 
retaliated by destroying the entire Ivorian air force and seizing the international 
airport in Abidjan348 • Protests by Gbagbo supporters and attacks against French 
and Western expatriates increased but were met with French fire349 • This 
incident effectively transformed France's role from peacekeeper to active player 
in the conflict and discredited it significantly as an impartial actor capable of 
leading the peace effort. 
VI. The ECOWAS Intervention 
i) Peacemaking 
ECOWAS was the first organisation to intervene in Cote d'Ivoire's coup, as 
it had been in both Liberia and Sierra Leone. Its initial involvement was 
informed by AU and ECOWAS principles that view the unconstitutional change 
of government as intolerable35o . ECOW AS mediation efforts between the 
government and rebels began months before Linas-Marcoussis was brokered on 
30 September 2002 and resulted in the signing of a ceasefire on 17 October 2002 
by both the government and the MPCI. This was a significant diplomatic success 
for ECOWAS that restored dialogue between the government and rebels and was 
a first step towards ending the fighting in Cote d'Ivoire's conflict. 
347 Ibid. 
348 Ibid. 
349 Ibid. 
350 The AU Algiers Declaration of .July 1999 established a framework for reaction to this and the 
ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance prohibits the recognition of any gOYernment 
that comes to power by unconstitutional means. 
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ii) Peacekeeping 
ECOW AS' Defence and Security Commission first made recommendations 
for the immediate deployment of peacekeeping troops on 26 October 2002 in 
order to monitor the ceasefire, disarm the rebel groups, and ensure the 
disengagement of the insurgents. On 31 December 2002, the ECOWAS Peace 
Force for Cote d'Ivoire (ECOFORCE) was deployed with 1,500 troops from Benin, 
Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, and Togo. ECOMICI successfully re-opened 
corridors that allowed for the return of humanitarian workers and economic 
trade. As in Sierra Leone, ECOMICI also acted to protect and provide security to 
the Ivorian government, deploying in the capital as well as throughout the 
country. 
However, ECOMICI experienced many challenges in its operation that 
reflected the new circumstances in which ECOWAS and its security mechanism 
were functioning. Firstly, ECOWAS was not organisationally prepared to handle 
the Ivorian crisis. It had yet to implement the structural framework that could 
streamline its military ventures, leading to its continued ad hoc nature and to 
inefficiency. Indeed, the Executive Secretariat consisted of only two officers 
when the crisis began351 and the Force Commander was named less than two 
weeks before ECOMICI's full deployment. This made the operational 
implementation of the ECOWAS-brokered ceasefire highly dependent on the 
presence and cooperation of French troops. Secondly, ECOWAS members 
responded slowly to troop mobilisation. This was due in part to political changes 
v\'ithin its member-states that altered their ability to launch high-risk and high-
3.,1 Gberie and Addo, p. 22. 
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cost military intelTentions. Nigeria in particular, was unable to lead and sustain 
the military effort in Cote d'Ivoire as it had done in Liberia and Sierra Leone due 
to its own domestic political and security concerns. 
ECOMICI's greatest difficulty was again its modest financial, logistical, 
and military capability to carry out a large-scale multi-dimensional peace support 
operation. This reality has changed considerably little since ECOMOG's first 
attempt in Liberia over a decade ago. In Cote d'Ivoire, ECOMICI was able to rely 
on the French for its mobility and support; however, France's complex role in the 
conflict negatively affected ECOMICI's operational and political independence 
and its neutrality as a peacekeeping force. As Lansana Gberie and Prosper Addo 
note; "[i]t is mainly through the assistance of the French, the government of Cote 
d'Ivoire, and through personal contacts ofthe Force Commander ... that 
[ECOMICI] was able to build up slowly, to survive, and then succeed."352 It is 
clear that similar circumstances may not be available to ECOWAS in the future, 
and indeed the appropriateness of these circumstances is questionable. Thus, 
the wherewithal to undertake timely and effective peace operations is likely to 
remain the organisation's greatest problem for the near future. 
VII. The United Nations Operation 
In 2004, MINUCI was extended Chapter VII powers:353 and replaced by the 
new United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire (UNOC!). Authority was to be 
transferred from MINUCI and ECOMICI to UNOCI to implement a complex 
peace support mission. UNOCI's duties included monitoring the ceasefire and 
35" Gberie and Addo, p. 24. 
0.>1 United Nations, Security Council Resolution 1528, 27 February 2004. 
117 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
the movements of armed groups, providing support for the implementation of the 
peace process, and the DDR, repatriation, and resettlement former combatants. 
This mandate was to be carried out "in close liaison v,rith the United Nations 
missions in Sierra Leone and in Liberia"3s4. French forces were to be deployed 
alongside UNOCI and were thus mandated to "use all necessary means in order 
to support UNOCI"355 to help secure the area around international forces, to 
intel'Yene in support of UNOCI elements when their security is threatened, to 
intel'Yene against belligerents outside of UNOCI -controlled areas, and to protect 
civilians. 
South African President Thabo Mbeki moderated the Pretoria Agreement, 
which declared the immediate and final cessation of all hostilities and the end of 
the war throughout Cote d'Ivoire on 6 April 2005. By the end of the month, rebel 
forces began withdrawing heavy weapons from the frontline. Presidential 
elections were due to be held on 30 October 2005. However, at the time of 
v,Titing, elections were postponed until October 2007 due to continuing chril 
unrest and disputes over disarmament and national identity. 
Conclusion 
ECOWAS actively applied the adage "African solutions to African 
problems" when little international help or support was offered to tackle horrific 
and extensive regional wars. Many have questioned the benefits of this 
regionalisation in peacekeeping; however the actual quality of the responses, 
354 United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Operation in Cote d'Iyoire 
Mandate, paragraph f). A\'ailable at http://w\\w.ul1.org/clepts/dpko/missions/ulloci/manclate.html 
3,5 Ibid, paragraph x). 
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which remains dubious, overshadows questions on the desirability of a division of 
labour with the UN. Nevertheless, it is significant that ECOWAS intervened in its 
capacity as peacemaker, peacekeeper, and peace-enforcer in all three cases. 
Indeed, the organisation contributed considerably to ending civil war in Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire through its presence in these conflict zones. The 
diplomatic efforts of ECOWAS leaders in particular played a substantial role: in 
Liberia, it successfully negotiated a ceasefire in 1990 that lasted for two years, 
allowing ECOMOG troops to re-establish security for the distribution of 
humanitarian supplies; and in Sierra Leone, Charles Taylor, Olusegun Obasanjo, 
and Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema all played a crucial role in brokering the Lome 
Accords:156 . 
Having said this, these three cases expose significant problems with 
ECOW AS' ability to maintain security in its region. These are largely related to -
or stem - from the nature of regional relations in general and from problems 
within ECOWAS specifically. As the cases demonstrate, the support given to 
dissident factions by sub-regional leaders intending to destabilise neighbouring 
regimes obstructed ECOMOG's peace operations. Such intricate allegiances and 
vested interests make for a complex web of regional relations that undermined 
the moral authority and legitimacy of ECOWAS/ECOMOG efforts towards peace. 
These continuing traditional alliances will undoubtedly jeopardise future 
operations. 
Secondly, ECOMOG struggled significantly in all three cases to maintain 
its neutrality, credibility, and acceptance as a peacekeeping force. In both Liberia 
l56 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 98. 
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and Sierra Leone, it did little to conceal its preference for a certain side of the 
conflict and openly used force to compel rebel leaders to meet these ends:'''7. It 
was therefore dra\\TI into the conflict as an active participant while its role 
mutated from peacekeeping to peace-enforcer. In Cote d'Ivoire, its dependence 
on the French also compromised its perceived-neutrality. Adding to this was 
Nigeria's military and financial dominance over the operations, which further 
diminished the peacekeeping force's legitimacy. Such perceptions informed 
many ECOWAS members' actions and led to their conclusion that "ECOMOG .. .is 
nothing but a convenient camouflage for an effective Nigerian war machine."358 
In addition, various political changes within ECOWAS member-states in 
the latter half of the 1990S altered governments' ability to carry out high-risk and 
high-cost military interventions abroad. While some, such as Guinea, faced 
internal uprisings and financial crises, others were consolidating, or in transition 
to, democratic rule and found it increasingly difficult to justify the necessity of 
ECOMOG's actions to their people. As a result, the personnel crisis experienced 
by the UN also came to plague ECOMOG, as seen by its slow and inadequate 
troop contributions during its more recent intervention in Cote d'Ivoire. 
These regional factors affecting ECOWAS only accentuated facets of its 
internal obstacles. As a security mechanism, the organisation remains weak and 
institutionally inexperienced. As Zartman highlights, ECOW AS has been unable 
to create a system of norms to govern both the internal and international 
3"7 Nuamah Kwaku, and Zartman, 1. William, "Intervention in Sierra Leone," in Lahneman, 
William J., (ed.), Military Intervention: Cases in Context for the Twenty-First Century (Lanham: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004), p. 141. 
3SH Godwin, Prince E., "Where ECOMOG Went Wrong," New African 279 (December 1990), p. 3. 
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relations of the region's states and to serve as guidelines for regional conflict 
management:l~9. The far-reaching protocols ofthe ECOWAS Mechanism will take 
a significant amount of time and resources to be executed and have yet to be fully 
implemented. The result of this deficiency is evident: over a span of 17 years, all 
three cases were highly improvised and lacked a clear or adequate mandate. 
Thus, when the situation got difficult, ECOMOG struggled to respond decisively 
and was criticised for either using too little or too much force and for 
compromising its neutrality36o • 
Related to ECOW AS' limited organisational capacity is its scarce logistical, 
military, and resource capacity to successfully carry out large-scale complex 
peace missions. Kwaku Nuamah and Zartman rightly argue that ECOMOG's 
failure to control Taylor "before his rebellion had broken down into internecine 
warfare ... would have precluded the creation of a rebellion in neighbouring 
Sierra Leone."361 This failure, however, is not ECOMOG's alone. Indeed, the UN 
itself has struggled with similar complex operations as attempted by ECOWAS, 
whose members are amongst the poorest in the world. James Woods points to 
the US, stating that "[t]here is little doubt that the US naval-marine task force 
dispatched to Liberia could have intervened decisively to bring an early end to the 
Liberian civil war precipitated by Charles Taylor."362 Placing blame, however, 
does little to ameliorate the fact that the international community as a whole 
failed to act at the opportune time early in the Liberian conflict. This contributed 
359 Zartman, "Regional Conflict Management," in Diehl and Lepgold, p. 98. 
360 Adebajo, Building Peace, p. 138. 
361 Nuamah and Zartman in Lahneman, p. 142. 
:162 Woods, "U.S. Government Decisionmaking," in Clarke and Herbst, p. 172. 
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to the subsequent ci\i.l wars that overwhelmed the rest of the region into the 
twenty-first century, costing thousands oflives and the UN millions of dollars in 
its mop-up peace operations and humanitarian programmes. 
This leads to perhaps the more critical issue that the three cases underline: 
the importance of active UN support and collaboration with sub-regional peace 
efforts. Indeed, the UN's unwillingness to act and \Nidespread appeals for its 
reform in the early 1990S brought ECOMOG greater significance in the region. In 
all three instances, the world organisation belatedly, but necessarily, became 
involved and it was through concerted regional and international efforts that the 
conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone were brought to an end. The same should 
apply to Cote d'lvoire. Fortunately, ECOMOG's relationship with the UN has 
evolved considerably from the strains of its first experiment in Liberia363 in 1991 
through its partnership in Sierra Leone into the sequenced management of the 
recent crises in Liberia and Cote d'lvoire. These are indications that a larger and 
better partnership is growing. In 1997, the first UN peace-building office was 
established in Liberia and in 2002, the first regional peace-building office in the 
world, the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOW A) 364, was built. 
:163 Adibe, Clement, "The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership," in Weiss, Thomas 
G., (ed.), Beyond UN Subcontracting: Task-Sharing with Regional Security Arrangements and 
Seryice Proyiding NGOs (New York: st. Martin's Press, 1998), p. 80. 
364 United Nations, "The UN Office for West Africa." Available at 
http://\\ "\\. uII.org/linowa IUlIO\"a Ibc "-grdne\\" .pd f 
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Concluding Remarks 
Peacekeeping's sui generis character allowed the UN to adapt it as a 
conflict management tool in an array of diverse conflicts around the globe in the 
post-Cold War era. However, the nature and scope of Africa's humanitarian 
emergencies generated by conflicts at this time far exceeded the international 
community's will and capacity to respond to crises in a region of limited strategic 
value. Political selfishness and inaction by the world's major powers led to public 
peacekeeping failures in Somalia and Rwanda. At the same time, the stark 
absence of any adequate security structure within Africa itself capable of acting in 
the place of such international bad action prevented Africans from managing the 
conflicts on the continent. The results were unnecessary bloodshed and Africa's 
disappearance from the world's watch list for the remainder of the 1990S. 
Policy changes within the US in particular, codified in PDD-25 under 
President Clinton, paved the path for international military non-intervention in 
Africa's conflicts. Britain's military presence on the continent followed and 
France, fresh out of controversy in Rwanda, recalibrated its traditionally heavy-
handed ways as well. At the UN, former Secretary-General Boutros-Gali also 
called for a scaling back from the peacekeeping and interventionist resurgence of 
the immediate post-Cold War era in his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace. 
Crisis struck the UN, as calls for reform ensued, as well as financial, political, and 
logistical insufficiency, leading to delayed half-measures and a growing lack of 
consensus within the Security Council. Further inhibiting the organisation from 
greater involvement in Africa in particular was that the UN's most powerful 
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members seemed content for it to exist in this state of perpetual yolatility:,6s. 
Indeed, the diverse and often competing interests of the strongest members of 
the Security Council, who driye the UN's decisions, and hence, its actions, 
dominated and preYented any decisiye political or military inyolyement in Africa. 
Thus, according to Dr. Bruce Jones, this competition ""rithin and between 
governments relating to the institutional development of the UN was probably 
the most important factor driving the trend towards regional peacekeeping in the 
In Africa, this reassessment in the West allowed the continent's regional 
and sub-regional organisations to fill the security void left by Western powers. In 
West Africa specifically, ECOWAS contributed significantly to bringing peace to 
Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Cote d'Ivoire through its immediate military presence 
and diplomatic efforts. Though armed with a strong political ""rill to act and 'Arith 
significant peacekeeping experience amongst its members, the region's political 
dynamics greatly restricted the organisation's ability to manoemTe freely and 
effectively. Moreover, ECOWAS' organisational, financial, and military 
deficiencies were even more stretched than at the global level and were only 
accentuated by the regional context in which it operated. 
As a substitute for actual multilateral military engagement through the 
UN, the US, Britain, and France chose to engage in their former colonies 
unilaterally, outside of a UN peace operation and mounted programmes directed 
at enhancing the operational capability oftheir former African client-states and 
l65 Williams, Paul D., "International Peacekeeping: The Challenges of State-building and 
Regionalisation," International Affairs 81:1 (2005): 163-174, p. 171. 
306 Jones and Cherif, p. 19. 
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colonies to launch peace operations independently. The unilateral military 
expeditions launched by Britain and France in Sierra Leone and Cote d'lvoire 
respectively, differed considerably based on the interests and approaches of the 
two major powers. The British operation worked alongside and bolstered the 
UN. Their mission was quickly developed into a broader long-term peace-
building process that saw British troops remaining in Sierra Leone for years to 
build-up and train the new police and army, as per their wider peacekeeping 
doctrine. In Cote d'lvoire, France's controversial attack on FANCI and its 
military involvement indicated a reversion to colonial-era policies, and criticisms 
were quickly drawn. Its actions did little to quell suspicions over its economic 
and political objectives in its former colony. Indeed the varying results of these 
interventions demonstrate that the unilateral involvement of former colonial 
powers in contemporary conflicts can be extremely controversial and 
inappropriate, particularly when measures are taken ",,'ithout the consent and 
legitimacy of the UN. 
With regards to the various assistance programmes funded by the major 
powers directed towards Africa, these have generally failed to address the basic 
lack of logistical, administrative, and military capability among ECOW AS 
member-states. They are therefore fundamentally flawed because the financial 
and military support that is provided is merely a short term solution based on 
donor countries' perceptions of what is needed by the recipients. Moreover, these 
programmes ignore the role, and importance, of the UN and Africa's and sub-
regional organisations, focusing instead on bilateral relations with individual 
African states. This is perhaps one of the greater flaws ofthe programmes, for 
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they fail to recognise the value of Africa's indigenous organisations. It also 
demonstrates that it is not capability or financial and military resources that are 
lacking, but rather the political will to act: and primarily in UN-led multilateral 
operations. Unfortunately, it is unlikely and regrettable that this arm's length 
commitment will change as long as Western powers do not feel directly 
threatened by conflicts in Africa, a stance that is increasingly difficult to morally 
defend when the international community is trying to enforce general 
humanitarian standards under multilateral authority. 
However, the three cases examined offer some hope, for ECOWAS and 
ECOMOG's relationship with the UN and external powers have evolved 
considerably from the first unilateral mission in Liberia in 1990 into a greater 
partnership, as seen in the later cases of Sierra Leone and Cote d'!voire. Thus, a 
linear progression of cooperation between ECOWAS, the UN, and the major 
powers involved in conflict management within the region can be seen: UN and 
regional troops have operated side-by-side in a coordinated fashion, as in Sierra 
Leone and Cote d'!voire; UN troops have preceded or followed a regional force, as 
in Liberia and Sierra Leone; and regional, UN, and national troops have operated 
in an integrated fashion. Such hybrid regional peace operations, characterised by 
greater cooperation and coordination between regional organisations, the UN, 
and major powers, have undoubtedly facilited the response and expanded the 
quality of this response to conflicts in West Africa. It gives credence to the 
argument that it is "no longer a case of either regional operations or UN 
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operations" but rather a time for a "smarter partnership" betv\'een regional and 
international institutions;,67. 
Institutional developments, as exemplified by ECOW AS' Protocol Relating 
to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, 
Peacekeeping, and Security, have also occurred within ECOWAS itself, which 
could also help to ameliorate the quality of regional responses to crises. 
However, the implementation of the Mechanism has been delayed to emergency 
responses to ongoing conflicts in the region. The organisation also remains 
institutionally weak, as the majority of its operations have been ad hoc and in 
need of greater substantial political, military, and logistical wherewithal. The 
security wing can only be as effective as the strength of its political structure, and 
this currently lacks, among other things, adequate financing, political authority, 
and enforcement capability as well as a peacekeeping doctrine to carry out the 
complex peace operations that are necessary to manage the conflicts in the 
region. Clearly, this is due to the struggle of many of the organisation's members 
to effectively control their territories and to fight extreme poverty within their 
borders. Political and military institutional procedures that are able to reinforce 
the greater organisation are therefore absent and this inherently weakens 
ECOW AS' security capabilities. 
For these reasons, concerns regarding ECOMOG's long-term affordability 
and sustainability are serious and need to be appropriately addressed. ECOWAS 
must move away from its current ad hoc arrangement to a more permanent 
J6- Malan, Mark, "Building African Capacity for Peace Operations: PerspectiYes from West Africa," 
draft discussion paper for a roundtable at the Henry L. Stimson Centre. (9 December 2004), p. 3. 
Ayailable at http:((mlw.stimson.org(fopo(pdf(ma]an-paper.pdf 
127 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
structure that encourages sustained military cooperation to enable it to develop 
more effective peace operations. This would require greater cooperation and 
burden-sharing between member-states and would also necessitate states to 
transfer more loyalty and authority to the regional organisation so that it could 
exercise greater regional influence and control. 
Recent developments on the continent at the regional level may also 
contribute to strengthening ECOWAS' conflict management capabilities. As 
previously stated, ECOMOG's role has primarily developed into an interim one in 
peace operations, where the sub-regional organisation's initial emergency 
response is handed to a UN-led multi-functional mission. Indeed, this same 
principle is outlined in the AU's African Standby Force (ASF) Policy Framework 
and has undoubtedly influenced ECOWAS' approach to its development of these 
standby forces368 . Thus, in accordance with this framework, the ECOWAS 
Defense and Security Commission has taken the lead in establishing a West 
African Standby Force of 6,500 soldiers that are able to be deployed rapidly in 
response to crises or threats to the sub-region's peace and security. 
For ECOWAS, this development within the AU and its Peace and Security 
Council should lead to better support from both the regional and international 
levels. Indeed, Britain has already pledged to help develop a peacekeeping 
doctrine for the West African Standby Forces. However, the capacity of ECOWAS 
members to provide more troops remains severely stretched. Moreover, it is 
national capacity and political will that will determine the availability of trained 
1(" Cilliers, Jakkie, and Malan, Mark, "Progress with the African Standby Force," ISS Occasional Paper 
98 (May 2005). Ayailable at http://I\'\\w.iss.org.za/pubs/papers/g8/Paper98.htm 
128 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
and equipped personnel. Thus, improving the number and quality of responses 
for peace operations.v,;ll most effectively be achieved by supporting national 
capacity-building programmes, which will be strengthened if tied \\;th a regional 
approach. 
In West Africa, significant progress has been made towards establishing a 
real capability for peace operations in the region. However, the gap between 
aspiration and implementation remains extremely wide: although framework 
documents and protocols have been created and institutional structures are being 
built, operational capacity remains limited in the face of rising demands and 
expectations. Ultimately, ECOW AS still lacks institutional expertise and capacity 
and is comprised of some of the world's least developed countries. Therefore, 
realism over what can be achieved in the short term by the organisation is 
required. Thus, building effective peacekeeping capacity in West Africa, and 
indeed Africa, will require time and a continued commitment from Africa's many 
organisations, the UN, and major powers. 
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List of Acronyms 
ACOTA 
ACPP 
AFL 
AFRC 
ANAD 
APC 
AFS 
AU 
CAR 
CEMAC 
CFA 
CPA 
DDR 
DRC 
ECOBRIG 
ECOFORCE 
ECOMICI 
ECOMIL 
ECOMOG 
ECOWAS 
EO 
FANCI 
FAR 
FLGO 
FPI 
FSCO 
GDP 
GPOI 
GPP 
ICG 
IGNU 
INPFL 
IPA 
LNTG 
LPC 
LUDF 
LURD 
MJP 
MINUCI 
MODEL 
MPCI 
MPIGO 
MRLM 
African Contingency Operations Training and 
Assistance programme 
African Conflict Prevention Pool 
Armed Forces of Liberia 
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
Treaty of Non-Aggression Assistance and Mutual Defense 
All People's Congress 
African Standby Force 
African Union 
Central African Republic 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa 
Communaute economique de ['afrique de l'ouest 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
ECOWAS Standby Brigade 
ECOMOG Force in Cote d'Ivoire 
ECOWAS Mission in Cote d'Ivoire 
ECOWAS Mission in Liberia 
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring 
Group 
Economic Community of West African States 
Executive Outcomes 
Forces armees nationales du Cote d'Ivoire 
forces armees rwandaises 
Front pour la liberation du grand-ouest 
Front populaire ivoirien 
Front pour la securite du centre-ouest 
gross domestic product 
Global Peace Operations Initiative 
Groupe de patriotes pour la paix 
International Crisis Group 
Interim Government of National Unity 
Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
International Peace Academy 
Liberian National Transitional Government 
Liberian Peace Council 
Liberian United Defence Force 
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy 
Movement for Justice and Peace 
United Nations Mission in Cote d'Ivoire 
Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
Mouvement patriotique du Cote d'Ivoire 
Mouvement populaire du grand-ouest 
Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Muslims 
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OECD 
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PDCI 
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RPF 
RUF 
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SLPP 
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UK 
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UN 
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UNAMSIL 
UNAVEM 
UNDPKO 
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UNITAF 
UNMIL 
UNOCI 
UNOMIL 
UNOMSIL 
UNOSOM 
UNOWA 
US(A) 
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
Nouvelles Forces 
Organisation for African Unity 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Operation des nations-unies du Congo 
Partie democratique du Cote d'Ivoire 
Presidential Decision Directive-25 
private military com pany 
Rassemblement des republicains 
Renforcement des capacites de la maintien de la paix 
Rwandan Patriotic Front 
Revolutionary United Front 
Southern African Development Community 
Sierra Leone Army 
Sierra Leone People's Party 
Standing Mediation Committee 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
United Kingdom 
United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
United Nations 
United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda 
United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone 
United Nations Angola Verification Mission 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon 
United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan 
United Nations Task Force 
United Nations Mission in Liberia 
United Nations Operation in Cote d'Ivoire 
United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia 
United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 
United Nations Operation in Somalia 
United Nations Office for West Africa 
United States (of America) 
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